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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics, and international affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

Regular membership: one year, $42.00; two years, $76.00; three years, $100.00; student, $27.00 a year. Libraries and institutions $193.00 a year. Periodicals postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Foreign postage is $8.00 additional per year. Volume 116 Number 2, Summer 2001. Special membership: contributing, $75; fellow, $150; patron, $250; benefactor, $1,000. *Contributions are tax deductible.* Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to Loren Morales, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; fax: 212-870-2202.

PREPARATION OF ARTICLE MANUSCRIPTS: *PSQ* is a fully refereed journal. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout in 12 point type and submitted in triplicate with a 200 word abstract. Place all tables, figures, and notes at the end of manuscript. Manuscripts over 40 pages will not be refereed. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES: University Microfilms has *PSQ* on CD-ROM dating from 1989 in their *General Periodicals on Disc* and the *Social Science Index on Disc*. Information Access Company produces *PSQ* full-text on their *Academic Index* dating from 1993. JSTOR archives the full-text of *PSQ* articles and book reviews from 1886 to 1994 online at http://www.jstor.org.

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ORDERS: Back issues of *PSQ* and reprints of articles may be ordered from the Academy. Single issue when available, $12.50; single article, $10.50. Checks should be made payable in U.S. dollars to the Academy of Political Science. Credit cards accepted: American Express, MasterCard, and Visa.

Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JEROME SLATER examines the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 2000 and argues provocatively that contrary to the prevailing view, it is Israel rather than the Palestinians that bears the primary responsibility, not only for the latest breakdown but for the entire course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948.

GERALD M. POMPER asserts that the presidential election of 2000 represents a paradox of democracy, distinctive in the eventual victory of the candidate with fewer popular votes and the decisive intervention of the Supreme Court. The results show sharp divisions among the electorate, both geographically and socially, as well as a unique Republican advantage in the "gender gap." The election carries important implications for the future of the presidency, the electoral college, and the stability of American democracy.

BARBARA FARNHAM examines President Ronald Reagan's reevaluation of the Soviet threat in light of the policy changes instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev. This presents a puzzle, because the psychological literature strongly suggests that people alter their central beliefs with great difficulty, if at all. Farnham describes Reagan's decision-making characteristics that allowed him to reevaluate his perception of threat when many others did not.

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN and FRANÇOIS VERGNIOLLE DE CHANTAL analyze the core tenets of the Supreme Court's emerging doctrines of judicial federalism under Chief Justice William Rehnquist. They assess the significance of these cases for the operation of contemporary American federalism, and consider their implications for the judiciary's role in the U.S. constitutional framework.

FIONA B. ADAMSON examines the relationship between democratization and war through a study of Turkish foreign policy making during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. She finds that, contrary to the claims of the democratic peace literature, elections and increased popular participation did not facilitate but rather inhibited a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

JEROME SLATER

With the election of Ariel Sharon and the Palestinian turn from revolution to terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process," which managed to go on for over ten years without producing peace, has degenerated into major violence. It is critically important that the reasons for this catastrophe be properly analyzed, for sooner or later there will be a resumption of negotiations, and the lessons of this failure must be understood.

Contrary to the prevailing view, Israel rather than the Palestinians bears the greater share of the responsibility, not only for the latest breakdown of the peace process but for the entire course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948. And U.S. economic and military assistance, along with America's nearly unconditional political and diplomatic support of Israel, has enabled Israel to disregard the legitimate interests and demands for moral justice of the Palestinians, as well as the potential constraints of regional power and international opinion. Well-intentioned but unwise U.S. support of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians has also enabled Israel to disregard its own best interests.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From 1948 to Oslo, 1993

According to the conventional Israeli historical narrative, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the consequence of seventy-five years of mindless Arab hatred of the Jews and an Arab unwillingness to match the Jewish effort to reach a fair compromise over the ancient land of Palestine. The Palestinian conflict with the Zionists then escalated into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict when the Arabs rejected the 1947 United Nations partition plan, which provided for the division

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of Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs and the creation of the State of Israel. In a continuing spirit of compromise, the conventional history holds, the Zionist leadership accepted the UN plan, but the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab states rejected it and launched an unprovoked invasion designed to destroy the new Israeli state. In the course of the ensuing war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living within Israel's boundaries fled to the neighboring Arab states, ordered or urged to do so by the invading Arab armies; the Zionists, by contrast, had urged the Palestinians not to leave, for they sought to demonstrate that the Palestinians and Israelis could live side by side within a Jewish state.

After the 1948 war, the story continues, Israel remained willing to settle the conflict on the basis of compromise, but they could find no Palestinian or other Arab leaders with whom to negotiate. As Abba Eban famously put it, "The Arabs never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity." The refugee issue remained unresolved, largely because it suited the cynical purposes of the Arab states to keep it festering; the result was the creation of Palestinian guerrilla terrorism, aided by the neighboring Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria. This local and international terrorism led in turn to new Arab-Israeli wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973, all of them forced on Israel by Arab aggression.

This wall of monolithic Arab hostility was not breached, the narrative asserts, until Anwar Sadat of Egypt decided to make peace with Israel in the late 1970s, followed twenty years later by another Arab leader, King Hussein of Jordan. But even today the overall Arab-Israeli conflict continues, because neither the Palestinians nor the rest of the Arab states are willing to accept fair compromises.

So goes the conventional history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. No matter how sincerely and deeply held, historical narratives are not always accurate, and the mythology they create can have devastating consequences. The Israeli narrative significantly distorts and oversimplifies the historical reality. The unwillingness of most Israelis to reassess their mythology is the fundamental reason for the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could even escalate into another general Arab-Israeli war. And the continued grip of the conventional mythology on the American Jewish community also contributes to the problem, because of the influence that community (of which, perhaps I should add, I am a member) has had on U.S. foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the past fifteen years, there has been a remarkable burst of historical scholarship, most of it by Israeli academicians and journalists, on the origins and dynamics of the Arab-Israel conflict. The Israeli "new history," as it has come to be known, has decisively refuted the conventional historiography and compelled a sweeping reassessment of the entire course of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1] In its essentials, the revised history holds that the Palestinian-Israeli

[1] The new history is now so extensive that a complete citation of the major works is beyond the scope of this article. However, the most important and influential books are Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel* (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,*

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conflict is rooted not in mindless Arab anti-Semitism but in Zionism's insistence that a Jewish state must be created in Palestine, despite the fact that for over 1,300 years it had been overwhelmingly inhabited by Arabs, who in the twentieth century sought political independence in and sovereignty over their homeland. In Palestinian eyes, this history far outweighs the Jewish claim to Palestine, which is ultimately based on the biblical account in which God promised the land of Palestine to the Jews, who subsequently conquered, inhabited, and ruled that land until they in turn were conquered and expelled by the Roman Empire two thousand years ago.

To be sure, the Jewish claim to Palestine is also based on the British Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised a national homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people. However, the Balfour Declaration did not promise Jewish sovereignty over Palestine; and in any case, the Palestinians argue, it was simply a unilateral imposition of British colonialism, which ignored the wishes and political rights of the indigenous peoples.

Be that as it may, the rise of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust radically changed the moral equation, because it made the case for a Jewish state both urgent and irrefutable, and by then there was no other practicable site for such a state other than Palestine. Even so, argued the Palestinians, they were not responsible for the Holocaust and should not be made to pay the price for western anti-Semitism. In any case, when Britain began allowing Jewish immigration into Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s, it met with violent Arab resistance and terrorism—which in turn engendered Jewish counterviolence and terrorism. This violence convinced the British and later the UN that Palestine had to be partitioned. As the new historians point out, however, the Arab rejection of this compromise was based not only on their insistence on 100 percent of their political rights, but also on their belief—which turned out to be correct—that the Zionist leadership would not be satisfied with or abide by a compromise.

The evidence is now irrefutable that David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, and the other leading Zionists "accepted" the UN compromise only as a necessary tactical step that would later be reversed, a base from which Israel would later expand to include all of biblical Palestine. In many private statements, Ben-Gurion was quite explicit, as in a 1937 letter to his son: "A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning. The establishment of such a Jewish state will serve as a means in our historical efforts to redeem the country in its entirety. . . . We shall organize a modern defense force . . . and then I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some

1947–51 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1992); Tom Segev, *1949: The First Israelis* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); and Shlaim, *The Iron Wall* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

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other means. . . . We will expel the Arabs and take their places . . . with the force at our disposal."[2]

A year later, Ben-Gurion told a Zionist meeting: "I favor partition of the country because when we become a strong power after the establishment of the state, we will abolish partition and spread throughout all of Palestine."[3] And "Palestine," as understood by the Zionists, included the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, and much of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. After 1947, Ben-Gurion acted on this philosophy, both in the expulsion of the Palestinians and in Israeli expansionism, for in subsequent years the Israelis took advantage of wars to seize all of those areas.

In any case, the Zionist acceptance of the UN partition plan was limited to only part of the plan—the part that established the state of Israel. The other core element of the UN plan—and of every other serious compromise plan for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1947 to this moment—was the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel. Not only did the Zionists reject such a compromise, they worked actively to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state in 1948 and for the next fifty years. Despite the widespread misperception that Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians "generous" peace proposals at Camp David, Israel is still resisting the creation of a genuinely viable and independent Palestinian state.

The Expulsion of the Palestinians

In the received mythology, Israel bears no responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, for it is said to have been created entirely as a consequence of Palestinian rejectionism and the Arab invasion of 1948. No part of the historical mythology has been so devastatingly refuted by the Israeli new history as this. In fact, the expulsion of the Palestinians began well before the Arab invasion and continued after the Israeli victory, for it was a direct consequence of thirty years of private Zionist discussions about the necessity for "transferring" the Palestinians out of the country when the opportunity arose. Beginning in 1947, the Israeli army began implementing a detailed strategic plan (Plan D) for dealing with the Palestinians, especially but by no means exclusively those who were actively resisting the Israelis. The plan called for the "destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously," and "mounting [of] operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and . . . in the event of resistance . . . the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state."[4]

[2] Quoted by Michael Bar-Zohar in his revealing biography of Ben-Gurion, *Facing a Cruel Mirror* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990).

[3] Quoted in Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, 24

[4] The full text of Plan D was published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18 (Autumn 1988). Many of the Israeli participants have provided details in memoirs or interviews, the best known of which was Yitzhak Rabin's memoirs, in which he wrote that after he led an army unit into a Palestinian village

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That's what was officially written down. In fact, there were many Israeli murders, political assassinations, and even wholesale massacres including women and children that went beyond the guidelines, some by so-called "uncontrollable" groups like the Irgun, but some even by regular Israeli army units. The general frame of mind was revealed in a memo of Ezra Dannin, the Israeli government adviser on Arab affairs: "If the High Command believes that by destruction, killing, and human suffering its aims will be achieved faster, then I would not stand in its way. If we don't hurry up, our enemies will do the same things to us."[5] In the wake of the expulsions or the terrified flights of entire Palestinian villages who could see what fate might await them, the army moved in, either bulldozing the abandoned villages to the ground or housing incoming Jewish immigrants in them.

In short, there is now irrefutable evidence that most of the Palestinians who became refugees from Israel in the 1947–1949 period did so because they were either forcibly expelled or fled as a result of Israeli psychological warfare, economic pressures, artillery bombardments, terrorism, and massacres, all carried out, as one leading scholar has put it, "under a general umbrella of protection and encouragement from Ben-Gurion and other political leaders. . . ."[6] The expulsion of the Palestinians created the refugee problem that festers to this day and led to the emergence of Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) movement in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. When the PLO began crossborder guerrilla raids on Israel, the Israelis retaliated in massive fashion, and the ensuing vicious circle of conflict precipitated the 1956 Arab-Israeli Suez War, the 1967 War, and the Israeli invasions of Lebanon, especially in 1982.

It all might have been avoided had Israel genuinely sought to compromise with the Palestinians in 1947–1948. Had there been such a Zionist-Palestinian compromise and had Israel refrained from expelling the Palestinians, it is likely that there would have been no 1948 Arab state invasion of Israel and no subsequent overall Arab-Israeli conflict. But Israel didn't want to compromise with the Palestinians, let alone allow the creation of a Palestinian state in any part of "Greater Israel." What it sought to do was, in the Israeli vernacular, "to create facts on the ground" and to force the Palestinians out of their homeland—by whatever means necessary, and regardless of the long-term consequences of such behavior.

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he asked Ben-Gurion: "What is to be done with the population?" Ben-Gurion responded with a "wave of his hand, in a gesture which clearly meant 'Drive them out.' " Israeli censors deleted this passage from the English translation of Rabin's memoirs, but it was revealed by the *New York Times*, 29 October 1979.

[5] Dannin is quoted by David Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch* (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1983), 36. For further evidence of direct Israeli government complicity in the massacres, see Benny Morris, "Falsifying the Record," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 24 (Spring 1995); and Tom Segev, "What Really Happened in the Conquest of Lod?" *Ha'aretz*, 12 May 2000.

[6] Ian Lustick, *Israeli Studies Bulletin* 13 (Fall 1997): 17.

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The Oslo Process

In the early years after its formation, Arafat's PLO was clearly maximalist: it insisted on the complete "liberation" of all of Palestine—meaning the destruction of Israel. However, as early as the late 1960s, this rejectionist position began giving way—albeit tentatively, ambiguously, and inconsistently—to a willingness to seek a two-state diplomatic solution with Israel. Nothing came of this, however, because Israel was not interested in exploring the emerging indications of Palestinian pragmatism, ignored all overtures, and refused even to talk with the PLO, let alone compromise with it.

Even more importantly, the Israeli Labor governments of the 1960s and 1970s, headed by Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres, began the process of creating Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, purposely placed in areas that would separate Palestinian cities and villages, so as to make impossible the creation of a viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian state.

Nonetheless, the PLO's position continued to evolve until in November 1988 it officially accepted a two-state solution of its conflict with Israel. Under the terms of the PLO commitment, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, would agree to be largely demilitarized, would accept the stationing of international peacekeeping forces along its borders with Israel, would end terrorism and all forms of attack on Israel from its territory, would refrain from alliances with Arab rejectionist states, and in all probability would agree to a settlement of the refugee problem on the basis of a token return to Israel, combined with large-scale international economic compensation of the refugees and their resettlement in the Arab world.[7]

The first meaningful agreement between Israel and the PLO was the Oslo accords of September 1993, negotiated by Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel. The accords called for the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, and a five year transitional period under which Israel would gradually withdraw its troops and administrative structures from the major Palestinian population centers in favor of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the interim Palestinian government until an independent state was established. At the end of the transitional period, there would be a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories conquered in 1967. In turn, Arafat promised to end anti-Israeli violence in the occupied territories and even to directly cooperate with Israeli security forces.

Although the Oslo accords did not quite specify that a permanent settlement must include the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, there was no doubt that this was the universal expectation of the Palestinians, the international community, and of both the Israeli government and public opin-

[7] The official Palestinian position was articulated in detail in a number of ways. For a full discussion, see the historic article by Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), then the second-ranking PLO leader, "Lowering the Sword," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990).

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ion. The achilles heel of Oslo was that it postponed the most difficult issues—the borders of the Palestinian state, the Israeli settlements, the Jerusalem problem, the division of West Bank water, and the refugee issue—until the final settlement that was to have been negotiated by May 1999. Thus, the Israelis were not required to remove any settlements or even to stop their expansion and the building of new ones, both in the territories and in East Jerusalem. Even so, it was clear that continued settlement expansion would not only be inconsistent with the spirit of Oslo, it would nullify the end goal of Palestinian independence.

Arafat was severely criticized by many Palestinians for these gaping loopholes in the Oslo agreements, and in retrospect the critics were correct. Yet, because Israel held all the cards and Rabin refused to go any further, it is hard to see what options were available to Arafat, other than to hope that the Israeli position would continue to evolve over time, so long as he kept the peace within Palestinian-controlled areas. What perhaps could not be foreseen was the extent to which Rabin remained committed to a hardline position that in effect would prevent any truly viable independent Palestinian state from being created. In the next few years, in a variety of ways, Rabin and his successor Shimon Peres violated the spirit of Oslo and even the letter of a number of the agreements.

Two years after the Oslo agreements were signed, Rabin announced his detailed plans for a permanent settlement with the Palestinians: there would no return to the pre-1967 borders; a united Jerusalem, including the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, would remain under exclusive Israeli sovereignty; most of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza would remain there, under Israeli sovereignty; free access to and military control over the settlements would be assured by a series of new roads to be built throughout the territories; Israel's security border "in the broadest meaning of that term" would be the Jordan River, meaning that Israel would retain settlements and military bases in the Jordan River valley, deep inside Palestinian territory. What the Palestinians would get was an "entity" that would be the "home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. . . . We would like this to be . . . less than a state."[8]

In the next year, Rabin began implementing this peace plan, under which the Palestinians would end up with a series of isolated enclaves on less than 50 percent of the West Bank and Gaza, cut off from each other and surrounded by Israeli settlers and military bases. Jewish settlement in an ever-expanding Jerusalem continued, including in Arab areas, and the massive road building project got under way, often requiring the confiscation and destruction of Palestinian homes and orchards.

Astonishingly, under Rabin the growth of the Jewish settlements was greater than it had been under the previous hardline Likud government of Yitz-

[8] Speech to Knesset of 5 October 1995, printed in *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* 5 (November 1995).

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hak Shamir. And even the most fanatical settlements, located in the heart of heavily Palestinian areas and presumably destined to be removed in a permanent agreement, were maintained. Rabin rejected the recommendation of his own cabinet to remove the small settlement in the Palestinian city of Hebron, following the massacre by a Jewish fanatic of twenty-seven Palestinians praying in a mosque.

Even the letter of the Oslo accords was often disregarded by the Rabin government: Palestinian prisoners that Israel had committed itself to release remained in jail; the promised Palestinian air field in Gaza was delayed; detailed provisions for free Palestinian passageway between Gaza and the West Bank, as well as free movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the territories, were often violated by Israeli closures that caused great personal and economic hardship; Palestinians living outside Jerusalem were often prevented from attending services at the Muslim mosques on the Temple Mount; Israel often did not comply with scheduled partial troop withdrawals; and tax and custom revenues that were to have been transferred by Israel to the Palestinian Authority were frequently held up.

Yet, throughout the Rabin period the PA complied with its obligation to do its best to end terrorism, perhaps excepting a brief period following the Hebron massacre. And it did so with great (though not total) success, as the Palestinian security forces under Arafat worked hand in hand with Israeli security forces, often in joint patrols, to identify and jail extremists and suspected terrorists, some of them from lists drawn up by the Israelis.

After Rabin's assassination and the accession of Shimon Peres, Israeli policy became even harder. There are indications that at the very end of his life, Rabin's position was softening, for his private and even some of his public statements showed far more empathy with the plight of the Palestinians. It was increasingly evident he had dropped his opposition to the creation of some kind of Palestinian state. Peres, though, stepped up the process of settlement expansion and road building and continued to oppose Palestinian statehood.[9] In the spring of 1996, Peres authorized the assassination of a Palestinian activist accused of terrorism; in retaliation, Palestinian fundamentalists killed dozens of Israelis in a series of urban bombings. Following the bombings and a disastrous Israeli intervention in southern Lebanon, the largest since 1982, the Israeli public turned against Peres and elected Benjamin Netanyahu.

Under Netanyahu, after one further small Israeli withdrawal, the Oslo process effectively came to an end: by May 1999, when the transition process was

[9] In March 1997, Yossi Beilin, one of Israel's leading doves and an adviser to Peres, said that whereas Rabin had envisaged a limited Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, Peres wanted Palestinian sovereignty to be limited to Gaza, with some kind of joint Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian rule over the West Bank. (Interview in *Ha'aretz*, 7 March 1997). Similarly, Yossi Sarid, head of Israel's moderate left Meretz political party, has said that Peres's plan for the West Bank was "little different from Ariel Sharon," and amounted to mere "cantonization." Quoted in Report of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Israeli-Palestinian Security*, 1995.

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supposed to have been completed, the Israeli occupation over most of the West Bank and Gaza was still in force, Netanyahu had reneged on any further troop withdrawals, the settlement process was continuing, Israel was tightening its grip on East Jerusalem, the road network was expanding, economic closures of the territories had become more draconic and more frequent, and Netanyahu refused to enter into the Oslo-required negotiations for a permanent settlement.[10]

Barak and the Peace Process

By the time Ehud Barak took office in 1999, not only were Israel's actions nullifying the Oslo process, but they had also gravely undermined Arafat's position among the Palestinians, who were now in worse shape—politically, economically, and psychologically—than they had been when the agreements were signed in 1993. Even so, after the 1996 retaliatory bus bombings, the Palestinian Authority (working closely with Israeli security forces) successfully cracked down on terrorist groups and Islamic extremists; as a result, in 1999 there were only two Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian terrorism, the lowest since 1987.[11]

Barak's performance in office was so strange that it does not seem an exaggeration to term it schizoid. It is true that at Camp David he went considerably further than any other Israeli prime minister in making concessions to the Palestinians. But not only did his proposals still fall considerably short of what was necessary to make peace, in both his rhetoric and his actions he continuously subverted his own peace plan and the rational analysis on which it was based. In several interviews, Barak has provided what is perhaps the best explanation for his behavior: he was seriously divided against himself. "Emotionally, I feel like a right-winger," he has admitted, "but in my head I'm realistic, pragmatic."[12] Until he came into office, Barak had long been a hardliner. As chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces in 1993, he had opposed the Oslo agreements, and throughout the 1990s his conception of a settlement with the Palestinians differed in no fundamental way from Netanyahu's or, for that matter, from Ariel Sharon's: if a Palestinian state became unavoidable, it would be allowed only in Gaza and about half the West Bank, with Israel continuing to exercise sovereignty and military control over the remainder, including the settlements, the Jordan Valley, all of Jerusalem, and most or all of the water aquifers.

Even after his election, Barak continued to reveal his ideological predispositions in his repeated references to the West Bank as "Judea and Samaria" and

[10] In 1996, Ze'ev Schiff, Israel's leading centrist security analyst, wrote that "not one promise made to the Palestinians has been fulfilled" by Netanyahu, who also continuously subjected Arafat to "humiliation and degradation." *New York Times*, 30 August 1996.

[11] David Makovsky, "Middle East Peace Through Partition," *Foreign Affairs* 80 (March/April 2001): 38. According to the Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein, as a result of Arafat's crackdown, "almost the entire military arm of Hamas has been eliminated, extremist Muslim activists were imprisoned, and the organizational infrastructure of the Islamic movements was seriously weakened." See *Ha'aretz*, 12 March 2001.

[12] Interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, "Arafat's Gift," *New Yorker*, 29 January 2001, 66.

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his comment on "the struggle of the State of Israel to rule over Greater Israel"; in his constant denigration of the Israeli Left and his admission that he felt closer to the pro-settlement National Religious Party than to Meretz, the home of most of the Israeli peace camp; and his "warm personal greetings" to the most fanatical and violent of the Jewish settlers in Hebron.[13]

Moreover, Barak had a barely concealed contempt for the Arabs, an attitude that, together with his arrogance and authoritarian personality, undermined his direct negotiations with Arafat. "Israel is a villa in the middle of a jungle," he often proclaimed, a "protective wall" for the West, a "vanguard of culture against barbarism." According to him, it was "Arab culture" that prevented an agreement at Camp David: "It is because of the character of the Arab discourse that their culture does not contain the concept of compromise. Compromise is apparently a Western concept of settling disputes."[14] Evidently it had slipped Barak's mind that it was Arab leaders like Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Kings Abdullah and Hussein of Jordan, and Hafaz Assad of Syria who reached and maintained compromise agreements with an Israel that was far more reluctant to sign them than were the Arabs.

Yet, up to a point, Barak was willing to act against his own predispositions, because his pragmatic, realistic side convinced him that for two reasons Israel had to settle with the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world. First, he had come to believe that it was no longer possible for Israel to rule over another people without continued violence and the eventual destruction of Israeli democracy itself. Even more importantly, Barak is one of the few Israeli leaders to have publicly acknowledged the intolerable dangers to Israel of war with an Arab world that is increasingly likely to acquire weapons of mass destruction: "Israel is galloping toward disaster . . . [I]f we do not reach a solution and the window of opportunity closes, we will find ourselves in a very sharp deterioration. It is impossible to set a timetable. It is impossible to know exactly what the trigger will be. Large-scale terrorist attacks . . . or a fundamentalist wave of operations against us—which the Americans and the rest of the world will be wary of dealing with for fear of their own interests—and with simple nuclear instruments and means of launching in Arab states in the background. . . . Therefore, I understand that we have an interest of a very high order in trying to reach agreements now."[15]

It is hard to reconcile Barak's understanding of these realities with his behavior, which destroyed the chances for a settlement: he refused to carry out the phased withdrawals of Israeli troops required by the Oslo and subsequent signed agreements, he failed to implement his promise to the Palestinians to withdraw from several Arab villages neighboring Jerusalem, he imposed re-

[13] See especially the op ed column of Amira Hass in *Ha'aretz*, 21 December 1999. "Barak's jargon," Hass wrote, "is identical to that of Gush Emunim," the far-right fundamentalist settler movement.

[14] Interview with Ari Shavit, *Ha'aretz*, 2 February 2001.

[15] Barak first pointed to the looming nuclear danger as requiring an Arab-Israeli settlement in an interview in the *Jerusalem Post*, 24 September 1999; the more recent quote is from the Shavit interview.

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peated closures and economic hardship on the Palestinians, and he authorized a continuation of Israeli roadbuilding, land confiscations, and settlement expansion in both East Jerusalem and elsewhere on the West Bank at the greatest rate since 1992, exceeding even that of the Netanyahu government.[16] Even as he was meeting with Arafat at Camp David, Barak was preparing a new Israeli government budget for 2001 that included increased subsidies of various kinds to entice Israelis to move into East Jerusalem and the West Bank settlements.[17]

In view of the settlement expansion, Barak's past (or continued) ideology, his distaste for Arabs in general and Arafat in particular, his endless—sometimes almost daily—radical flipfloppings, and the peremptory manner in which he dealt with the Palestinians at Camp David, even some of his own cabinet ministers wondered whether he had been seriously seeking a settlement and was really prepared to pay the necessary price for it. Or was he "carrying out a dangerous maneuver, the aim of which was to corner Arafat and show the whole world that . . . [Arafat] was refusing peace?"[18]

No one understands Barak, and it will probably never be known whether he was cynical and Machiavellian, seeking (as several Israeli columnists now suggest) to preserve the essence of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank under the guise of negotiating a settlement.[19] Or—as seems more likely—did he at some level genuinely want a settlement but was so ambivalent, confused, and autocratic that he was the wrong man for the job?

In a final act of self-destruction and incoherence, Barak all but ensured the Israeli public's rejection of the Camp David framework and the subsequent landslide electoral victory of Ariel Sharon by presenting a serious compromise with the Palestinians not as the necessary foundation for a secure peace but as an unavoidable catastrophe, a bitter pill that he himself could barely swallow.[20] When the Palestinians rejected the Barak/Clinton take-it-or-leave-it proposals at Camp David, Barak interpreted this as proof that "the Palestinians are still clinging to the 'phased theory' as a practical plan"[21]—that is, the strategy of destroying Israel in stages. If that were the case, small wonder that Barak failed to convince the Israeli public that he was a better man than Sharon to deal with the problem.

[16] *Ha'aretz*, 27 September 1999; *New York Times*, 28 September 1999.

[17] *Ha'aretz*, 27 February 2001. In Barak's final year in office, nearly 2000 new housing units were constructed, the highest number since Ariel Sharon had served as Housing and Construction minister in 1992. See *Ha'aretz*, 5 March 2001.

[18] Zeev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 9 February 2001.

[19] For example, "many of Oslo's supporters held that the new arrangements . . . would replace direct Israeli control . . . with a form of indirect Israeli control, through the Palestinian Authority . . . and thereby continue its occupation of Palestinian territory." See Meron Benvenisti, *Ha'aretz*, 8 March 2001.

[20] As put by Gideon Levy, *Ha'aretz*, 31 December 2000.

[21] Shavit interview, *Ha'aretz*, 2 February 2001.

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Camp David

The general perception of the Camp David summit negotiations in July 2000 is that Barak made an unprecedented and generous offer to the Palestinians, only to be met by a shocking if not perverse rejection by Arafat, who was not only unwilling to compromise but responded by ordering a violent uprising at just the moment when the chances for peace had never been greater.

There was just enough surface plausibility in this narrative initially to have persuaded even the Israeli peace camp that they had naively misunderstood the real intentions of the Palestinian leadership and that Israel really did lack a partner for peace. But this disillusion with the Palestinians quickly gave way to a more sober reassessment among serious Israeli analysts, many of whom now are far more critical of Barak's proposals and developed a much greater empathetic understanding of the plight of Arafat and the Palestinians.

The first difficulty in assessing Camp David, as well as subsequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that continued until just before the February elections, is that all of Barak's proposals were verbal; evidently seeking to keep all his options open, even as he was supposedly negotiating a final settlement, Barak refused to allow the creation of an official record. As a result, even the participants at Camp David and at subsequent meetings have differing accounts of precisely what Barak offered.[22]

Still, there is general agreement on the main lines of Barak's verbal proposals:

- Israel would agree to a demilitarized Palestinian state in Gaza and 82–88 percent of the West Bank. In subsequent discussions with the Palestinians, Israeli negotiators apparently improved this offer to about 92 percent of the West Bank, though it is not clear whether Barak approved this change.
- On boundaries, Barak proposed to have Israel return to its pre-1967 borders, with what he portrayed as only minor exceptions. A small part of the West Bank would be annexed to Israel, in areas immediately contiguous to Jerusalem or to the pre-1967 Israeli lines, within which 80 percent of the Israeli settlers were located. As compensation for this annexation of Palestinian land, there would be a territorial exchange, in which the Palestinian state would be given some Israeli land in the Negev desert adjacent to the Gaza Strip.
- On the remainder of the settlements in the heavily Palestinian-populated Gaza Strip and West Bank heartland—many of which contained the most fanatical settlers—Barak was murky. It is still not known whether he contemplated that these settlements would be removed upon an overall agree-

[22] As William B. Quandt, a former U.S. government official and one of the most prominent U.S. specialists on the Arab-Israeli conflict, has put it: "verbal understandings had a way of dissolving when the Americans tried to translate them into concrete terms . . . as a result, it was hard to know at the end, what if anything, had been agreed upon." William B. Quandt, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30 (Winter 2001): 33. See also Akiva Eldar, "On the Basis of the Nonexistent Camp David Understandings," *Ha'aretz*, 16 November 2001.

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ment; whether they would be allowed to remain in place if they so chose, but as part of the new state of Palestine; or whether they would be under nominal Palestinian sovereignty but actual Israeli military control.[23] In all likelihood, not even Barak knew his own mind on this crucial issue.

- On Jerusalem, Barak proposed to incorporate into an enlarged Greater Jerusalem all the Jewish settlements that had been built throughout Arab East Jerusalem since 1967, as well as those in the city's suburbs, which in fact extend far into the West Bank. The Palestinians would be given sovereignty over the remaining Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, as well as over the Muslim Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, and they would be allowed to establish their capital in these areas. Israel would retain sovereignty over the rest of the Old City, though at least for a while Barak apparently considered some kind of mixed sovereignty over what the Israelis call the Temple Mount and the Arabs call Haram al-Sharif, meaning the plateau on which stand the two major Muslim holy places, the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
- On the Jordan river valley and nearby mountain tops, Barak insisted on continued Israeli settlements, early warning stations, and military bases and patrols for a period of six-twelve years, after which the Israeli security requirements could be reevaluated. Evidently Barak left open the possibility that these Israeli forces could be nominally part of a broader international peacekeeping force, but it was clear that Israel would continue its military presence and effective control over the area.
- On the water issue, Barak apparently proposed only that Israel and the Palestinians cooperate on expanding the water resources for both states, principally through desalination. However, most of the existing water aquifers would be located within the 6–8 percent of the West Bank that would be annexed by Israel.
- On the Palestinian refugee issue, Barak refused to acknowledge that Israel bore any moral or historical responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, even rejecting Palestinian papers that quoted extensively from Israeli memoirs, military statements, and the Israeli new history scholarship.[24] Nor was he open to considering the possibility of distinguishing between the principle and the practical implementation of any Palestinian refugee rights. At most, Barak would allow some 10,000 refugees to return to Israel as part of a family reunification program, not as a Palestinian right but as an Israeli gesture.

[23] One of Barak's advisers at Camp David, Joseph Alpher, is vague on the question of the the nonannexed settlements, writing that they would "gradually" come under Palestinian rule, and that "some particularly problematic settlements might be deliberately dismantled by Israel." See "Camp David and the Intifada," Americans for Peace Now Issue Brief, 7 December 2000.

[24] Akram Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30 (Winter 2001): 82. Hanieh is the editor of the Palestinian daily *al-Ayam*, a close adviser to Arafat, and a member of the Palestinian delegation at Camp David.

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It is true that Barak's proposal went further than any other previous Israeli offer to the Palestinians, especially in agreeing to a Palestinian state and to the sharing of at least part of Jerusalem. On the other hand, it is no less true that Barak's proposals fell far short of a genuinely fair compromise that would result in a viable Palestinian state. Within a few weeks of Camp David, a number of Israeli political analysts had reached this conclusion.[25] Particularly revealing was the forthright assessment of Ze'ev Schiff, the dean of Israel's military/security journalists and a centrist in the Israeli political spectrum. According to Schiff, because of Barak's ongoing violations of the spirit of the Oslo agreements—"above all . . . the relentless expansion of the existing settlements and the establishment of new settlements, with a concomitant expropriation of Palestinian land . . . in and around Jerusalem, and elsewhere as well"—the Palestinians had been "shut in from all sides." Thus, Schiff concluded, "the prospect of being able to establish a viable state was fading right before their eyes. They were confronted with an intolerable set of options: to agree to the spreading occupation . . . or to set up wretched Bantustans, or to launch an uprising."[26]

As both the Palestinians and Israeli political analysts began to draw up detailed maps, it became evident not only that Gaza and the West Bank would be divided by the State of Israel, but that each of those two areas would in turn be divided into enclaves by the Israeli settlements, highways, and military positions, the links between which "would always be at the mercies of Israel, the Israel Defense Forces and the settlers."[27] With little or no control over its water resources, with no independently controlled border access to neighboring countries, and with even its internal freedom of movement and commerce subject to continued Israeli closures, the already impoverished Palestinian state would be economically completely dependent on—and vulnerable to—Israel.[28]

In greater detail, this is what the consequences of Barak's proposals would have been:

Borders. First, the Jerusalem "metropolitan area," which since 1967 had been expanded to include almost one-fifth of the entire West Bank, would now be incorporated into the city. The eastern boundaries of this "Greater Jerusalem" and the other newly annexed settlements would reach almost to the Palestinian town of Jericho, itself only a short distance from the Jordan River and

[25] Especially the Israeli Peace Now movement, the Meretz political party, and leading columnists of *Ha'aretz*, including Ze'ev Schiff, Meron Benvenisti, Amira Hass, Gideon Levy, Akiva Eldar, and Danny Rubinstein.

[26] *Ha'aretz*, 24 November 2000.

[27] Amira Hass, *Ha'aretz*, 14 November 2000.

[28] As Hanieh summed it up: "The three huge settlement blocs in the north, center, and south of the West Bank were expanded and they were connected to each other and to Israel by large areas of Palestinian land in such a way as to control Palestinian water resources in the West Bank." See Hanieh, "Camp David Papers," 83.

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Dead Sea. The net effect of these Israeli facts on the ground would be to split the West Bank nearly in half.[29]

Second, the so-called blocs of settlements that Barak proposed to annex were ten times the area of Tel Aviv and contained Palestinian villages whose population of some 120,000 was actually greater than the settler population. What would happen to that Arab population? Since it was inconceivable that Israel would want to incorporate a large number of new Arab citizens into the Jewish state, presumably they would be relocated or transferred by one means or another, thereby adding still further to the refugee problem, with all the moral and practical problems that would entail.

Third, the land that Barak proposed to give to the Palestinian state in a territorial exchange was only about 10 percent of what Israel was taking from the Palestinians. Moreover, it was empty desert. By contrast, the land that Israel would annex was relatively fertile; even more important, it contained most of the West Bank underground water aquifers—precisely why the settlements had been put there in the first place.[30]

Israeli military control. The independence of the Palestinian state would have been severely compromised—perhaps nullified—by the continuation of Israeli military control throughout the new state. Under the terms of Barak's proposals, Israel would continue to control all of Palestine's border access points with the outside world; would continue to patrol and protect all the Jewish settlements that remained in place in the West Bank, and perhaps even in Gaza; and would remain for at least six years—perhaps indefinitely, for all Palestinians knew—throughout the Jordan River valley.

Jerusalem. The situation in Jerusalem would have been intolerable for the Palestinians—and not simply for religious or symbolic reasons. As noted, Barak insisted that the Palestinians accept all of Israel's "facts on the ground" since 1967, except that they would be given sovereignty over the remaining Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The problem was that these neighborhoods would be isolated and impoverished enclaves, cut off not only from the rest of the Palestinian state but even from each other by the Jewish neighborhoods, roads, and military outposts. Since 1967 it had been Israeli policy to establish Jewish political and economic control over all of Jerusalem and to create conditions that would convince the Arab residents to leave. To this end, highly-subsidized Jewish neighborhoods were built in East Jerusalem, while the Arab neighborhoods were left in poverty, denied economic assistance and even most city services. As a result, even if Arafat had agreed to Barak's proposals, the

[29] Among many analyses, see Danny Rubinstein, *Haaretz*, 29 October 2000.

[30] For detailed analyses of the proposed territorial exchange, see the statement by Peace Now, 7 December 2000; Akiva Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, 20 October 2000; the "Palestinian Response to the Clinton Proposal," 30 December 2000, reprinted in *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, January-February 2001; and Hanieh, "Camp David Papers."

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long-run prospects for Jewish-Arab stability in the context of such extreme political, social, and economic inequality would have been dismal.

Some former Jerusalem city officials and city planners, including Deputy Mayor Meron Benvenisti, now openly admit that this was the purpose of Israel's policies. For example, see a major but little-remarked story in the *New York Times* on 15 March 1997, in which a number of current and former Israeli officials admitted that "political planning" and "lopsided development strategies" had been employed to ensure Jewish dominance over Jerusalem and to encourage the Palestinians to move out of the city into neighboring West Bank towns. Even long-time Jerusalem mayor, Teddy Kollek, who in the past had claimed he did everything he could to help the Jerusalem's Arab population, spoke quite differently in an 10 October 1990 interview with the Israeli newspaper, *Ma'ariv*. The Arabs of East Jerusalem, he bluntly admitted, had become "second and third class citizens," for whom "the mayor [that is, Kollek himself] nurtured nothing and built nothing. For Jewish Jerusalem I did something. . . . For East Jerusalem? Nothing!"

The symbolic/religious issues of Jerusalem centered on political sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Since 1967, the Israelis have controlled the entire Old City, although they have allowed Muslim religious authorities to administer the mosques on the Temple Mount. As indicated, at Camp David there were indications that Barak was considering a variety of suggested compromises: shared Jewish-Arab sovereignty over the Temple Mount, or "the sovereignty of God" rather than any state sovereignty, or an arrangement by which Israel would have sovereignty over the Western Wall on the lower part of the Mount, the Palestinians (or perhaps an international Muslim agency) would have sovereignty over the mosques on top of the Mount.

Arafat apparently rejected any settlement that would dilute Palestinian sovereignty over all of the Old City, save for the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall. In some ways, this was a surprisingly hardline position. But, under Barak's proposals, Israel effectively would continue to control access to the Islamic religious shrines—a power that had frequently been employed in recent years to prevent Palestinians from outside Jerusalem from entering the Old City. As Arafat told Clinton, in responding to his proposed compromise under which Israel would allow the Palestinians a "sovereign presidential compound" next to al-Aqsa Mosque: "So there will be a small island surrounded by Israeli soldiers who control the entrances."[31] Moreover, in one important respect, Barak actually hardened the Israeli position when he demanded that a place be set aside on top of the Temple Mount for Jewish prayer. When Israel captured the Old City in 1967, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had prohibited Jews from praying on top of the Temple Mount (as opposed to the Jewish Western Wall at its base) in the hopes of avoiding a religious conflict with not only the Palestinians but with the entire Muslim world. This prohibition has

[31] Quoted by Hanieh, "The Camp David Papers," 35.

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stood since then, challenged—until Barak—only by the most extreme of Jewish fundamentalist sects.[32] In the last analysis, because the entire Muslim world insisted on undivided Muslim sovereignty over Harem al-Sharif, Arafat had little choice in the matter.[33] In any case, in the months following Camp David, Barak began retreating from his apparent willingness to consider compromises over the Temple Mount; little more was heard about God's or shared sovereignty.

Water. Barak's Camp David proposals effectively perpetuated Israel's control over most of the West Bank's water, since the most important aquifers would be incorporated into the newly annexed Israeli territory. If for no other reason, this made the Barak plan intolerable to the Palestinians, and a strong indication that Barak continued to resist the establishment of a genuinely independent and viable Palestinian state.

Right of return. Another intractable issue, at least on its face, was "the right of return" for the Palestinian refugees. Almost no Israeli, no matter how far to the "left," can accept the nominal—not actual—Palestinian insistence that all the refugees have the right to return to their homes and villages in Israel, most of which, in any case, no longer exist. The "return" of some three million Palestinians would mean that within a short time there would no longer be a Jewish majority in Israel, destroying the very *raison d'etre* of the creation of a Jewish state. In any case, given nearly a century of mutual violence and hatred, a large influx of Palestinians would be a formula for unending civil, religious, and ethnic warfare. There are no contemporary precedents or models for two peoples long at war with each other suddenly becoming capable of living in peace and harmony within the confines of one small state. Cyprus, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and many other states provide grim counterexamples.

However, Barak did not merely reject the Palestinian right of return, he also flatly refused to acknowledge any Israeli moral or practical responsibility for the events of 1948. That is a different matter altogether, not only because

[32] "Suddenly, allowing Jews to pray in the Haram al-Sharif became an essential Israeli demand, adding a religious dimension to the conflict [and] toying with explosives that could ignite the Middle East and the Islamic world." See Hanieh, "Camp David Papers," 83. Similarly, of one of Israel's leading historians on Jerusalem has noted: "Within Israel, the only constituency for that demand is a radical fringe that wants to drive the Muslims from the holy site. For Palestinians, just raising the idea confirmed the worst fears about Israeli intentions at al-Aqsa." See Gershon Gorenberg, "The Real Blunders," *Jerusalem Report*, 20 November 2000.

[33] Clinton administration officials have confirmed a Palestinian report that when Arafat was under considerable pressure from Clinton at Camp David because of his unyielding position on the Temple Mount, Arafat said to the president: "Do you want to attend my funeral? I will not relinquish Jerusalem and the holy places." See *Ha'aretz*, 17 September 2000. Moreover, according to Menahem Klein, an Israeli academician specializing in Jerusalem affairs and a member of the Israeli delegation to Camp David, Arafat is genuinely religious and his interest in the Islamic holy sites is authentic, not a tactic. See *Ha'aretz*, 15 March 2001.

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it is simply a lie to deny Israeli responsibility, but more importantly because such an acknowledgment would pave the way for a compromise on the issue, the essence of which would be to separate the principle of return from its implementation.

The Palestinian Response

Thus, the Israelis and Palestinians remained far apart on every major issue at Camp David—not just over the Temple Mount and the right of return, as was generally believed at the time.[34] Yet, most Israelis and Americans have blamed only Arafat for the breakdown at Camp David and the subsequent Palestinian uprising. Critics have made two general arguments. The more extreme one is that Arafat simply pocketed Barak's offers at Camp David and was willing to make no compromises of his own. In this view, which implies—preposterously—that it was the Palestinians rather than the Israelis who held all the cards, Arafat thought that if he held out long enough he could eventually reach his real goal, which was the destruction of Israel in stages.

This argument ignores the enormous power differential between Israel and the Palestinians, disregards the long history of Palestinian compromises going back to the 1970s and formalized in 1988, and fails to observe the additional compromises that Arafat made both at Oslo in 1993 and Camp David in 2000. By officially agreeing since 1988 to accept a two-state solution, with Palestine but not Israel demilitarized, Arafat and the Palestinian Authority accepted that Israel would permanently be far stronger than Palestine and would comprise 78 percent of the land of Palestine, as that was defined in the League of Nations Mandate to Britain in 1919. In fact, at Camp David, Arafat went even further; for in agreeing to accept the incorporation of at least some Jewish settlements into an expanded Jerusalem, including formerly Arab East Jerusalem, he was reducing still further the percentage of Palestine that the Palestinian state would comprise.[35]

Indeed, there is a much better case that at both Oslo and Camp David, Arafat went too far in accepting Israeli-created facts on the ground. By accepting at Oslo the postponement of the problem of the Jewish settlements in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, Arafat allowed Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, and Barak to claim that the continued Israeli expansion did not violate the Oslo agreements. And by apparently accepting at Camp David Israeli annexation of the Jewish neighborhoods and Palestinian sovereignty only over the noncontig-

[34] This is emphasized in the quasi-official Palestinian assessment of Camp David by Hanieh, and it has also been confirmed in an important speech by Robert Malley, a Clinton administration negotiator at Camp David, quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*, 11 March 2001.

[35] This was candidly admitted by Joseph Alpher, one of Barak's leading advisers at Camp David, in his analysis, "Camp David and the Intifada." Quandt also argues that the Palestinian acceptance of Israel within the 1967 lines "was already a huge concession and should not be starting point for further concessions." See his "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 31.

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uous Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, Arafat in effect had collaborated with Barak in creating an inherently unstable, as well as unjust future explosion point.

Thus, the argument that an uncompromising Arafat rejected a golden opportunity for peace has no foundation. The more moderate charge against Arafat—for example, as argued in a series of influential columns by Thomas Friedman, the chief diplomatic correspondent of the *New York Times*—is that while Barak's offers at Camp David did not go far enough in meeting legitimate Palestinian demands, Arafat should have conditionally accepted them as the basis for continued negotiations, making counterproposals rather than ending diplomacy in favor of violence. In fact, Friedman and many Israeli critics of Arafat now commonly argue that the Palestinian Authority's rejection of Barak's offers and his launching of "this idiotic uprising" can only be interpreted as proof that Arafat never would have settled for a two-state compromise, because he has never "given up his long-term aim of eliminating Israel."[36]

Though this argument, if only because of its endless assertion, is increasingly passing for revealed truth, there is no evidence or logical basis for it. It is evidently based on the unarticulated premise that the Palestinian rejection of Camp David and the subsequent launching of the intifada leaves no other possible inference. However, Barak's take-it-or-leave-it proposals would not have allowed the Palestinians to have a truly viable or independent state, and his actions on the ground, especially the ongoing and even escalated expansion of the settlements and military road-building, would have perpetuated, consolidated, and made even more irreversible the Israeli occupation over much of the West Bank and Gaza.

In the final analysis, of course, it could never be proved that some Palestinians—possibly including Arafat—did not harbor, in some secret corner of their dreams, the hope of regaining all of Palestine. But the enormous power disparities between Israel and a demilitarized Palestinian state would preclude any attempt to operationalize such dreams, if they exist. Once a Palestinian state was established, it would be on permanent notice that continued violence against Israel would inexorably lead to an overwhelming Israeli military response that would permanently end Palestinian statehood. In those circumstances, an Israeli crushing of the Palestinians would be seen throughout the world as a legitimate act of self-defense.

The argument that Arafat should have continued to rely on diplomacy to remedy the inadequacies of Barak's Camp David proposals is a more serious and persuasive one. Indeed, in light of the Israeli backlash against the Palestinian uprising, the election of Sharon, and the subsequent Palestinian escalation of the uprising into outright terrorism directed against the Israeli population within the Green Line, there clearly are reasonable grounds for criticism of Arafat's judgment. Even so, there are serious problems with this argument.

[36] Thomas Friedman, "It Only Gets Worse," *New York Times*, 22 May 2001.

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First, it is impossible to know whether Barak was prepared to go any further than he did at Camp David. To be sure, there are a number of reliable reports that at subsequent secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations held in the Sinai resort of Taba, both the Israeli and Palestinian delegates, desperate to reach an agreement and save the peace process before the impending election of Ariel Sharon, were more flexible than they had been at Camp David. On the other hand, there is good reason to doubt that Barak would have accepted further concessions made by his own negotiating team, for during this period he made a number of public statements that actually backtracked from his Camp David positions, for example on whether he was willing to share sovereignty with Arafat or the Arab world on the Temple Mount. No doubt the approaching elections constrained Barak on this and other issues, but that doesn't change the fact that Arafat had little reason to expect further Israeli movement.

Even more importantly, the historical record since 1967, and especially since the Oslo agreements of 1993, makes it clear that the longer "the peace process" is stretched out, the more Israel takes advantage of its unconstrained power to preempt the outcome of negotiations by creating facts on the ground. That is the central problem in the argument that Arafat should have agreed to continue the negotiations indefinitely, or settle for some kind of partial or "interim" accord, which continued to postpone definitive agreements on the major issues: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, water, and the right of return.

In short, any criticism of Arafat, if it is to be taken seriously, must face up to the fact that the Israelis—certainly including Barak and now Sharon—have given the Palestinians every reason to believe that an interim or transition period would not be one toward general peace and a fair compromise, but rather toward a deeper and more irreversible Israeli consolidation of its occupation.

Furthermore, the criticisms of Arafat are based on the dubious premise that he authorized or at least substantially controlled the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, employing it as a strategy to force greater Israeli concessions in the negotiating process. To begin with, the time line doesn't support this argument: the intifada did not break out until two months after the breakdown at Camp David, following the Barak-approved visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. Second, even the Israeli intelligence services were divided on whether or to what extent Arafat controlled the intifada. To this date, no one knows whether Arafat ordered the uprising or whether it was an explosion from below—one that occurred not only because of Palestinian despair at a "peace process" that had produced even greater Israeli repression and expansion since Oslo, but also because of the Palestinian public's frustration over Arafat's concessions and corrupt, authoritarian rule.[37] In this view, Arafat could only hope

[37] Some Israeli commentators (for example, Amira Hass, *Ha'aretz* 21 February 2000) have argued that it was a deliberate Israeli strategy after Oslo to coopt the Palestinian Authority and thus retain indirect Israeli control over most of the West Bank, by granting special economic, travel, and other privileges to Palestinian political, military, and economic elites—many of whom personally prospered in the 1990s, even as the suffering of the public worsened. For strong statements of the view that the al-Aqsa intifada was an explosion from below, brought about by Palestinian despair directed both at

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to survive as he had done many times in the past, not so much by leading Palestinian opinion but by following it, riding on the back of the tiger rather than in control of it.

Probably both views are oversimplified, for there is increasing evidence to support a more nuanced explanation of the intifada. It is likely that Arafat neither ordered the intifada as a strategic move in the negotiating process with Barak, nor is it today simply an explosion from below. The most plausible interpretation is that the al-Aqsa intifada began as a largely spontaneous eruption, but one over which Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have gained some but by no means complete control. In particular, there is no evidence and no Israeli intelligence consensus on whether Arafat ordered, acquiesced in, or was powerless to control the recent wave of Palestinian terrorist bombings inside Israel.

An alternative line of argument would separate the moral from the practical issues in evaluating the Palestinian revolution after the Oslo/Camp David breakdown. Though proponents of nonviolence will disagree, throughout history, revolution has often been justified when the political process has failed and there is no other way to redress serious injustices.

The Palestinians have repeatedly said that the intifada is not directed against the state or people of Israel proper, but only against the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This claim, which has great moral as well as political significance, was given credibility by the fact that with but few exceptions, Palestinian violence (at least until the election of Sharon) was directed almost exclusively at either Israeli military forces or the most external settlers in the occupied territories—not against Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries.

The spread of outright Palestinian terrorism—bombings directed against civilians—into Israel proper has changed the moral equation, and perhaps the practical one as well. Until the recent bombings, a strong case could be made that it was morally irrelevant whether or not Arafat controlled the Palestinian intifada, whether or not it was a designed strategy from above or a spontaneous explosion from below, or some combination of both, for the Palestinians not only had just cause to rebel against Israeli occupation and repression but had also generally employed disciplined and constrained methods that distinguished between Israeli society and Israel as an occupying force.

To be sure, the moral issue remains complex, because the Israeli policies of collective punishment and closures have done great harm to Palestinian civilians. However, the practical consequences of the Palestinian turn toward violence—even when it was limited to the occupation—is another matter.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority because of the continued Israeli occupation and worsening economic situation since Oslo, see two articles by Henry Siegman, formerly a major leader in the official American Jewish community, now at the Council on Foreign Relations: "Israel: A Historic Statement," *New York Review of Books*, 8 February 2001; and "Hopes for Peace Under Sharon," *Ha'aretz*, 27 February 2001.

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In the short run, it has been disastrous, and there are increasing Palestinian voices, including even some PA officials, calling for reassessment and the consideration of unarmed resistance to the occupation.[38] On the other hand, it is far too soon to know whether the peace process has been dealt a fatal or only temporary blow; a few years of Sharon may yet convince the Israeli public of the need for greater compromise with the Palestinians.

Put differently, after Camp David the Palestinians faced an impossible dilemma: indefinitely prolonged negotiations almost certainly would have consolidated and deepened the Israeli occupation, while armed resistance to it risked an Israeli backlash and even worse repression. Maybe—at least in principle—there was a third way. No doubt a Palestinian Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr. would have been preferable to Yasir Arafat, though one may doubt that their methods would have had any greater success, at least in the short run, in persuading the Israelis to return to their 1967 lines.

Moreover, at least until the Palestinian shift toward outright terrorism, one should hesitate to blame the victims for choosing the wrong resistance strategy. Still, given the immense power disparities between Israel and the Palestinians, the inability or unwillingness of the Israelis, the American government, and the American Jewish community to abandon the discredited Israeli mythology, and the moral as well as practical costs of Palestinian terrorism, in the long run there appears to be no other alternative to negotiations combined with nonviolent resistance to the ongoing Israeli occupation

A Future Settlement

The Palestinian uprising of 2000–2001 has made it clearer than ever that there can be no genuine settlement that is both fair and stable over the long run without a near-complete Israeli withdrawal to its pre-June 1967 borders. Only a few Israeli peace activists and intellectuals are prepared to consider this today, but that was also true a decade ago about the need for a Palestinian state, and a year ago about the need to divide Jerusalem.

The 1948 expansion of Israel in the wake of the Arab attack arguably served Israel's security, because the 1947 UN partition plan left Israel with borders that would have been difficult to defend indefinitely against determined enemies. But even that is not an open-and-shut case, for Israel's refusal—however understandable—to return to the UN boundaries or to allow the return of the Palestinian refugees that it had driven out had the consequence of ensuring that Israel *would* have determined enemies.

The 1967 expansion of Israel into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, however, is not a close case: it was neither motivated by nor had the consequence

[38] For example see the column by the Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab in the *Jerusalem Post*, 1 March 2001; and the remarks of the PA leader Ahmen Qurei: "The intifada will continue, but it's not necessary for it to be a military intifada. It can take another shape." Quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 11 March 2001.

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of enhancing Israeli security. The motivation was ideological, another step in the fulfillment of the Zionist dream of Jewish sovereignty over all of ancient Palestine. The consequence was to intensify Palestinian nationalist resistance to the Israeli occupation and to exacerbate the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.

The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian and 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaties were made possible by Israel's willingness to return all the territories captured in 1967, in exchange for their demilitarization and other steps to enhance Israeli security. An Israeli-Syrian peace agreement was nearly reached in the 1990s, based on the same principles: a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, the demilitarization of the returned territory, and other security measures.

The Palestinians are unlikely to accept less. Even if some of their leaders, like Arafat, were once willing to do so, the settlement would have been unlikely to hold. Still, there is some flexibility in how the principle of complete Israeli withdrawal could be implemented, for Palestinian leaders have repeatedly said that once Israel accepts the principle of full withdrawal, the Palestinians will be willing to negotiate on how to operationalize it.

In practice, it is probable that Israel can annex some of the West Bank settlements immediately adjacent to the 1967 lines, for Palestine Authority negotiators have suggested that they could accept small territorial adjustments that would bring about 50 percent of the settlers (as opposed to the 80 percent demanded by Barak) within Israel, provided that the annexations don't include substantial numbers of Palestinian villages and that Palestine is compensated with land from Israel that is comparable in both size and quality. For example, Palestinian leaders have privately suggested that they would give serious consideration to a territorial exchange in which Israel gave the Palestinian state some land adjacent to the Gaza and West Bank borders and a column of land linking Gaza to the West Bank through Israel's Negev desert.[39]

It is hard to see how the Jerusalem issues can be resolved without a near complete return to the pre-1967 status quo: the division of the city into Jewish West Jerusalem and Arab East Jerusalem, with Muslim sovereignty over the Old City, especially Haram al-Sharif, except for the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall. Difficult as this issue is, for both sides it is largely symbolic. In that case, it may fairly be asked, why should the Israelis have to relinquish their claim in favor of the Palestinians? First, on moral grounds it is not unreasonable for the side that has been mostly in the wrong to have to pay a higher price than the victims. More importantly, no Arab or Islamic state will consent to continued Israeli sovereignty over some of the most important mosques in the Muslim world. Neither Arafat nor the Israelis can afford to antagonize this world or agree to anything that might expose the moderate Arab governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and perhaps even Syria to mass outrage.

[39] See the *Ha'aretz* news stories of 29 and 31 January 2001.

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What will be even harder for the Israelis to swallow is that they must also reverse thirty-five years of Jewish expansion into East Jerusalem and neighboring areas of the West Bank. Even if Arafat had been willing in the past to accept the preservation of some of the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and its suburbs, it is improbable that such a compromise would now prove to be stable. In the present climate, it is hard to imagine that the Palestinian people will accept the continued presence of Israeli towns and neighborhoods within what they legitimately regard as Palestinian territory.

Similarly, there is little possibility of a stable settlement if Israel continues to insist that it retain de facto military control over the Jordan River valley, for the Palestinians will not agree to any Israeli military presence in any part of their territory. On the other hand, there were strong indications at Camp David and subsequent negotiations that the Palestinians would agree to something like the Sinai peninsula settlement and precedent: the stationing of an international force—including American soldiers—in the West Bank.[40]

Under such arrangements and in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement—including a still obtainable Israeli-Syrian peace agreement—Israel's legitimate security interests would be well served. The solution, as it was in the agreements with both Egypt and Jordan, is to distinguish between Israel's political boundaries and its security boundaries. Israel's western political boundary is its border with the Sinai peninsula, but its security boundary is the Suez Canal—meaning that the violation of the demilitarization agreement and the crossing of the canal by Egyptian armies would mean war.

Similarly, Israel's eastern political boundary is the Jordan River and the Israel-Jordanian border from the Dead Sea south to Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba. However, its eastern security boundary is the Jordanian border with Iraq—meaning that the presence of any hostile armies in Jordan advancing towards Israel, whether they be Syrian, Iraqi, or Iranian, would be a cassus belli that would precipitate an overwhelming Israeli response long before the armies reached the Jordan Valley.[41]

As for the water issue, that too cannot be solved by the Israelis at the expense of the Palestinians; the West Bank water aquifers must belong to a Palestinian state. To be sure, Israel would then lose an estimated 25–30 percent of its present fresh water sources, and this would require some transitional sharing agreements. However, within about five years the West Bank aquifers can be replaced by desalination plants and by the importation of water by tankers and pipelines. Furthermore, even if Israel retained all of the West Bank aquifers, it would be a rapidly wasting asset, for within a few years the imbalance between present Israeli resources and water usage would reassert itself. In any case, because of the availability of technological means to solve the water problem,

[40] Hanieh, "Camp David Papers," 94; see also *Ha'aretz*, 14 August 2000, 27 February 2001.

[41] For a full discussion of the security issues, see Jerome Slater, "Netanyahu, A Palestinian State, and Israeli Security Reassessed," *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (Winter 1997–98): 675–689.

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over the longer run the real issue is not so much water as it is money—and the amounts needed are far from intolerable.[42]

Other than Jerusalem, the most difficult issue is the right of a Palestinian refugee return to Israel, which for reasons already discussed cannot be implemented in literal fashion. However, in the context of an overall peace settlement, the issue would be much less intractable than it appears to be: there is every reason to believe that the issue could be resolved in a manner that would be acceptable to both sides, symbolically and in practice.

In the last decade, there have been a number of authoritative statements by Palestinian leaders that indicate they are prepared to distinguish between the right of return and its implementation, if only Israel will acknowledge its responsibility for having created the problem. For example, in his 1990 article, Abu Iyad, one of the most important PLO officials, wrote that the Palestinians understand that the literal implementation of the right of return is not possible, and that negotiations can resolve the matter: if Israel accepts "the principle of the right of return or compensation." "We shall for our part remain flexible regarding its implementation . . . we also expect the international community to play its full role concerning the matter of compensation."[43]

In the last few months, this position has been reiterated; there have been repeated public statements by high Palestinian leaders that they recognize that Israel can never accept the "return" of large numbers of refugees or their descendents, and that they have no intention of demanding it.[44]

From the variety of Palestinian and Israeli reports on the right-of-return issue, it is clear that the elements of a solution would be an Israeli acknowledgment of its political and moral responsibilities; the return to Israel of a relatively small number of those refugees and their descendents who still have close family ties to Israeli Arabs; the resettlement of most of the others in Palestine—perhaps especially in former Israeli territory acquired by the Palestinians in a territorial exchange, which would allow the Palestinians to say that the refugees had returned to "Israel";[45] and the resettlement of the remainder in the new Palestinian state, elsewhere in the Arab world or in the West, with generous

[42] For example, a 1995 Israeli study concluded that for only $110 million annually, Israel could meet its current and projected water needs. (*New York Times*, 24 August 1995).

[43] See Abu Iyad, "Lowering the Sword," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990): 103. This position has been essentially reconfirmed in recent authoritative Palestinian statements, for example in Hanieh, "Camp David Papers."

[44] See the Palestinian reply to the 2000 proposals of President Clinton, in which they state that they are "prepared to think flexibly and creatively about the mechanism for implementation for the right of return." (*New York Times*, 3 January 2001). As well, Nabil Sha'ath, the Palestinian minister for planning and a close adviser of Yasir Arafat, has recently written that a solution to this issue that "meets the requirements of both sides" is within reach. (*Washington Post*, 15 May 2001).

[45] This was an idea to which "serious thought" was given in the abortive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations between the failure at Camp David and the election of Sharon. See *Ha'aretz*, 31 January 2001.

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economic compensation provided by both Israel and the international community.[46]

In short, it is increasingly clear that the right-of-return issue is far more a symbolic than real obstacle to a settlement. In light of the many indications that the issue is eminently soluble, the continued insistence by Israelis and their defenders that it poses an insurmountable problem suggests that they are unwilling or incapable of listening closely to the Palestinians. Even worse, it is evident that many are simply seizing on the issue as a pretext for their unwillingness to see a settlement that would lead to an independent Palestinian state.

Conclusion

With the Israeli election of Ariel Sharon, the intensification of Israeli suppression of the intifada, and the Palestinian terrorist response, the outlook for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is bleak. Without highly unlikely changes in Israeli policy, there is likely to be further Palestinian violence and terrorism, leading to a vicious cycle of greatly intensified Israeli retaliation and Palestinian counter-retaliation.

Even the possibility of an escalation into a wider Arab-Israeli war cannot be ruled out. To be sure, such a regional war seems unlikely, since Israel and all its neighbors are acutely aware of the potential catastrophic costs of a new war, that could even escalate into the use of biological or nuclear weapons. On the other hand, wars that have seemed irrational in cost-benefit terms—even to their participants—have often occurred, as unforeseen events take over and spin out of control.

Both because it is so much more powerful than the Palestinians and because it is primarily responsible for the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel has the main responsibility for averting a catastrophic escalation and finally reaching a fair settlement. Yet Israel has never been willing to acknowledge its role in the origins and dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has never been willing to acknowledge its moral responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians, and has missed a number of opportunities to settle both the Israeli–Palestinian and the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. Blinded by Zionist ideology and by the genuine history of Jewish victimization, Israel has failed to realize that in this conflict—shockingly—it is Israel that is the oppressor and the Palestinians who are the victims.

The weakest part of Zionist ideology has always been its claim, based on biblical history and ancient Jewish inhabitance, to eternal Jewish sovereignty over the entire land of Palestine. Aside from the fact that the historical accuracy of the biblical account is increasingly disputed by modern scholars (including Israeli archaeologists), the ancient historical narrative would be of dubious rel-

[46] Among the many stories, see the important article by Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem" *Ha'aretz*, 29 May 2001.

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evance even if it were demonstrably accurate, for the passage of two thousand years created a very different political and moral reality.

Many Israelis and their supporters fear that even a partial abandonment of Zionist mythology would have the consequence of delegitimizing the State of Israel today. But this fear is groundless. However questionable the Zionist argument from ancient history or even from the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the Holocaust and then the creation of the State of Israel changed matters decisively, irrefutably, and irrevocably. Since 1948, the only argument necessary to the Zionist case is the existential one: new human realities have been created, Israel exists, and it has a right to live in peace and security. It would be far better and far more conducive to the creation of a genuine peace with the Palestinians and the entire Arab world, if Israel simply rested its case there.

Put differently, because the existential argument is so obviously compelling and unanswerable, an Israeli acknowledgment of past injustices and its acceptance at long last of a genuine and fair compromise would have the consequence of legitimizing rather than delegitimizing Israel among all but the most fanatical Palestinians and Arab leaders. An Israeli willingness to face their history, free of the distortions and myths that have blinded them, is the psychological prerequisite for the establishment of peace for both the Palestinians and Israelis.

The United States also has a responsibility to help avert disaster. First of all, it has a moral responsibility, because it has collaborated with the Israelis in blaming the victims and denying the moral complexity of Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, which from the outset has involved a tragic clash of two legitimate nationalist movements with strong claims to the same land. Over fifty years of nearly unconditional moral, diplomatic, economic, and military support of Israel—however well-intentioned, even noble in motivation—has created for the United States a compelling moral obligation now to counterbalance unconstrained Israeli power and level the playing field.

That is precisely what Bill Clinton failed to do. Although he is generally viewed, both in Israel and the United States, as the greatest American friend Israel has ever had, in fact Clinton's collaboration with Israeli intransigence did great harm to true Israeli interests. Two reasons suggest themselves as explanations for Clinton's abdication of U.S. responsibilities. First, he genuinely loved Israel—not wisely, but too well—a sentiment that was uninformed by true understanding of the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Less exaltedly, in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as his foreign policies in general, Clinton repeatedly sacrificed moral principle or American national interests in favor of domestic pandering.

On taking office, Clinton quickly abandoned the policy position of every American president since 1967: that Israeli settlements in the West Bank were both illegal and an obstacle to peace and that Israel had no right to preempt the future of Jerusalem by unilateral actions. George Bush tied at least part of the American economic aid program to an end of Israeli settlement expansion, and this action had a lot to do with the Israeli public's decision to vote for Rabin over Shamir in the 1992 Israeli elections.

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But Clinton, idealizing Rabin, dropped all U.S. pressures and ignored his expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as other actions that undermined the prospects that the Oslo process could bring about a fair settlement. Even after Netanyahu came to power in 1996, Clinton—though now realizing that it was Israel's policies rather than those of the Palestinians that were blocking peace—acted as though he was powerless to do anything about it. By repeatedly assuring Netanyahu that under no circumstances would the United States use its economic and military assistance programs to induce Israeli policy changes, Clinton gratuitously threw away the considerable American leverage.[47]

Finally, while Clinton threw himself into an effort to bring about a peace settlement in his last months in office, his failure was preordained because of his nearly unqualified support for Barak's policies. Even after the breakdown of the negotiations at Camp David, when for the first time the Clinton administration decided to publicly present its own peace plan, in fact the plan differed in only minor ways from Barak's and did not meet the legitimate Palestinian demands about the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the Israeli monopolization of water resources, and an end to the Israeli military control of the West Bank, including the Jordan River valley.[48] Indeed, by not only failing to bridge the Israeli–Palestinian gap but by publicly blaming the Palestinians and even suggesting the possibility of American sanctions against them, Clinton ended up by forfeiting the last remnants of Palestinian or general Arab confidence in U.S. fairness. In the end, Clinton not only completely failed in his sincere but fatally flawed effort to bring about Middle East peace, he triggered a wave of anti-Americanism in the region that has created major problems for American diplomacy in the Bush administration.

Moral obligations aside, the United States has a responsibility to its own self-interests, even to its national security in the most literal sense, to help bring about an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Continued American support of Israeli repression of the Palestinians will certainly further undermine the U.S. relationship with the Arab world, thereby jeopardizing support for such important American national interests as the containment of Iraq and Iran and continued unfettered access to Arab oil. But most important of all, the nuclear or biological terrorism that threatens the Middle East also threatens the United

[47] This is the central point of Quandt's important article, in which he compares the effectiveness of Nixon's and Carter's carrot-and-stick policies to Clinton's ineffectiveness. Note also the 1994 attack of Akiva Eldar, the Washington correspondent for *Ha'aretz*, on Secretary of State Warren Christopher's "groveling" before U.S. Jewish leaders, when he promised "not to put pressure on Israel, God forbid." (*Ha'aretz*, 2 March 1994) Eldar added that the American Jewish community would not thank Clinton if his policy failed—although that prediction proved to be wrong.

[48] For a Palestinian account of Clinton's identification with all the Israeli negotiating positions, see Hanieh, "Camp David Papers." Quandt and Malley have essentially confirmed this Palestinian account and severely criticize Clinton's failure throughout the 1990s to have differentiated American national interests from Israeli positions and to have used both carrots and sticks to induce greater Israeli flexibility. See Quandt, "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict"; Malley, *Jerusalem Post*, 11 March 2001.

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States, because of Arab or Islamic fury at the nearly unqualified U.S. support of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians.

The Bush administration now has two options. It can seriously engage with the problem, but it can do so successfully only if it uses the full range of U.S. leverage over Israel, both carrots and sticks, to induce major changes in Israeli policies. In the past, when the United States has been serious about constraining the Israelis, it has almost always been successful, as for example when it used the leverage afforded by American economic and military assistance programs to induce Israeli pullbacks from Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese territory, following the 1956, 1967, and 1982 Israeli–Arab conflicts. However, if such a strategy is either eschewed or fails, and if Israel cannot be dissuaded from its plunge toward disaster, then the United States must protect itself and its national interests by disengaging, pending the day when a genuinely impartial U.S. diplomatic effort might prove successful.

Finally, the American Jewish community has a significant responsibility. Given the influence of the community in American domestic politics and over the Middle East policies of the U.S. government, no changes in U.S. policy can be expected—at any rate, *before* the potentially impending disasters rather than afterward—in the absence of firm public Jewish support. The first step must be an end of the Jewish community's prediliction to turn a blind eye toward the true history and present realities of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

In light of history, it is hardly surprising that the Jewish community shrinks from public criticism of Israel, or that it cannot bring itself to face the implications of what Israeli historians themselves have revealed. Yet a continued failure to do so would amount to an abdication of the liberal and humanistic values that the Jewish people are supposed to represent, as well as a betrayal of the real interests of their Israeli brethren.

What Israel desperately needs today, above all from its true friends in America, Jews and Gentiles alike, is not the kind of uninformed and mushy love—not to mention pandering—of a Bill Clinton, but the diplomatic equivalent of tough love. In the late 1970s, the Argentine Jewish leader and journalist Jacobo Timerman fled murderous anti-Semitism in his native country to find refuge in Israel—precisely why Israel had been founded. But Timerman did not forget the broader values, other than sheer survival, that the founding of Israel was meant to serve. In the midst of the disastrous Lebanon war—the main architect of which is now prime minister of Israel—Timerman eloquently called on American Jews to help save Israel from itself, a plea that is even more apt today: "It is possible that only the Jewish people outside of Israel can now do something for us. There are Diaspora Jews who have kept the values of our moral and cultural traditions, which have been trampled here by intolerance and nationalism. . . . It may help those of us who are in Israel to cure the sickness that is destroying Israel."[49]

[49] Jacobo Timerman, "Journal of the Longest War, Part 2," *New Yorker*, 25 October 1982, 104.

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

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

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The 2000 Presidential Election: Why Gore Lost

GERALD M. POMPER

The presidential election of 2000 stands at best as a paradox, at worst as a scandal, of American democracy. Democrat Albert Gore won the most votes, a half million more than his Republican opponent George W. Bush, but lost the presidency in the electoral college by a count of 271–267. Even this count was suspect, dependent on the tally in Florida, where many minority voters were denied the vote, ballots were confusing, and recounts were mishandled and manipulated. The choice of their leader came not from the citizens of the nation, but from lawyers battling for five weeks. The final decision was made not by 105 million voters, but by a 5–4 majority of the unelected U.S. Supreme Court, issuing a tainted and partisan verdict.

That decision ended the presidential contest, and George W. Bush now heads the conservative restoration to power, buttressed by thin party control of both houses of Congress. The election of 2000, however, will not fade. It encapsulates the political forces shaping the United States at the end of the twentieth century. Its controversial results will affect the nation for many years of the new era.

The Shape of Politics in 2000

The Geography of the Vote

Not only two candidates, but virtually two nations confronted each other in the election of 2000. While Gore and Bush received essentially identical support in the total popular vote, they drew this support from very different constituen-

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FIGURE 1
The Electoral Map of 2000



cies. The electoral map (Figure 1) illustrates the cleavage. In carrying the preponderance of states (30), Bush changed the landscape of American politics. He swept the interior of the nation, including great swaths of the nation's territory in the South, Border, Plains, and Mountain areas. Gore won in only 20 states (and the District of Columbia), almost all on the geographical fringes of the nation—bordering the Atlantic Ocean (north of the Potomac), the Pacific Ocean, and the Great Lakes.

Reflecting the sharp geographical divisions, which are detailed in the Appendix, the vote varied considerably among the nation's regions and states. While Gore won as much as two-thirds of the votes in New England, he won fewer than one in three in the Mountain states. These differences among the states were considerably more marked than in recent contests.[1]

[1] The standard deviation of the Democratic vote was 9.1 in the 2000 election, compared to 7.0 in 1996 and 6.0 in 1992. Two-thirds of the states fall within this range, above or below the national average.

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The ballots also revealed a rare instance of the conflict between "big states" and "small states" that had been feared by the framers of the Constitution.[2] Gore almost won because he carried six of the nine largest states, an advantage of 165 to 78, while Bush carried thirteen of the nineteen smallest, a 54–23 lead. The Texan's dominance in these small states exactly compensated for his loss of the single largest state, California. Even though he accumulated a million fewer votes than Gore (as well as a smaller plurality) in the combined totals of these states, the inherent tilt of the electoral college toward the smaller states brought a draw in this particular matchup.

The geographical pattern of party support in 2000 was quite similar to that seen in recent elections, a correlation of .94 with the 1996 results.[3] Gore's support among the states was quite similar to that of Clinton—but it was critically smaller across the nation, a median loss of 5 percent. State size aside, the source of Bush's victory was his success in moving eleven states—including Gore's Tennessee and Clinton's Arkansas—that had supported the previous Democratic ticket into the Republican column, adding 112 electoral votes.

The close national division was reflected in some of the states. A shift of merely a quarter of 1 percent of state votes—an infinitesimal national total of 17,000 ballots nationally—would have reversed 55 electoral votes from five states (Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin). Only in these close states, particularly Florida, did votes for the minor candidacies of Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan make a difference—but there they were still an immense influence.

Nader and his Green party won merely 3 percent (2,830,900) of the national vote, far below the 5 percent required to receive federal financial support in the future (his principal goal), even less than the support won by Ross Perot as a third-party candidate in 1996 (8 percent) and 1992 (19 percent), and vastly less than the extravagant attention Nader had attracted in the press. Buchanan did far worse, gaining less than half a million votes (.4390), even though he had over $12 million in federal money, inherited from the Reform party previously headed by Perot.

Despite their small numbers, Nader's and Buchanan's supporters provided the margin of victory for Bush. If Nader had not been on the ballot, Gore would have carried Florida and all of the other close states easily, giving him a comfortable electoral total of at least 292.[4] If Buchanan had not been a candidate,

[2] For an incisive analysis of the actual patterns of conflict at the Constitutional Convention, see Calvin Jillson, *Constitution Making* (New York: Agathon Press, 1988).

[3] This figure is the simple regression of the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in 2000 and 1996, excluding the outlying District of Columbia. The correlation with the three-party vote of 1996 is .95. Correlation of the 2000 and 1992 vote is .86 for the two-party vote and .79 for the three-party vote.

[4] In the VNS exit poll, approximately half (47 percent) of the Nader voters said they would choose Gore in a two-man race, a fifth (21 percent) would choose Bush, and a third (32 percent) would not vote. Applying these figures to the actual vote, Gore would have achieved a net gain of 26,000 votes in Florida, far more than needed to carry the state easily; increased margins in the other close states; and a net gain of nearly 6,000 in New Hampshire, bringing him to a virtual tie.

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the Florida ballot might have been simpler to understand, giving Gore enough votes to win the national election simply by carrying the Sunshine State. Even without Florida, we might speculate—but cannot demonstrate—that an election without Nader would have enabled Gore to campaign in other winnable states (most obviously Tennessee and New Hampshire) and overcome his shortfall of only three electoral votes.

Parties and the Vote

The geography of the election reflected a changing pattern of party loyalties. As the nation endured this odd election at the beginning of the new millennium, major changes in the character of its political parties also emerged.

Two major divisions had structured American presidential elections for much of the twentieth century.[5] During the middle of the century, Democrats dominated, building successive victories on economic and welfare issues and on the heritage of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. The major controversies between the parties centered on the role of the national government, particularly its distribution of taxes and benefits—such as jobs, Social Security, and health care—among different groups. Democrats won all but two presidential elections from 1932 to 1964, assembling a winning coalition of lower-income voters, Catholics, union members, blacks, and white southerners.

During the latter third of the century, new issues and new coalitions came to the fore. Cleavages on issues of race, morality, and lifestyle developed alongside the previous divisions on economic and welfare policy. The parties differed on such issues as civil rights and affirmative action, abortion, women's role in society, crime, and school prayer. Republicans reversed the previous pattern of presidential elections, winning five of the six contests from 1968 to 1988, assembling a different winning coalition composed of higher-income voters, white Protestants from both the North and the South, religious conservatives, and defecting Catholics and union members. Even when Democrats won—in 1976 and in the two Clinton candidacies—their victories were unconvincing.

The election of 2000 merged or obliterated many of these divisions. During the Clinton years, Democrats overcame their losing reputation on moralistic issues, as Clinton became identified with such stands as harsh treatment of criminals (including support for the death penalty) and welfare reform. The president maintained his popularity even after revelation of his sexual immorality, as seen in the failure of the Republican effort to impeach and remove him from office.

In 2000 Republicans also moved away from previous unattractive positions. On the economic dimension, no longer opposed to all government programs,

[5] See Edward G. Carmines and Geoffrey C. Layman, "Issue Evolution in Postwar American Politics" in Byron E. Shafer, *Present Discontents* (New York: Chatham House, 1997), 89–134, and William G. Mayer, *The Divided Democrats* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

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the party under Governor Bush proposed new policies to improve education, expand health care, and add funds and programs to Social Security and Medicare. Still conservative, the Bush Republicans now modified their ideology by proclaiming a new "compassionate" outlook and reduced their emphasis on moral issues, particularly abortion. Without overt change in his pro-life stance, George W. Bush gave only fleeting attention to the previously divisive issue, promising no more than a ban on unpopular and rare late-term ("partial birth") abortions.

Differences remained significant, but the election campaign was notable for the similarity of the issues stressed by the candidates and for the disappearance of older conflicts. A generation earlier, in 1972, Republicans had accused Democrats of favoring "acid, amnesty, and abortion"; that bitter campaign would be later remembered for Richard Nixon's efforts to destroy his opponents and subvert the Constitution in the Watergate break-in.

The old controversies were gone or had become consensual policies. Drug usage was condemned, and abortion was ignored. Vietnam, the conflict that had defined a generation and its lifestyle, was now a country to be visited by Clinton, once a draft resister and now the U.S. commander-in-chief. Emblematic of the change was that the Democratic party, once the arena for the greatest antiwar protests, nominated Gore, a volunteer who had actually served briefly in the war zone, while the Republicans nominated Bush, who had found a safe billet in the Texas Air National Guard.

There remained a basic philosophic difference between the parties and their leaders. Republicans' instincts still led them first to seek solutions through private actions or through the marketplace, while Democrats consistently looked for government solutions. That difference was evident in such fundamental questions as allocation of the windfall surpluses in the federal budget: Bush sought a huge across-the-board cut in taxes, while Gore proposed a panoply of new government programs and tax cuts targeted for specific policy purposes.

Similar differences could be seen on other issues emphasized during the campaign. To improve education, Bush relied on state programs and testing, while hinting at his support for government vouchers that parents might use for private-school tuition; Gore proposed new federal programs to recruit teachers and rebuild schools. To provide funds for Social Security, Bush proposed that individuals invest part of their tax payments in private investment accounts, while Gore would transfer other governmental funds into the Social Security trust fund. This philosophical difference could be seen even in the most intimate matters, such as teenage pregnancy, where Republicans relied on individual morality, namely, sexual abstinence by adolescents, while Democrats supported sex education programs, which might include distribution of condoms in public schools.

By 2000 the parties' supporters had become philosophically coherent as well. Fewer than one of every thirteen Republicans considered themselves lib-

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erals, and fewer than one in eight Democrats were conservatives. Voters also responded to the ideological difference between the parties: four out of five self-identified liberals voted Democratic, and the same proportion of conservatives voted Republican, often giving greater weight to ideological preference than to traditional party loyalty (see Table 1). The partisan contest of 2000 was also an ideological conflict.

Social Forces and the Vote

In addition to geographical and party differences, the American electorate was polarized along social lines, as detailed in Table 1.[6] These cleavages can be seen in the difference in the Gore vote between the following paired groups (the first group being more Democratic):

- the poor and the rich, a 14-point difference;
- single and married people, 13 points;
- working women and homemakers, 14 points;
- gays and straights, 23 points;
- nonbelievers and frequent churchgoers, 25 points;
- Catholics and white Protestants, 15 points;
- Jews and white Christians, 40 points;
- other voters and the religious right, 36 points;
- residents of large cities and rural areas, 34 points;
- high school dropouts and college graduates, 14 points; and
- union members and nonmembers, 18 points.

Only age, of the major social categories, did not show significant differences between groups.[7] In 2000 the United States was not united.

Most prominent, although unfortunately not novel, was the "racial gap" between blacks' support for Gore and whites' for Bush (a 48-percentage-point difference in the vote of the two races). While the white vote for Gore was similar to that for Clinton, African-American support for the Republican candidate was lower than in any election since the 1960s.

Bush had made some efforts to gain more minority votes, giving blacks prominent roles in the party convention and arguing that some of his programs, such as educational testing, would particularly benefit this group. These appeals turned out to be fruitless, however, given the Republican's conservative position on welfare issues and affirmative action. Black groups, such as the N.A.A.C.P., mounted a multimillion-dollar campaign to increase minority turnout, expecting that the mobilized voters would be Democrats. Although

[6] Support for Nader was low in all groups, too low for meaningful analysis, and varied little among social groups. He received 5 percent or more in the national exit poll only among 18–29 year-old white men, non-churchgoers, white liberal Independents, and former Perot voters.

[7] This analysis is based on the VNS national exit poll, as published in the *New York Times*, 12 November 2000, supplemented by data provided by CBS News.

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the black proportion of the electorate remained essentially unchanged at 10 percent, these efforts probably were decisive in close northern states. It would require more than televised black faces to win black votes for the Republicans.

Other ethnic minorities also supported the Democrats. Both parties paid special attention to Latinos, knowing that they would soon be the largest nonwhite group in the population and that they already comprised a significant voting bloc in critical states such as California, Texas, and Florida. Despite Bush's command of Spanish and past Hispanic backing in Texas, the Republican fell short, prevailing only among Cuban Americans in Florida. Two-thirds of Latinos voted for Gore, a proportion similar to that won by Clinton. In a possible portent of the future, Asian Americans, still a small group among voters, changed to a pro-Democratic vote from 1996, when a plurality voted for Dole.

In recent elections, much attention has been paid to the differing attitudes and votes of women and men, the vaunted "gender gap." That gap should not be exaggerated, because much of the difference can be explained simply as a reflection of party loyalties—both sexes overwhelmingly voted for the candidate of their preferred party. Democratic women and men both voted for Gore (by 87 percent and 85 percent), just as Republican women and men both voted for Bush (by 90 percent and 92 percent). Sex differences became significant only among Independents, where Gore led by 12 points among women, offset by Bush's 9-point lead among men.

Still, the gender gap was evident again, but different from the past, in the presidential vote of 2000. While Bush won 53 percent among men, he gained only 43 percent among women. Gore's opposite advantage among women (54 percent to 42 percent) was insufficient to overcome the Texas governor. This "gap" between the sexes was the largest difference in the twenty years since it first became apparent.

The Bush advantage was even greater among whites. White women divided their vote evenly between Bush and Gore, eliminating any net effect on the total vote. White men voted 5–3 in favor of Bush. This Republican strength among white males was the overwhelming gender influence in the election, probably gaining Bush a net advantage of over 4 million votes.[8]

An explanation for this difference is not easy to find. The simplest reason would be issues with particular impact on one sex or another, with abortion the

[8] There are approximately 39.4 million white male voters: 100 million persons voted, 82 percent are white, and 48 percent of the whites are males ($100 \times .82 \times .48 = 39.4$). There is no net candidate advantage among white women. Applying the 12-point white gender difference to the male vote, the net advantage to Bush is 4.7 million votes ($39.4 \times .12$). Among blacks, there is overwhelming support for Gore among both sexes. The gender gap there results in a female advantage for Gore. There are approximately 5.2 million black female voters: 100 million persons voted, 10 percent are black, and 52 percent of the blacks are females ($100 \times .10 \times .52$). Black men voted 85 percent for Gore, black women 94 percent. Applying the 9-point gender difference to the black female vote, the net advantage for Gore is under half a million votes ($5.2 \times .09$). Combining the races, the gender gap resulted in a Bush gain of over 4 million votes. Calculations are based on the VNS national exit poll.

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TABLE 1

Social Groups and the Presidential Vote (in percentages)

Pct. of 2000 Total Vote	Party and Ideology	2000 Gore	2000 Bush	1996 Clinton	1996 Dole	1996 Perot	1992 Clinton	1992 Bush	1992 Perot
2	Liberal Republicans	31	67	44	48	9	17	54	30
14	Moderate Republicans	11	88	20	72	7	15	63	21
19	Conservative Republicans	4	95	6	88	5	5	82	13
5	Liberal Independents	68	17	58	15	18	54	17	30
15	Moderate Independents	48	41	50	30	17	43	28	30
6	Conservative Independents	17	79	19	60	19	17	53	30
13	Liberal Democrats	91	5	89	5	4	86	5	11
20	Moderate Democrats	86	12	84	10	5	76	9	15
5	Conservative Democrats	73	26	69	23	7	61	23	16
	Ethnic Group								
82	White	42	54	43	46	9	39	40	20
10	Black	90	8	84	12	4	83	10	7
4	Hispanic	67	31	72	21	6	61	25	14
2	Asian	54	41	43	48	8	31	55	15
	Sex and Race								
39	White men	36	60	38	49	11	37	40	22
43	White women	48	49	48	43	8	41	41	19
4	Black men	85	12	78	15	5	78	13	9
6	Black women	94	6	89	8	2	87	8	5
	Sex and Marital Status								
32	Married men	38	58	40	48	10	38	42	21
33	Married women	48	49	48	43	7	41	40	19
16	Unmarried men	48	46	49	35	12	48	29	22
19	Unmarried women	63	32	62	28	7	53	31	15
	Age								
17	18–29 years old	48	46	53	34	10	43	34	22
33	30–44 years old	48	49	48	41	9	41	38	21
28	45–59 years old	48	19	48	41	9	41	40	19
22	60 years and older	51	47	48	44	7	50	38	12
	Education								
5	Not a high school graduate	59	39	59	28	11	54	28	18
21	High school graduate	48	49	51	35	13	43	36	21
32	Some college education	45	51	48	40	10	41	37	21
24	College graduate	45	51	44	46	8	39	41	20
18	Post-graduate education	52	44	52	40	5	50	36	14
	Religion								
47	White Protestant	34	63	36	53	10	33	47	21
26	Catholic	49	47	53	37	9	44	35	20
4	Jewish	79	19	76	16	3	80	11	9
	Family Income								
7	Under 15,000	57	37	59	28	11	58	23	19
16	$15,000–$29,999	54	41	53	36	9	45	35	20
24	$30,000–$49,999	49	48	48	40	10	41	38	21
53	Over $50,000	45	52	44	48	7	39	44	17
28	Over $75,000	44	53	41	51	7	36	48	16
15	Over $100,000	43	54	38	54	6	—	—	—
26	**Union Household**	59	37	59	30	9	55	24	21

(*continued*)

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TABLE 1

Continued

Pct. of 2000 Total Vote	Party and Ideology	2000 Gore	2000 Bush	1996 Clinton	1996 Dole	1996 Perot	1992 Clinton	1992 Bush	1992 Perot
	Size of place								
9	Population over 500,000	71	26	68	25	6	58	28	13
20	Population 50,000–500,000	57	40	50	39	8	50	33	16
43	Suburbs	47	49	47	42	8	41	39	21
5	Population 10,000–50,000	38	59	48	41	9	39	42	20
23	Rural areas	37	59	44	46	10	39	40	20

most obvious possibility. But there is almost no difference between men and women on their "pro-choice" or "pro-life" attitudes. Moreover, although attitudes on abortion were mirrored well in the vote, that issue was actually of very little importance in this election campaign.

Issues may have produced the large gender gap in more subtle ways. Gore's policy agenda was a more "female" agenda, in a political rather than biological sense: the vice president focused on questions likely to be of more concern to women because of their social situation. The social reality in the United States is that women bear a greater responsibility for children's education and for health care of their families and parents, and that women constitute a disproportionate number of the aged. This reality was reflected in political concerns, as women saw education, health care, and Medicare as the principal issues of the election.[9] For these reasons, Gore's greater readiness to use government to solve these problems might appeal particularly to women.

A gender gap has two sides, however, and in 2000 it reflected men's preferences even more than women's. Bush's appeal, too, can be found in particular issues. The social reality is that men are more likely to be the principal source of family income and to assume greater responsibility for family finances. This reality was again mirrored in issue emphases, with men making the state of the economy and taxes their leading priorities, with defense and Social Security of lesser importance.

The gender difference in issue focus was the foundation of gender difference in the vote. Gore was favored among voters who emphasized the "female" issues of health care (an advantage of 31 percent), education (8 percent), and Social Security (18 percent), and Medicare (21 percent). But Bush was favored far more strongly on taxes (a huge advantage of 63 percent) and on world affairs and defense (14 percent), as well as on lesser issues that brought male attention, such as the stereotypically gendered issue of gun ownership.

[9] Gary Langer, "New Republican, Old Issues," analyzing the ABC News poll, reported at (www.abcnews.go.com), November 2000.

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The Campaign

The presidential race should have been a runaway, according to precampaign estimates. In the end, to be sure, the outcome came down to miscounting or manipulation of the last few ballots. Analytically, however, the puzzling question is why Gore did so badly, not why Bush won.

The economy, usually the largest influence on voters, had evidenced the longest period of prosperity in American history, over a period virtually identical with the Democratic administration. A second predictor, the popularity of the incumbent president, also pointed to a Gore victory, for President Clinton was holding to 60-percent approval of his job performance. In elaborate analyses just as the campaign formally began on Labor Day, academic experts unanimously predicted a Gore victory. Their only disagreements came on the size of his expected victory, with predictions of Gore's majority ranging from 51 to 60 percent of the two-party popular vote.[10]

The academic models failed. It is simpler to explain Clinton's inability to transfer his popularity to his selected successor. Vice presidents always labor under a burden of appearing less capable than the sitting chief executive, and there is a normal inclination on the part of the electorate to seek a change. Previous incumbent vice presidents, such as the original George Bush in 1988 and Richard Nixon in 1960, had borne this burden in their own White House campaigns, but Gore's burden was even heavier, because he needed to avoid contact with the ethical stain of Clinton's affair with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.

The Perils of Prosperity

The limited impact of economic prosperity is more difficult to explain. Although the public overwhelmingly thought the economy was doing well and saw the nation as on "the right track" economically, Gore received little or no political advantage from this optimism. Only a fraction thought him better qualified than Bush to maintain the good times.

There are at least three possible explanations. First, because prosperity had gone on so long, voters may have come to see it as "natural" and unrelated to the decisions and policies of elected politicians. Second, voters might not know whom to praise and reward for their economic fortunes, since both parties in their platforms claimed credit for the boom. These explanations seem weak, however, because two out of three voters believed Clinton was either "somewhat" or "very" responsible for the nation's rosy conditions.

A third explanation, better supported by the opinion data, finds that Gore did not properly exploit the advantages offered by his administration's eco-

[10] Robert G. Kaiser, "Is This Any Way to Pick A Winner?" *Washington Post*, 26 May 2000. On the day of the election, the political scientists were less confident: David Stout, "Experts, Once Certain, Now Say Gore Is a Maybe," *New York Times*, 7 November 2000.

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TABLE 2

Economic Effects on the Presidential Vote (percentage voting for Gore)

	Change in Personal Financial Situation			
	Better Off (51%)	*About Same (38%)*	*Worse Off (11%)*	*Total*
View of National Economy				
Excellent (19%)	76	52	58	70
Good (68%)	56	34	31	45
Not so good/poor (13%)	44	29	29	33
Total	61	35	33	

Source: Calculated by the author from VNS exit poll data.

nomic record. In his campaign appeals, Gore would briefly mention the record of prosperity but then emphasize his plans for the future. The approach was typified by his convention acceptance speech:

> [O]ur progress on the economy is a good chapter in our history. But now we turn the page and write a new chapter. . . . This election is not an award for past performance. I'm not asking you to vote for me on the basis of the economy we have. Tonight, I ask for your support on the basis of the better, fairer, more prosperous America we can build together.[11]

Rhetorically and politically, Gore conceded the issue of prosperity to Bush. The Texas governor, too, saw both a good present economy and a challenge for future improvement in his convention speech:

> This is a remarkable moment in the life of our nation. Never has the promise of prosperity been so vivid. But times of plenty, like times of crisis, are tests of American character. . . . Our opportunities are too great, our lives too short, to waste this moment. So tonight we vow to our nation: We will seize this moment of American promise. We will use these good times for great goals.[12]

Gore lost the advantages of the strong economy he inherited when, reviewing the past, he did not tie himself to this record. In the public's evaluation of the present, the vice president won among those who considered the economy "excellent" and their own financial situation improved in the past year. But he did not reap votes from those who considered the economy simply "good," or their own situation unchanged (see Table 2).

Looking to the future, Gore led among those who thought the economy would improve in the next year, and trailed among the smaller number who expected an economic deterioration. The critical group, however, was the majority who thought the economy would remain stable—in this group, Gore trailed slightly (by 47 to 49 percent). Gore failed in the election because he failed to convince this swing group that continued prosperity depended on continued Democratic governance.

[11] *New York Times*, 18 August 2000.

[12] *New York Times*, 4 August 2000.

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Gender may also have played a role in undermining Gore's inherited advantage on the economy. Although voters who emphasized this vital factor did favor the vice president (59 to 37 percent), he gained far fewer votes (a 15-percent gain) on the issue than Clinton had four years earlier (34 percent), even though the economy had strengthened during the period. Here, too, as on issues generally, Gore emphasized the "female" side of his policy positions, such as targeting tax cuts toward education or home care of the elderly. He offered little for men who would not benefit from affirmative action in the workplace or who would use money returned from taxes for other purposes. As a result, he gained far less from men (57 percent) than from women (68 percent) who gave priority to economic issues.

In theoretical terms, the vice president turned the election away from an advantageous retrospective evaluation of the past eight years to an uncertain prospective choice based on future expectations.[13] Because the future is always clouded, voters often use past performance to evaluate the prospective programs offered by candidates,[14] but Gore did little to focus voters' attention on the Democratic achievements. As the academic literature might have warned him, even in good times "there is still an opponent who may succeed in stimulating even more favorable future expectations. And he may win."[15]

More generally, Gore neglected to put the election into a broader context—of the administration's record, of party, or of the Republican record in Congress. All of these elements might have been used to bolster his chances, but he, along with Bush, instead made the election a contest between two individuals and their personal programs. In editing his own message so severely, Gore made it less persuasive. If the campaign were to be only a choice of future programs, with their great uncertainties, a Bush program might be as convincing to the voters as a Gore program. If the election were to be only a choice of the manager of a consensual agenda, Bush's individual qualities might well be more attractive.

The Democratic candidate had the advantage of leadership of the party that held a thin plurality of voters' loyalties. His party was historically identified with the popular programs that were predominant in voters' minds—Social Security, Medicare, education, and health care—and the Democrats were still regarded in 2000 as more capable to deal with problems in those areas. Yet Gore eschewed a partisan appeal. In the three television debates, illustratively, he mentioned his party only four times, twice citing his disagreement with other Democrats on the Gulf War, and twice incidentally.[16] Only Bush would ever

[13] Morris Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

[14] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), chap. 3.

[15] Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting*, 198.

[16] My thanks go to Marjorie Hershey, who provided this information from her computer search of the television debates' text.

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commend the Democratic party, claiming a personal ability to deal effectively with his nominal opposition.

Gore neither challenged this argument, nor attacked the Republicans who had controlled Congress for the past six years, although promising targets were available. The vice president might have blamed Republicans for inaction on his priority programs, such as Social Security and the environment. He might have drawn more attention to differences on issues on which his position was supported by public opinion, such as abortion rights or gun control. He could even have revived the impeachment controversy, blaming Republicans for dragging out a controversy that Americans had found wearying and partisan.[17] The public had certainly disapproved of Clinton's personal conduct, but it had also steadily approved of the president's job performance. That distinction could have been the basis for renewed criticism of the Republicans. Yet Gore stayed silent.

Gore's strategy was based on an appeal to the political center and to the undecided voters gathered there. At the party convention and in his acceptance speech, he did try to rouse Democrats by pointing to party differences—and the effort brought him a fleeting lead in opinion polls. From that point on, however, moving in a different direction, he usually attempted to mute those differences, and his lead disappeared. If there were no important differences, then Democratic voters had little reason to support a candidate whose personal traits were less than magnetic. Successful campaigns "temporarily change the basis of political involvement from citizenship to partisanship."[18] By underplaying his party, Gore lost a vital margin of votes, as more Democrats than Republicans defected.

Turnout may have made the difference in the election results. Nationally, there was only a small increase over the last election in voter participation, to 51 percent of all adults, although there were considerable increases in the most contested states, particularly by union household members and African Americans.

Usually, the preferences of nonvoters are not much different from those who actually cast ballots,[19] but the 2000 election may have been an exception to that rule. CBS News polls immediately before and after the balloting suggested that, if every citizen had actually voted, both the popular and electoral votes would have led to an overwhelming Gore victory.[20] The nonvoters, how-

[17] Molly W. Sonner and Clyde Wilcox, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Public Support for Bill Clinton during the Lewinsky Scandal," *PS* 32 (September 1999): 554–57; and John Zaller, "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution to Political Science," *PS* 31 (June 1998): 182–87.

[18] Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 8–9.

[19] Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 108–14.

[20] In the CBS poll released on 5 November, those expected *not* to vote favored Gore by 42 to 28 percent. In the CBS poll released on 13 November, as the electoral count remained undetermined, those who regretted not voting favored Gore by 53 to 33 percent.

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FIGURE 2
The Presidential Race in the Polls



ever, had less information about the election and less confidence in the political system, and they were less likely to see a difference between the parties.[21]

A stronger Gore effort to explain these differences and to bring those uncommitted citizens to the polls might have made the election result quite different. A greater emphasis on the economic record of the administration might have been particularly important in spurring turnout among lower-income voters, who voted in considerably lower proportions than in recent elections.[22]

Issues and Character in the Campaign

In 2000 the campaign was sharply contested, but reasonably civil—until the postelection period. Attacks abounded, but they focused on real issue differences between Gore and Bush, as each contestant worried over the public's declared aversion to personal, negative campaigning.

Bush is credited with a skillful campaign, but this judgment may be nothing more than the halo effect of eventually being the winner. Actually, Bush was criticized for his campaign both at its beginning and when he faced defeat during the recount. Moreover, the exit polls indicated that those who made up their minds later in the campaign were more likely to vote for Gore, despite his defective strategy, than for the presumptively better campaigner, Bush. Overall, in fact, the campaign seemed to have had very little effect. Once the nominating conventions concluded, Bush and Gore were tied at the outset of the active campaign on Labor Day, and they remained tied on the day of the balloting—

[21] Reported by the Vanishing Voter Project of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (www.vanishingvoter.org), November 2000.

[22] A minority of the voters (47 percent) had annual family incomes below $50,000, compared to 61 percent in 1996 and 68 percent in 1992. This change is far greater than the growth in income during these years.

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TABLE 3

Issues in the Campaign of 2000 (Days Emphasizing Designated Issues)

Topic	*Bush*	*Gore*
Foreign and Defense Policy		
Diplomacy	3	2
Military defense	2	
Domestic Issues		
Education/family policy	8	10
Health coverage	1	2
Social Security	5	3
Medicare, prescription drugs	4	5
Crime, gun control, drugs	1	
Economic management	1	8
Taxes, budget	11	9
Environment/energy	4	5
Social Issues		
Morality, pornography, media	2	3
Campaign finance	1	1
Civil rights		2
Abortion		
Clinton behavior		
Political Focus		
Candidate character	8	4
Debates/preparation	10	8
No Public Activity	3	2
Total	64	64

Source: Lead issue reported daily in the *New York Times*, 4 September–7 November 2000.

and beyond. The lack of substantial change is seen in the track of the polls, in shown in Figure 2.

Specific events, such as the television debates, probably changed opinion from day to day, as indicated by the incessant polls, but they are probably given exaggerated importance. Bush made some errors in language, and Gore was not a model of etiquette. Gore could have been more vivacious in appearance, and Bush could have been more humble in demeanor. In the overall campaign, however, voters focused on the central decisions—the direction and leadership of their nation in the new century.

No single issue dominated the campaign. Education, health care, Medicare and Social Security, defense, the federal budget, and taxes were among the priority issues for the voters, but none focused the voters' minds in the way that the economy had done in the Clinton elections.

Both Gore and Bush talked about these issues and each gave considerable attention to the same issues, enabling the voters to make a reasoned choice between the two candidates (see Table 3). Bush apparently won on important elements of the issue debate. A slightly greater proportion found that he shared their general view of government (51 percent compared to 47 percent). More

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TABLE 4

Sources of the Presidential Vote

	Percentage Mentioning	*Percentage Voting for*		*Contribution to Vote of*	
		Gore	*Bush*	*Gore*	*Bush*
Issue					
Economy/jobs	18	59	37	12	8
Education	15	52	44	9	8
Social Security	14	58	40	9	6
Taxes	14	17	80	3	13
World affairs	12	40	54	5	7
Health care	8	64	33	6	3
Medicare/prescription drugs	7	60	39	5	3
Totals				49	48
Traits					
Honest	24	15	80	4	21
Experienced	15	82	17	13	3
Strong leader	14	34	64	5	10
Deal with complexity	13	75	19	10	3
Good judgment	13	48	50	7	7
Cares about people	12	63	31	8	4
Likeable	2	38	59	1	1
Totals	93			48	48

Source: Calculated by the author from VNS exit poll data.

specifically, voters tended to prefer the Republican's plan for across-the-board tax cuts and his proposal to allow individual investment of Social Security taxes.

When voters evaluated the candidates on Election Day, they took two different approaches. On most issues, Gore was preferred. On seven possible issues, Gore won the votes of more voters who emphasized five of them. Bush was seen as better only among those who were primarily concerned with taxes and world affairs, the latter reflecting men's concern with military defense.

When it came to individual character traits, however, Bush was deemed superior on most traits, particularly honesty and strength of leadership. He was also viewed as less likely "to say anything to get elected" and less prone to engage in unfair attacks. These individual characteristics are relevant to the conduct of the presidency, and voters should not be denigrated because they used these standards at the ballot box. On the other hand, voters gave little stress to Bush's greater "likability," a criterion of little relevance to government. Ultimately, his perceived character traits carried the day for the governor (see Table 4).[23]

[23] The calculation for the last columns is a simple multiplication of the percentage of all responses citing the specific issue or trait by the percentage in that group voting for a particular candidate. Since all respondents did not answer these questions, the resulting figures are then normalized to a base of 100. For example, 18 percent cited the economy and jobs as the most important issue, 59 percent of this group voted for Gore, and all responses summed to 88 percent. The contribution to the Gore vote then = .18 × .59 / .88 = .12. Nader's appeal was spread across many issues and traits, with some particular appeal on the foreign policy issues, probably trade, and his presumed caring quality.

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FIGURE 3
Dynamics of the Presidential Vote, 1996–2000



The vote showed significant shifts from 1996 (see Figure 3), working to Bush's advantage. There was more party switching by former Clinton supporters than by former Dole supporters, and previous backers of Perot also moved more heavily toward the Republicans.

The Clinton scandal probably had some effect on these patterns, giving more prominence to character traits and providing more reason for party switching. Although most of the country gave little weight to the Lewinsky affair, a fourth did find it "very important." Majorities of voters continued both to praise Clinton's job performance and to disapprove of his personal behavior. A particularly important group was made up of those who combined these two attitudes, a fifth of the electorate. Although these voters strongly supported Gore (by 63 percent to 33 percent for Bush), that was still a smaller vote harvest than Gore might have reaped in an electoral field unsown with Clinton's wild oats. Among these ambivalent voters, Gore lost 15 percent of former Clinton supporters, not a large number but enough (2 percent of the national total) to be the decisive difference in the electoral standoff.

The election carried implications for the parties beyond the confusing and close results of 2000. Both could read the returns as encouraging portents for the future. The Republicans had won control, however narrow, of all branches of the government. The congressional revolution of 1994, which ended four decades of Democratic control, was maintained into a fourth Republican term.

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They would hold the White House for four years, and could fill the three likely vacancies on the Supreme Court. The public was more conservative than liberal and more supportive of the party's call for reduced government. If prosperity held, the ranks of upper-income voters and the entrepreneurial spirit would grow.

Democrats could also find comfort. The taint of Bush's minority victory and the ballot recounts might enfeeble his administration and provide an immediate platform for the Democratic party's return to power in 2002 and 2004. The population was increasingly diverse ethnically, and the demographic growth among Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans was likely to bolster Democratic ranks. Its modernist cultural values, including gender equality, were increasingly shared throughout the nation.[24] The union movement had revived and had demonstrated skill and unity in mobilizing its members. The nation was divided in 2000, but Democrats could hope to revive and thrive in the future.

THE OUTLOOK FOR AMERICAN POLITICS

The long election of 2000 eventually settled the primary question, the identity of the new president. Yet it raised new issues, even fundamental questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of American institutions.

The Presidency

President George W. Bush enters the presidency without any mandate and with half of the nation questioning his legitimate title to the White House. He shares power with a Congress essentially evenly divided between the parties, and he will confront the bitterness of disappointed Democrats. The public, now more knowledgeable and more cynical about political maneuvering, provides no clear policy direction for governing a divided nation.

Still, the government will function. Even though the president had only half the votes, he has all of the executive power. His predecessor, Clinton, also lacked a popular majority yet managed effectively to use the powers of his office—appointments, executive orders, vetoes, budgets, and agenda-setting. The mail will be delivered, the diplomatic corps and the armed forces will be ready to defend American interests abroad, appropriations will eventually be passed.

Perhaps the new president will show unexpected skill in conciliating his opposition and bringing the citizenry together on a moderate agenda. Perhaps he will develop a personal magnetism to inspire public enthusiasm, a quality unseen in either candidate during the campaign. More likely is failure to innovate solutions to national problems and continued deadlock on such issues as health care, Social Security, campaign finance reform, and foreign policy in the post–

[24] Alan Wolfe, *One Nation, After All* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998).

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cold war world. Most likely is a contentious election in 2004, when the incumbent president will try to defend his questionable title to office.

The election result will reinforce the recently diminished status of the presidency. With the ending of the cold war, foreign policy became less of an immediate concern for the nation. The institutional effect was to decrease the significance of the president, the principal officer of foreign policy. Economic prosperity has had a similar effect. With no apparent need for government intervention to maintain employment and growth, the economic leadership of the president has become less critical. Instead, the vital decisions seem to be those of the unelected Federal Reserve Board, whose chair, Alan Greenspan, is often given the most credit for the long-term boom.

In addition to these general impersonal influences, Clinton weakened the moral standing of the presidency by his personal conduct, and the office was further diminished by the Republican impeachment and its focus on Clinton's salacious affair. The presidency has been a powerful position because it combines the "dignity" of a head of state with the "efficiency" of a head of government.[25] Losing much of the majesty of the office also means a partial loss of its utility.

Because of the Clinton-Lewinsky-impeachment controversy, the personal traits of the next president became an important element in the 2000 election, and this was a principal source of Bush's appeal. The nation now may regain ritualistic "dignity and honor" in the White House, as both candidates pledged. It is less likely, however, to regain the political advantages of a strong presidency—national unity, policy leadership, and inspiration to great goals.

The Electoral College

The election vindicated the genius of the seemingly plodding institutions of the American republic, the Constitution, and particularly the electoral college. The Framers had devised the electoral system for an age in which transportation and communication were slow, but it served the country well in a time of jet planes and e-mail. By providing a long interval between the popular vote and the meeting of the electors, the system provided time to count and recount votes, to argue and settle lawsuits, to begin cooling passions, and to allow a degree of routine transition to a new administration.

Those advantages should be kept in mind in the inevitable consideration of changes in the electoral college.[26] If the present system were changed, politics would change, as campaigners altered their techniques and redirected their efforts, and we cannot predict all of the consequences. We can, however, make some estimates of the political impact.

[25] Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* [1867] (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), chap. 1.

[26] See Judith Best, *The Choice of the People?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) for elaboration of the competing arguments and proposals.

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The most obvious change would be to abolish the electoral college altogether and to choose the president by direct popular vote. In 2000 the result would have been a narrow Gore victory. Realistically, this change is unlikely to pass the difficult barriers to constitutional amendment, since the present system works to the advantage of small states, which could prevent an amendment from passing the Senate or the state legislatures.

If adopted, however, this new system would have its own problems. In a close election such as 2000, recounts would surely be demanded throughout the nation. The clumsy election administration evident in Florida is not unique; defects exist in every state and county. A difference of only a hundred votes per county—as little as one vote in every other precinct—would have reversed the results in 2000, so partisans would be mining every possible vein of new votes. A national recount would mean that the extended delays already experienced in the one state would be replicated everywhere, making it unlikely that America would have a president clearly accepted in time for the inauguration.

A frequently heard proposal for change within the electoral college is to alter the means of choosing the electors within the individual states, which could be done simply by state legislatures without amending the U.S. Constitution. Imitating the system presently used in Maine and Nebraska, one elector could be awarded to the leading presidential candidate in each congressional district (corresponding to the members of the House), and two (corresponding to the state's senators) could be awarded to the statewide winner. One immediate effect would be to extend the partisanship of congressional redistricting, known as gerrymandering, to the presidential election.

In 2000 the result of this system would probably be a clear Bush victory, despite his minority in the country. Assuming the presidential vote had followed that for the House, Bush would win 222 votes from the individual congressional districts where Republicans won House seats, and he would add 60 votes from the 30 states he captured. This total of 282 electoral votes would be an even greater distortion of the popular vote than the actual results in the election.

Another proposal has been to divide the electoral college vote of each state in proportion to the popular vote in each state, rather than awarding blocs on the winner-take-all system. In 2000, a proportional division would have led to an even closer result, in favor of Bush, than the actual count: Bush would have received 262.6 electoral votes, Gore 261.4, and Nader 13.8.[27] The proportional system would have made Bush the president with neither a majority nor a plurality of the popular vote. This result would again evidence the tilt of the electoral college toward the small states, but it would certainly not reflect the total electorate's preferences any better than the present system.

Any change other than direct popular vote would lack democratic legitimacy, but the direct vote would suffer such great problems in operation that it

[27] Calculated, to three decimal places, from the vote totals in the Appendix table. The remaining 0.2 electoral votes would be cast for minor candidates such as Buchanan.

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is unlikely to be adopted. Perhaps the only change that can be easily made is to abolish the actual position of elector—to avoid the possibility of "faithless" electors—and simply award the votes mathematically. A minimum and necessary statutory change would provide a better and uniform system of electoral administration under federal law.

Restoring Legitimacy

Beyond the presidency, the election of 2000 has raised troubling questions about the stability of American government generally. In the heat of the recount controversies, the integrity of the entire electoral process was questioned. Both the Gore and Bush camps saw the opposition as preparing a "legal coup d'état." Party competition was denigrated as illegitimate opposition, directly contradicting the basic premise of a healthy democracy.

Democrats saw ballot manipulation in the actions of the Florida secretary of state—who was characterized as a "Soviet commissar"—and in the counting of overseas ballots. Republicans attacked the courts for "legalistic" interpretations of statutes, although courts are precisely designed for such work. Demonstrators attempted, with some apparent success, to disrupt the recount in Miami. A leading conservative intellectual found a "constitutional crisis... preferable to supine yielding to an imperial judiciary."[28] In keeping with this defiant attitude, the Florida legislature considered choosing electors regardless of the ballot count, and congressional Republicans prepared plans to count the electoral vote for Bush and Cheney whatever the reported tallies.

The institutions of American democracy were eventually vindicated, but the threats themselves are very worrisome. Safety came without much help from politicians who might have acted as statesmen. The art of politics, as eloquently stated by James Madison, is to reconcile the competitive "impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens" in a way that promotes "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This vital task is entrusted to elected representatives, "whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."[29] These qualities were not evident among American politicians in 2000. No major official in either party spoke for any interest other than his party's victory.

Safety came instead from the American public, who showed remarkable restraint and calm, even as it avidly followed events. Americans' "willingness to accept a less than perfect outcome reflects both a realism about the way we run elections and a lack of passion about either candidate."[30] Even as media pundits and partisan advocates became increasingly antagonistic, the public

[28] William Kristol, "Crowning the Imperial Judiciary," *New York Times*, 28 November 2000.
[29] *Federalist* No. 10 [1787] (New York: Modern Library, 1941), 54, 59.
[30] Andrew Kohut, "May Either Man Win," *New York Times*, 25 November 2000.

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held to two goals—completion and accuracy—and reiterated two basic commands: get it done, and get it right.[31]

The concluding words on the presidential election were spoken long ago, by Benjamin Franklin at the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. When a spectator outside asked whether the Framers had created a monarchy or a republic, Franklin replied, hopefully, "A republic, madam, if you can keep it."[32] After the tumult, division, and enmity born of the election of 2000, Americans will need to try harder if they still want to keep their republic.

APPENDIX

The Presidential Vote of 2000

	Electoral Vote		*2-party Vote %*		*Popular Vote (1,000s)*			*1996 2-party Vote %*	
State	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Nader*	*Clinton*	*Dole*
Ala		9	42.4	57.6	692.6	941.2	18.2	45.9	54.1
Alaska		3	32.1	67.9	79.0	167.4	28.7	39.7	60.3
Ariz		8	46.7	53.3	685.3	781.7	45.6	51.5	48.5
Ark		6	47.2	52.8	422.8	472.9	13.4	59.3	40.7
Calif	54		56.2	43.8	5,861.2	4,567.4	418.7	57.6	42.4
Colo		8	45.5	54.5	738.2	883.7	91.4	49.3	50.7
Conn	8		59.3	40.7	816.0	561.1	63.3	59.7	40.3
Del	3		56.7	43.3	180.1	137.3	8.3	58.6	41.4
DC	3		90.5	9.5	171.9	18.1	10.5	90.2	9.8
Fla		25	50.0	50.0	2,912.3	2,912.8	97.5	53.2	46.8
Ga		13	44.0	56.0	1,116.2	1,419.7	0.0[a]	49.3	50.7
Hawaii	4		59.8	40.2	205.3	137.8	21.6	64.3	35.7
Idaho		4	29.1	70.9	138.6	336.9	0.0[a]	39.2	60.8
Ill	22		56.2	43.8	2,589.0	2,019.4	103.8	59.3	40.7
Ind		12	42.0	58.0	902.0	1,245.8	0.0[a]	46.8	53.2
Iowa	7		50.2	49.8	638.5	634.4	27.7	55.6	44.4
Kans		6	39.1	60.9	399.3	622.3	36.1	39.9	60.1
Ky		8	42.3	57.7	638.9	872.5	23.1	50.5	49.5
La		9	46.1	53.9	792.3	927.9	20.4	56.7	43.3
Maine	4		52.8	47.2	320.0	286.6	37.1	62.7	37.3
Md	10		58.4	41.6	1,144.0	813.8	53.8	58.6	41.4
Mass	12		64.8	35.2	1,616.5	878.5	173.6	68.6	31.4
Mich	18		52.6	47.4	2,170.4	1,953.1	84.1	57.4	42.6
Minn	10		51.3	48.7	1,168.3	1,109.7	126.7	59.3	40.7
Miss		7	41.4	58.6	404.6	572.8	8.1	47.0	53.0
Mo		11	48.3	51.7	1,111.1	1,189.9	38.5	53.5	46.5
Mont		3	36.4	63.6	137.2	240.2	24.4	48.3	51.7
Neb		5	34.8	65.2	231.8	433.9	24.5	39.5	60.5
Nev		4	48.1	51.9	280.0	301.6	15.0	50.6	49.4

(continued)

[31] See, for example, the CBS News/*New York Times* Poll of 20 November and the *Washington Post*/ABC News Poll of 4 December 2000.

[32] Max Farrand, ed. *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, vol. 3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), 85.

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APPENDIX

Continued

	Electoral Vote		*2-party Vote %*		*Popular Vote (1,000s)*			*1996 2-party Vote %*	
State	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Gore*	*Bush*	*Nader*	*Clinton*	*Dole*
NH		4	49.3	50.7	266.3	273.6	22.2	55.5	44.5
NJ	15		58.2	41.8	1,788.9	1,284.2	94.6	59.7	40.3
NM	5		50.0	50.0	286.8	286.4	21.3	54.5	45.5
NY	33		63.1	36.9	4,107.7	2,403.4	244.0	65.4	34.6
NC		14	43.5	56.5	1,257.7	1,631.2	0.0[a]	47.5	52.5
ND		3	35.5	64.5	96.3	174.9	9.5	46.1	53.9
Ohio		21	48.2	51.8	2,183.6	2,350.4	117.8	53.5	46.5
Okla		8	38.9	61.1	474.3	744.3	0.0[a]	45.6	54.4
Ore	7		50.2	49.8	720.3	713.6	77.4	56.0	44.0
Pa	23		52.1	47.9	2,486.0	2,281.1	103.4	55.2	44.8
RI	4		65.6	34.4	249.5	130.6	25.1	69.2	30.8
SC		8	41.8	58.2	566.0	786.9	20.3	46.7	53.3
SD		3	38.4	61.6	118.8	190.7	0.0[a]	48.1	51.9
Tenn		11	48.0	52.0	981.7	1,061.9	19.8	51.3	48.7
Texas		32	39.0	61.0	2,433.7	3,800.0	138.0	47.3	52.7
Utah		5	28.3	71.7	203.1	515.1	35.8	38.0	62.0
Vt	3		55.4	44.6	149.0	119.8	20.4	63.4	36.6
Va		13	45.9	54.1	1,217.3	1,437.5	59.4	48.9	51.1
Wash	11		52.9	47.1	1,247.7	1,108.9	103.0	58.4	41.6
WV		5	46.8	53.2	295.5	336.5	10.7	58.3	41.7
Wisc	11		50.1	49.9	1,243.0	1,237.3	94.1	55.9	44.1
Wyo		3	29.0	71.0	60.5	147.9	0.0[a]	42.5	57.5
Totals	267	271	50.3	49.7	50,997.1	50,456.6	2,830.9	54.7	45.3

Sources: New York Times, 30 December 2000, A17; *Washington Post*, 21 December 2000, A9; http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/2000/results

Notes: The total national vote was 105.4 million, 51.2% of those eligible. The total Buchanan vote was 448,750, or 0.43% of popular vote. Other candidates are omitted.

[a]The Nader vote was not reported in states showing a vote of zero.

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

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Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat

BARBARA FARNHAM

The Reagan administration came into office in 1981 "with the most avowed anticommunist crusading policy in two decades."[1] For President Ronald Reagan, this policy reflected a profound sense of threat that was deeply rooted in his firm convictions about the nature of communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. Yet by the end of his second term, Reagan had substantially revised his view of this threat and accepted the possibility of working with the Soviet Union in the interests of peace. He had been transformed from an "essentialist," who believed that the Soviet Union was governed by an ideology that put no limits on what it could justifiably do to gain its ends of "absolute power and a communist world," to an "interactionist," who saw the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of mutual misperception. He was hopeful about the possibility of substantial change.[2]

This presents us with a puzzle, because the psychological literature strongly suggests that central beliefs are altered only with great difficulty, if at all.[3] Since

[1] Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 1.

[2] Ibid., 767–769. As Thomas Banchoff has observed, no postwar U.S. administration has "altered its view of the threat as significantly as the Reagan administration between 1981 and 1988." Thomas Banchoff, "Official Threat Perceptions in the 1980s: the United States" in Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, ed., *The Changing Analysis of the Soviet Threat* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990), 82.

[3] As Janice Stein has put it, "Cognitive psychologists suggest that stability is the default position and change the *exception.*" (Emphasis in original.) Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," *International Organization* 111 (Spring 1994): 163.

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people tend to interpret new information in the light of what they already believe, they are likely to be slow to change their views, and those most committed to their beliefs will have the most difficulty revising them.[4] This suggests that decision makers may not always be responsive to changes in the nature or level of threat. Yet, as Reagan's behavior demonstrates, they do sometimes overcome their cognitive limitations to make fairly accurate assessments of threat. What enables these decision makers to reevaluate threat successfully while others remain prisoners of their predispositions?

The question is particularly intriguing in view of the numerous criticisms that have been leveled at Reagan's cognitive abilities. According to one observer, for example, he was intellectually shallow and inconsistent, superficially attached to different and not necessarily compatible beliefs.[5] Moreover, David Stockman gives us a picture of the President as both ignorant of the complexities of policy and profoundly muddled,[6] while others note his lack of analytical ability, lack of curiosity, and legendary dislike of detail, which, combined with his ignorance of many issues, put him at the mercy of his advisers.[7] Richard Neustadt has remarked on Reagan's unfortunate habit of "combining ignorance and insistence" (incuriosity about details together with deep commitment to his convictions),[8] which provided fertile soil for such fiascos as the Iran-contra scandal.[9] Clearly, Reagan's success in perceiving and responding to the changes in Soviet policy, especially when many others did not, needs to be explained.

[4] See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 7; Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 113–27; and Deborah Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 32–34.

[5] Keith L. Shimko, *Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 236–37, 239–41, 246–47.

[6] Richard Neustadt has collected a number of the references that convey Stockman's view. Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidents, Politics, and Analysis" (Brewster C. Denney Lecture Series, Institute of Public Management, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, 13 May 1986), 17. Others who note Reagan's ignorance and lack of curiosity in matters of policy are Shimko, *Images*, 245–46; Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1982), 372–73; Lou Cannon, *President Reagan* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1991), 130; Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Presidential Personality and Performance* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1988), 224; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 270, 276; Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 128–29.

[7] George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1133; Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988), 289–91; Robert C. McFarlane, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 106; Larry Speakes, *Speaking Out* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 67, 304; Cannon, *Reagan*, 375; Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference* (New York: Free Press, 2000), 146, 149; Larry Berman, "Looking Back at the Reagan Presidency" in Larry Berman, ed., *Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 5; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 55, 181–82, 304. Reagan's ignorance of nuclear matters is particularly striking, 291–92, 305.

[8] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 270, 276, 280; see also Gary Wills, *Reagan's America* (New York: Penguin, 1988), 286, 380.

[9] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 270–71, 287, 290.

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Baseline 1981–1984: Reagan's Initial Perception of the Threat

Showing that President Reagan's understanding of the threat to American security changed in response to the changes in Soviet policy instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev requires establishing a baseline. How did Reagan perceive the threat initially? What were his beliefs about its source and nature, and what evidence did he use to support them?

The Soviet Threat

From the beginning of his presidency and long before, Ronald Reagan believed that the Soviet Union was the prime source of threat to American security, a threat so pervasive and limitless that it was almost existential.[10] For Reagan, the Soviets threatened all the basic values of the United States and were behind "all the unrest that is going on" in the world.[11] Moreover, these beliefs were long-standing and deeply rooted.[12] The only mitigating factor in Reagan's analysis of the Soviet Union was a tendency to distinguish the Soviet people from their leaders,[13] plus an occasional reference to mutual suspicion fueling the arms race and U.S.–Soviet conflict, along with the suggestion that this might be mitigated by increased communication.[14]

Reagan's sense of threat was compounded by fundamental mistrust based on what he saw as the Soviet Union's "record of deceit and its long history of betrayal of international treaties." This he claimed "could be found in the writings of Soviet leaders: It had always been their philosophy that it was moral to lie or cheat for the purpose of advancing Communism. . . . [T]hey had told us, without meaning to, that they couldn't be trusted."[15] Reagan saw the threat posed by the Soviet Union as broad and all-encompassing, political as well as

[10] The term "existential threat" has been used by Daniel Lieberfeld to connote a threat to basic security or national existence. Daniel Lieberfeld, *Talking with the Enemy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); see also Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1900), 265; Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out in the Blue* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 30–31; interview with Walter Cronkite, 3 March 1981, cited in Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997).

[11] Speech in March 1983, cited in Banchoff. "Official Threat," 87–88; campaign speech, June 1980, cited in Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 12.

[12] See Reagan, *American*, 14; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 12–13; Betty Glad "Black-and-White Thinking: Ronald Reagan's Approach to Foreign Policy," *Political Psychology* 4 (March 1983): 44–46, 67; Fischer, *Reagan*, 81–2; and Shimko, *Images*, 101, 120.

[13] As Shimko points out, however, the Soviet government "was assumed not to reflect the desires of its people." Ibid., 146.

[14] Ibid., 372, 374.

[15] Reagan, *American*, 14, 267. See also Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 159. Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 8; Glad, "Black and White," 45; and Banchoff, "Official Threat," 88. Shimko distinguishes between hardline images which virtually the whole administration held and inherent bad faith enemy images which only some, like Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, shared with Reagan. *Images*, 233.

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military. "[G]uided by a policy of immoral and unbridled expansionism," and following a pattern set by Lenin,[16] the Soviet Union was advancing "all over the world" with the goal of promoting revolution.[17] It was thus a threat to the security of the free world on all fronts.[18] Not only was it the malign force behind all national liberation movements, it was also the sponsor of international terrorism and a significant threat to human rights.[19]

As evidence of the Soviet threat, Reagan pointed to both intentions and capabilities. His interpretation of Soviet intentions was highly ideological. In January 1981, he told reporters that he did not "'have to think of an answer as to what their intentions are' because all Soviet leaders since the Revolution had 'more than once repeated . . . their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialist or Communist state. . . .'"[20] Reagan's view of the capability side of the equation had two aspects: his perception of Soviet strength and his fears about American weakness. His overall assessment of Soviet capabilities was, again, heavily ideological, combining the conviction that the Soviets held a short-run advantage over the United States with a belief in their inevitable failure over the long term owing to their ideological blinders.

Reagan began his presidency convinced that because of a massive offensive military buildup in the 1970s ("the largest and costliest military buildup in the history of man"), the Soviet Union enjoyed "a definite margin of superiority over the United States," with all the ominous consequences this entailed.[21] However, this superiority was not to endure. Not only could the United States correct the imbalance with a military buildup of its own, but also the Soviet system itself was inherently weak. Briefings during the campaign and once in office had convinced Reagan that "the Soviet economy was in even worse shape than I'd realized. I had always believed that, as an economic system, Communism was doomed. . . . Now, the economic statistics and intelligence reports I was getting . . . were revealing tangible evidence that Communism as we knew

[16] Reagan, *American*, 548, 239, 265–68.

[17] Cited in Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 14, 22; Shimko, *Images*, 103–104; Fischer, *Reagan*, 19–20. On the administration's view of the political and military threat, see Banchoff. "Official Threat," 83–87.

[18] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 20; see also Banchoff, "Official Threat," 88.

[19] Reagan, *American*, 238–39; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 19–20, 24, 26.

[20] Cited in ibid., 8. See also Shimko, *Images*, 106, 235; and Reagan's remarks in his press conference in March 1981, cited in Banchoff, "Official Threat," 87. For more on the ideological basis of Reagan's views about Soviet intentions, see Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 33, 98; Edwin Meese, *With Reagan.* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 164, 169; Oberdorfer. *Turn*, 90; and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's account of Secretary of State George Shultz's description of Reagan as "stubborn and ideologically unprepared for agreements with the Russians." See Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Random House, 1995), 81. See also Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd., 1991), 81.

[21] Reagan, *American*, 294; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 41; see also Fischer, *Reagan*, 20; Shimko, *Image*, 102–103, 108–111; Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 34; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 32; and McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 218.

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it was approaching the brink of collapse. . . . The Soviet economy was . . . a basket case, partly because of massive spending on armaments."[22]

In the short run, however, the Soviet Union was exceedingly dangerous—in part because of *American* shortcomings. That is to say, the Soviet threat was magnified by U.S. military weakness and a loss of resolve that could only be cured by an American military buildup.[23] Reagan began such a buildup almost immediately after taking office by requesting a huge increase in the defense budget.[24] As to the loss of American resolve, Reagan believed that in the late 1970s the United States ". . . had begun to abdicate [its] historical role as the spiritual leader of the Free World and its foremost defender of democracy. Some of our resolve was gone, along with a part of our commitment to uphold the values we cherished." In line with their malevolent intentions, the Soviets "had tried to exploit [this weakness] to the fullest."[25]

The Nuclear Threat

As serious as the Soviet threat was, it was far from being the only one. Reagan believed that the mere existence of nuclear weapons put Americans equally at risk. He was dismayed that American defense policy placed "our entire faith in a weapon whose *fundamental target was the civilian population.*" He was appalled by the possible consequences, observing that, "Even if a nuclear war did not mean the extinction of mankind, it would certainly mean the end of civilization as we knew it. . . . [A]s long as nuclear weapons were in existence, there would always be risks they would be used, and once the first nuclear weapon was unleashed, who knew where it would end?"[26]

Reagan had adopted these beliefs well before he became president.[27] They accorded with his religious ideas about the coming of Armageddon, and they were exacerbated by his realization in 1979 after a visit to NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) that no defense against nuclear mis-

[22] Reagan, *American*, 237–38; Meese, *With Reagan*, 164–65, 169. See also Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 11; Shimko, *Images*, 142–44; Fitzgerald, *Way Out*, 175, n. 106.

[23] Reagan, *American*, 294–95. See also, Weinberger on his first meeting with the President-elect, *Fighting*, 34–35; McFarlane, *Special*, 218–19; Shimko, *Images*, 102, 144; Fischer, *Reagan*, 26.

[24] This buildup, according to Garthoff, "had been decided on before obtaining requests from the military services—it was intended to signal the strong resolve of the new administration to build ("rebuild") military strength. . . ." Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 33. As Garthoff also notes, despite the fact that in 1983 the Scowcroft Commission report refuted the idea of a "window of vulnerability" for the United States and the CIA found no spending gap between the United States and the Soviet Union, the military buildup continued. Moreover, at least some members of the administration (Weinberger, Perle) exaggerated the Soviet threat in order to gain support for that buildup, 33, 504.

[25] Reagan, *American*, 266; see also Shimko, *Images*, 103.

[26] Reagan, *American*, 549, 550. (Italics in original.) See also Shultz, *Turmoil*, 246.

[27] See, for example, his speech to the Republican national convention in 1976. Anderson, *Revolution*, 71–72; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 277.

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siles existed.[28] Moreover, his nuclear fears were only reinforced by the briefings he received after he became president.[29]

Reagan's plan for dealing with the nuclear threat was two-pronged. First of all his "dream . . . became a world free of nuclear weapons." However, recognizing that this would not be easily achieved, he also dreamed of creating "a defense against nuclear missiles, so we could change from a policy of assured destruction to one of assured survival."[30] This dream, of course, was transformed into the (in)famous Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a policy to which Reagan clung tenaciously throughout his presidency.[31] Reagan's commitment to both dreams is clearly shown in the discussion below of his negotiations with Gorbachev. However, even before Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, Reagan's apprehension about nuclear weapons was reflected in his attempts in 1983–1984 to negotiate with the Russians.

Pre-Gorbachev Changes in Tone and Policy

Toward the end of President Reagan's first term, a shift occurred in his tone and policies that had little to do with Soviet behavior.[32] This represented a change in emphasis from the Soviet side of Reagan's sense of threat to the nuclear side; it did not, however, signal a substantive change in his core beliefs about the Soviet Union. Early in 1983, Reagan began to show an interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union. In February, despite the anticipated (and later openly expressed) opposition of his National Security staff, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the head of the CIA, William Casey,[33] Reagan agreed to Secretary of State George Shultz's suggestion that he meet with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. After the meeting, Shultz was sufficiently "impressed and reassured" by Reagan's performance to push ahead with his plan to "design a broader and longer-term approach to U.S.-Soviet relations to put before the president," and to get him "heavily engaged."[34]

[28] Fischer, *Reagan*, 106–108; Anderson, *Revolution*, 80–83; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 25–26, 67; Shultz, *Turmoil*, 261–62. On Reagan's beliefs about Armegeddon, see Edmund Morris, *Dutch* (New York: Random House, 1999), 632–33. Fitzgerald views the NORAD story as a dramatization of Reagan's longstanding horror of nuclear weapons, with Reagan himself at the center of the drama as an "American Everyman." See Fizgerald, *Way Out*, 20–29.

[29] Weinberger, *Fighting*, 341; Reagan, *American*, 550.

[30] Ibid., 550.

[31] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 260–64; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 99. See also Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 463, 466. For Reagan's interest in strategic defense between 1979 and 1983, when he announced his program to the American people, see Anderson, *Revolution*, 75–76, 84–88, 93–97.

[32] As Garthoff points out, in the first eight months of 1983, Soviet leaders sought without success to engage the United States in serious arms control negotiation. *Great Transition*, 111. See also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan,1984), 131.

[33] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 159, 164–66, 267; Jack F. Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York, Random House, 1995), 77; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 16; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 104.

[34] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 164–65; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 16–17. See also Reagan, *American*, 572. For developments in spring and summer 1983, see Matlock, *Autopsy*, 79. For Reagan's own view of the matter,

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The culmination of the president's inclinations and the secretary's efforts was a speech on 16 January 1984 in which Reagan stressed negotiation and dialogue, rather than confrontation, and a common interest in avoiding war and reducing "the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition."[35] In another major change, Reagan acknowledged for the first time that "most [Third World] conflicts have their origins in local problems" and emphasized the need to "reduce the risk of U.S.–Soviet confrontation in these areas."[36] While these conciliatory gestures were clearly a departure from his previous stance, however the president was far from abandoning the negative themes he had sounded earlier. Throughout 1984 both Reagan and members of his administration continued to refer to the Soviet Union as a threat.[37]

How can we explain this combination of conciliatory gestures and negative rhetoric? Possibly it was simply an expression of what Don Oberdorfer has called the "dichotomous nature of Reagan's views" about the Soviet Union.[38] However, while there is considerable evidence of Reagan's dichotomous thinking, we need to understand why in 1984 he chose increasingly to stress the cooperative side.

Heightened Sense of Nuclear Threat

A number of factors came together for the president in late 1983 that may have triggered this shift in emphasis. To begin with, a series of events occurred highlighting the danger of nuclear weapons.[39] The first of these was the Soviet downing in September 1983 of a Korean airliner that had strayed into Soviet air space

see Reagan. *American*, 572. For developments in the spring and summer of 1983, see also, Matlock, *Autopsy*, 79.

[35] "Soviet-American Relations," 16 January 1984, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 20 (23 January 1984): 41. For references of this sort to common interests in 1983 and 1985, see Keith L. Shimko, "Reagan on the Soviet Union and the Nature of International Conflict," *Political Psychology* 13 (September 1992): 371–72.

[36] "Soviet-American Relations," 42. For an analysis of this speech, see also Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 142–44; and Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 545. For an extremely optimistic view of the speech as the "turning point in his administration's approach to the Kremlin," see Fischer, *Reagan*, 3–4, 32–38. Throughout 1984, Reagan returned to many of the ideas expressed in this speech. Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 152, 156, 161. For other conciliatory moves by Reagan and his administration, see Fischer. *Reagan*, 40–45.

[37] See, for example, his 2 June speech in Ireland, cited in Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 153, 154, 157, 160. These negative references culminated in the Republican party's 1984 election platform, adopted by a Reagan-controlled convention, which affirmed that "the Soviet Union's globalist ideology and its leadership obsessed with military power make it a threat to freedom and peace on every continent."

[38] Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: from the Cold War to a New Era, The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 22–23. See also the similar view of Assistant Secretary of European and Canadian Affairs, Rozanne Ridgway in William C. Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 18.

[39] Fischer, *Reagan*, 109.

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(KAL 007). While Reagan ultimately came to believe that the shooting down of KAL 007 had been a mistake, he was extremely troubled by it, believing that it "demonstrated how close the world had come to the precipice and how much we needed nuclear arms control. . . ."[40]

Alarming as the thought of an inadvertently triggered nuclear war was, Reagan's distress was compounded by other events that autumn that made him "aware of the need for the world to step back from the nuclear precipice." The first of these was a television movie, "The Day After," which graphically depicted the effects of a nuclear war and left the president "greatly depressed."[41] Following hard on the heels of this distressing cinematic event, Reagan underwent another "most sobering experience"—a briefing from the military on the SIOP (single integrated operational plan) for U.S. strategy to deal with a nuclear attack. He later characterized this briefing as a "scenario for a sequence of events that could lead to the end of civilization as we knew it. In several ways, the sequence of events described in the briefings paralleled those in the ABC movie."[42]

The final episode in this series of nuclear-related incidents was the aftermath of the extensive military exercise carried out by American and NATO forces in November 1983 (Able Archer 83) to test procedures for using nuclear weapons in the event of war. Although the exercise was ultimately scaled down, it remained large enough to alarm the Soviets, causing some to think that the United States was actually preparing a nuclear attack. First dismissed as "Soviet scare tactics," the intelligence reports eventually began to be taken seriously within the administration, especially by the president.[43] For the first time Reagan realized to his great surprise that the Soviet Union might actually feel threatened by the *United States*. Thus, in November 1983, he determined to communicate "outside the normal diplomatic channels" with Yuri Andropov, the Soviet general secretary, confiding in his diary that he felt that "the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them, we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that."[44]

[40] Reagan, *American*, 584. See also Matlock's view that "there was a serious concern, beginning with President Reagan, about the lack of communication following KAL." Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 76. Note that despite the fact that this incident had brought the nuclear threat to the fore, it also confirmed Reagan's view of the Soviet threat. Reagan, *American*, 585. For a more detailed account of this episode, see Fischer, *Reagan*, 112–114; and Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 118–127, who also discusses Soviet reactions.

[41] Reagan, *American*, 585; also Fischer, *Reagan*, 115–20.

[42] Reagan, *American*, 585–86. Fischer offers a psychological explanation for the impact of these events on Reagan, *Reagan*, 120–22.

[43] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 138–140; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 66–67; and Fischer, *Reagan*, 122–34.

[44] Reagan, *American*, 588–89; Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 324; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 139, 142n; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 67; and Fischer, *Reagan*, 134–38. There is some evidence that Reagan held such beliefs as early as 1982. See Shimko, *Images*, 107; and Shimko, "Reagan," 365, 369–70. Reagan's renewed sense of nuclear threat also heightened his interest in nuclear defense.

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Impact of the U.S. Military Buildup

A heightened sense of nuclear danger was not the only factor encouraging Reagan's move toward cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1983 and 1984. Another was his perception that the success of the military buildup he had initiated now allowed him to deal with the Soviets from a position of strength.[45] In that sense, the buildup was at least a permissive, and probably a necessary, condition of his willingness to negotiate.[46] Reagan himself testified to this in his memoirs. While declaring that the Soviets had not changed in their "addiction" to "Lenin's secular religion of expansionism and world domination," he observed that "something *else* had changed: I felt we could now go to the summit, for the first time in years, from a position of strength. . . ."[47] This sense of renewed strength was also reflected in Reagan's speeches on 16 January and at the United Nations on 24 September 1984.[48]

Secretary Shultz and the 1984 Election

From the start, George Shultz believed that while it was necessary to be wary of the Soviet Union, "we should also be ready to deal with the Soviets more constructively if the opportunity arose."[49] Throughout 1983 and 1984 Shultz persisted in his endeavor to get the president involved in such an approach, peppering Reagan with memos on the subject and promoting opportunities for dialogue between the president and, among others, Dobrynin and Andrei Gromyko. Despite the determined opposition of Weinberger, Casey, and most of the National Security Council (NSC) staff, Shultz ultimately prevailed, winning Reagan's support.[50]

We should remember, however, that Reagan, at least, believed the secretary had been effective precisely because his views accorded with the president's own, while those of Shultz's opponents (Weinberger, Casey, and Edwin Meese) did not. As he confided in his diary in November 1984, ". . . [the dispute]

[45] Glad points out that Reagan harbored a long-standing belief that if confronted with strength and aware that they could not win, the Soviets would give up and back down. "Black and White," 64.

[46] According to Robert Jervis, ". . . behavior is influenced by leaders' perceptions and beliefs about their own nations (self-perceptions). A state that sees itself in decline is likely to see others and to behave very differently from one that conceives of itself as continuing to be strong, if not dominant." Robert Jervis, "Perception and Misperception, and the End of the Cold War" in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 228. The putative success of his military buildup also allowed Reagan's personal confidence in his own abilities to come to the fore. Matlock, *Autopsy*, 77; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 22.

[47] Reagan, *American*, 594. (Italics in original.) See also Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 324; and Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 769.

[48] "Soviet American Relations," 41. For the September UN speech, see Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 161. See also, McFarlane, *In Confidence*, 563; and Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 35–36.

[49] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 6.

[50] Ibid., 159–67, 265–70; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 102–10; Reagan, *American*, 605–606; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 77–78; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 34–37; McFarlane, *Sacred*, 295.

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is so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I can't let that happen. Actually George is of course carrying out my policy."[51]

Finally, some, although not Reagan himself, point to the impending 1984 presidential election as a motivating factor in his willingness to negotiate with the Soviets on nuclear arms. According to Oberdorfer, Reagan was told by his pollster, Richard Wirthlin, that his "most serious political vulnerability" was the public's fear that he would bring America into "an unnecessary war."[52] Moreover, Raymond Garthoff contends on the basis of a "well-informed administration source" that as early as the end of 1982 Reagan was thinking about the need to improve relations with the Soviet Union in terms of the coming campaign, and that this continued to play a role in administration planning through the 1984 election.[53] However, while the campaign may have influenced Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union in 1984, it does not seem to have been as important as the other factors, especially given the counter pressures from the right against any such negotiations.

How are we to understand Reagan's rhetorical and policy shifts toward the Soviet Union in 1983 and 1984? Given his persistently negative view of the Soviet Union, it is hard to see it as a serious alteration in his perception of the Soviet threat, especially since the Soviets had not in fact changed their behavior. Rather, it represented a change in emphasis from the Soviet threat to the nuclear threat,[54] triggered by a series of nuclear-related incidents and combined with a more confident self-assessment of U.S. military power, Secretary Shultz's initiatives, and the political needs growing out of the forthcoming election campaign, all of which made him more receptive to negotiating with the Soviets.[55] There was, however, no radical change in Reagan's core beliefs about the nature of the Soviet Union and the threat that it posed to the United States. Further change would, as even Jack Matlock (who was considered a moderate within the administration) believed, have to wait until the Soviet Union itself changed, "If the Soviet Union stayed as it was, we could hope only to manage the mutual hostility, not to harmonize policies."[56] Fortunately, as it turned out, such change was not as distant as most believed at the time.

[51] Reagan, *American*, 606.

[52] Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 52; see also Shultz, *Turmoil*, 270.

[53] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 102, 152; see also Reagan's own allusion to the campaign and foreign policy in *American*, 605.

[54] On the basis of a psychological analysis, Beth Fischer argues that this shift represented a real change in Reagan's perception of threat. *Reagan*, 2–5, 135, 141, 146–56. The evidence presented above shows otherwise. Reagan changed his emphasis and some policies, but his view of the Soviet threat remained the same.

[55] Greenstein also notes this combination in "Ronald Reagan," 215.

[56] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 167; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 23; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 80; Alexander Dallin, "Learning in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s" in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 415.

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GORBACHEV: CHANGE AND RESPONSE

Initial Overtures

The year 1985 began with a continuation of the "unsteady, gradual normalization" of U.S.–Soviet relations of the previous year.[57] When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as general secretary of the Communist party on 11 March 1985, the reaction of the Reagan administration was subdued. Although Secretary Shultz and Vice President George Bush had been favorably impressed by Gorbachev at their first meeting,[58] and although Reagan had proposed a summit meeting and Gorbachev had responded positively, the president retained his long-standing suspicion of anything Soviet.[59] Five weeks after Gorbachev's accession to power, Reagan noted in his diary that "Gorbachev will be as tough as any of their leaders. If he wasn't a confirmed ideologue, he never would have been chosen by the Politiburo." This meant, "We'd have to be as tough as ever in dealing with the Soviets. . . ." Reagan also noted, however, that "we should work hard to establish channels directly between Gorbachev and me through quiet diplomacy." In his public statements, he expressed the hope for "more constructive relations."[60]

The Geneva Summit, 19–21 November 1985

Although he was not often acclaimed for his dedication to the briefing book, Reagan's preparations for the summit were extensive. As National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane saw it, he was "clearly determined to be thoroughly prepared for his first meeting with a Soviet head of state. He worked hard, and by the time he reached Geneva, was thoroughly in command of his brief." Moreover, his efforts were, at least in part, motivated by an extremely successful meeting with the new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnazde in late September.[61]

These experiences led to a partial change in Reagan's rhetoric. Rather than emphasize Soviet culpability for problems in the relationship, Reagan pointed to "misunderstandings," and in his speech to the nation just prior to the summit he stressed his "mission for peace," the need to reduce "suspicion and mistrust," and his belief that nuclear weapons were the real threat. As Reagan himself

[57] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 197. Nevertheless, Reagan's Inaugural and State of the Union speeches still stressed the Soviet threat and the consequent need for a U.S. buildup and SDI. Ibid., 201–202.

[58] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 532; see also Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 207, n.27; and Thatcher's widely quoted assessment of Gorbachev as a "man we can do business with." *Downing Street*, 463.

[59] See Mandelbaum and Talbott, *Reagan*, 44.

[60] Reagan, *American*, 615; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 208. Nevertheless, he also "resumed crusading rhetoric, charges of Soviet untrustworthiness, and reaffirmations of SDI," 213.

[61] McFarlane, *Sacred*, 308. McFarlane himself remembers working "harder, probably, than I ever had or would again." This included one hundred meetings with Reagan and eleven NSC meetings. Ibid., 312. See also Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 142; and Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 234.

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noted, ". . . once we'd agreed to hold a summit, I made a conscious decision to tone down my rhetoric to avoid goading Gorbachev with remarks about the 'evil empire.'"[62]

Ultimately, the Geneva summit yielded a number of benefits for both sides. Reagan and Gorbachev "had come to like and respect each other," and were able to establish the basis for a working relationship.[63] Certainly, this was true of the president: "Reagan came out not convinced by Gobachev's beliefs, but respecting them. And he came out seeing Gorbachev as a person, a fellow politician . . . who had constraints just as he had, and if we could do it, he was willing to try to find a way around [those constraints]. So I think the impact of the personal contact on Reagan was very substantial."[64] Gorbachev had been "humanized" for the president; he "had zeroed in on the character of the human being in the other chair, "admitting that the Soviet leader had deep convictions of his own."[65] What is more, the feeling was mutual.[66] Observers sensed a "personal chemistry" between the two leaders.

As an added benefit, according to Jack Matlock, Reagan came away with a renewed sense of "confidence in his ability to convince," which led "him to take chances because he felt that the Soviet system could change."[67] Thus, while the Geneva summit did not alter Reagan's basic view of the Soviet threat, it did represent a considerable step forward. As Reagan himself said on his return to the United States, he and Gorbachev now "understand each other better. I gained a better perspective; I feel he did too."[68] Moreover, while Gorbachev has often been given much of the credit for the success of the summit,[69] it was Reagan who insisted on arranging more time for the private discussions that went a long way to produce these positive effects.[70]

Reykjavik Summit, 10–12 October 1986

During the first six months of 1986, negotiations for the next summit failed to prosper. Not until June did Reagan respond favorably to Gorbachev's arms

[62] Garthoff, *Great Transformation*, 235–37; "United States-Soviet Summit in Geneva, Address to the Nation," 14 November 1985, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 21 (18 November 1985): 1399; Reagan, *American*, 628.

[63] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 606; remarks of Rozanne Ridgway in Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses*, 18; and Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 596.

[64] Matlock in Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses*, 22–23.

[65] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 607; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 595; Shultz in Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses*, 16; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 54.

[66] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 607, 606; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 54; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 227; Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Schevardnadze* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 43. See also Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses*, 11.

[67] Ibid., 22; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 239.

[68] Ibid., 247.

[69] Ibid., 239.

[70] Ibid., 236. As Shultz has noted, Reagan and Gorbachev "spent almost five of the fifteen hours of official meetings talking together privately." *Turmoil*, 606.

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control initiatives, though even then the president showed no inclination to abandon his dream of strategic defense.[71] Finally, however, in late September an interim meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev was scheduled to prepare for the next summit. It would be held at Reykjavik, Iceland in October.

At that meeting, the greater part of the discussion, to say nothing of all the drama, centered on arms control. Negotiations took place with respect to the entire arsenal of nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. More strikingly, the two leaders seriously discussed eliminating all ballistic missiles and actually considered doing away with all strategic nuclear weapons as well. The sticking point was SDI, Gorbachev insisting that it be confined to the laboratory and Reagan refusing to give up testing.[72] Thus, the meeting broke up with both sides registering considerable disappointment; many, including most of the participants, considered Reykjavik a failure.

Given such negative sentiments, it is somewhat surprising that almost all the participants assessed Reykjavik retrospectively as, in Reagan's words, "a major turning point in the quest for a safe and secure world."[73] Shultz was even more enthusiastic, calling its results "sensational," because it introduced the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty and created, "in an immense amount of detail, the basic structure of the START I agreement." In Matlock's view, though the participants failed to appreciate it at the time, "The Reykjavik meeting produced breakthroughs that cleared the way for subsequent treaties. . . ."[74] Moreover, it seems to have marked a turning point in the development of Gorbachev's attitudes that made a number of later agreements possible.[75]

The Washington Summit and the INF Treaty, 7–10 December 1987

These positive retrospective evaluations of the Reykjavik summit notwithstanding, the relationship between United States and the Soviet Union was far from smooth in its aftermath. As Matlock describes it, "For several months, a feeling of bitterness and betrayal weighed upon U.S.–Soviet contacts. The lead-

[71] Ibid., 265–84; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 94.

[72] Ibid., 163; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 95–96; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 285–88; Palaszhenko, *My Years*, 54–57. For Reagan's own account of Reykjavik, see *American*, 675ff; for Gorbachev's, see *Perestroika*, 236–44.

[73] Reagan, *American*, 683.

[74] Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 175, 174; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 96–97. See also Reagan, *American*, 683–84; Palazchenko, *My Years*, 57–58; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 291; Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 240; Speakes, *Speaking*, 143. For a considerably less rosy assessment, see Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 470–71. Reagan himself thought that "Gorbachev was ready to talk the next time we met in Washington because we had walked out on him at Reykjavik and gone ahead with the SDI program." *American*, 684.

[75] "[I]t was at Reykjavik . . . that Gorbachev put away passion and decided that he could and would work with Reagan. He saw in him a person capable of taking great decisions, and Gorbachev himself told me so when we returned to Moscow." Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 610; see also Matlock, *Autopsy*, 97; and the testimony on this subject of Gorbachev's personal adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 109.

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ers had come tantalizingly close to agreement, and each blamed the other for failure." As Reagan himself pointed out, during the fourteen months after Reykjavik, "progress didn't come easily" although he also recognized that ". . . not all of the obstacles to continuing the momentum started at Geneva originated in Moscow."[76]

In January, the White House issued a strongly anti-Soviet paper titled the "National Security of the United States," which reflected the influence of the hard-liners in the administration. Moreover, the president continued to see the shifts in Soviet foreign and military policy as a consequence of U.S. pressure and renewed military strength.[77] He was cautious about Gorbachev's domestic changes as well, although he claims to have taken note of them,[78] and according to Matlock, while these changes did begin in 1987, Reagan's caution was not entirely misplaced.[79] However, after much negotiation, a date for the Washington summit was set for December 1987.

In contrast to Reykjavik, the Washington summit was generally thought to have represented progress. Unlike previous encounters, this one began on a note of considerable warmth between the two leaders. Moreover, they signed the INF treaty, in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy all intermediate and shorter-range land-based missiles and their launchers, and which included "remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspection and monitoring arrangements." In addition, they discussed human rights, bilateral relations, and regional conflicts; and they agreed to hold another summit in 1988.[80]

Nevertheless, few considered the Washington summit an unqualified success. As Anatoly Chernyaev noted ". . . the INF Treaty was signed in an atmosphere that I would still describe as a rather high level of mutual mistrust." However, he also observed that, "It was right after the INF Treaty . . . that the character of our relations changed. And of course, in changing the character of our relations, the personal rapport between Shultz and Shevardnadze and between Gorbachev and Reagan was of great importance. . . . [I]t was after the INF Treaty that our relationship began to evolve in the framework of trust."[81]

On the American side, the reviews were also mixed. Attributing the signing of the INF Treaty to Reagan's having restored America's military and political strength, Weinberger cautioned that "the restoration of the West's security must not be abandoned to an over-optimistic view of East-West relations."[82] Reagan himself thought that his own policies had ultimately produced the

[76] Matlock, *Autopsy*, 98; Reagan, *American*, 684. For a detailed account of this period, see Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 291–99.

[77] Ibid., 305–306, 308–309, 316.

[78] Reagan, *American*, 686–87; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 315.

[79] Matlock, *Autopsy*, 65–66.

[80] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 325–32.

[81] Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 49; see also Gorbachev's statement to the Politburo, 17 December 1987.

[82] Weinberger, *Fighting*, 332.

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treaty, and Shultz, while differing from Weinberger in his sense "that a profound, historic shift was under way," also believed that "there is nothing in the 'new political thinking' that suggests that the end of the adversarial struggle is at hand."[83]

Despite these mixed feelings, however, the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev was progressing rapidly. Moreover, according to Matlock, "from late 1987 . . . we began to register significant results in all parts of the U.S.–Soviet agenda. The speed of change was dizzying for those of us who had worked for decades on what had for long seemed the intractable problems of dealing with USSR."[84]

The Moscow Summit, 29 May–2 June 1988

The Moscow summit meeting saw the culmination of the rapprochement between Reagan and Gorbachev, as well as a substantive change in Reagan's view of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Matlock had been greatly impressed by the changes in the Communist party program issued in May 1988, and he communicated his excitement to Reagan when he briefed him in Helsinki just prior to the Moscow summit. "I told the president that if they turned out to be real, the Soviet Union could never again be what it had been in the past."[85]

As for the meeting itself, the discussions, although without major breakthroughs, were conducted in a friendly manner.[86] However, the real importance of the summit lay in the impact on Reagan of his visit to Moscow. Impressed by the warmth and friendliness of the Soviet people, he even disavowed his characterization of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire": "I was talking about another time, another era."[87] As Reagan recalled it, "perhaps the deepest impression I had during this experience and other meetings with Soviet citizens was that they were generally indistinguishable from people I had seen all my life on countless streets in America."[88]

This newfound attitude was tested, but not shaken, by Reagan's first-hand observation of the KGB's rough handling of the crowd during his walk on the streets of Moscow.[89] Indeed, the most interesting aspect of this episode is that

[83] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 332, 335; Shultz, *Turmoil*, 1003.

[84] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 332; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 148.

[85] Matlock, *Autopsy*, 121–23.

[86] For the substance of the discussions, see Garthoff, *Great Transformation*, 353–56; and U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior—1988–90: Gorbachev-Reagan-Bush Meetings at the Summit* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 71–72.

[87] Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 299, 294–95, Reagan, *American*, 709; Garthoff, *Great Transformation*, 352; Hugh Sidey, "Good Chemistry," *Time*, 13 June 1988, 14.

[88] Reagan, *American*, 709; Sidey, "Good Chemistry," 17.

[89] "I've never seen such brutal manhandling as they did on their own people who were in no way getting out of hand." Reagan, *American*, 709. See also Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 776; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 296–97.

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it did not have a more negative impact on Reagan's feelings about the Soviet Union, though it clearly confirmed his long-held beliefs. Nor did it deflect his "conversion to a belief in friendly relations," and his respect and admiration for Gorbachev.

> Looking back now, it's clear that there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that produced something very close to a friendship. He was a tough, hard bargainer. He was a Russian patriot who loved his country. . . . I liked Gorbachev even though he was a dedicated Communist. . . . [H]e was different from the Communists who had preceded him to the top of the Kremlin hierarchy. . . . [H]e was the first not to push Soviet expansionism, the first to agree to destroy nuclear weapons, the first to suggest a free market and to support open elections and freedom of expression.[90]

On his way home from Moscow, Reagan gave a speech in London that suggests the extent of his transformation. He not only had kind words for Gorbachev ("a serious man, seeking serious reform"), but he also gave his most optimistic assessment of the future to date: ". . . quite possibly, we're beginning to take down the barriers of the postwar era; quite possibly we are entering a new era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union. We will have to see."[91]

New York Meeting, 7 December 1988

During the months before the New York summit, relations between the two superpowers were "basically uneventful."[92] Gorbachev continued his efforts to reform the Soviet Union, and on the day of his meeting with Reagan he gave a path-breaking speech at the United Nations in which he publicly announced many of those changes. Many people focused on his most striking pronouncement—he was prepared to cut 500,000 troops from the Soviet armed forces. But Shultz noted, "If you read that speech carefully, you will see that for the first time Gorbachev publicly renounced Marxism-Leninism as an approach to the analysis of international issues and international processess."[93]

The meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan later that day, which also included Vice President Bush, was "ceremonial" rather than substantive. Marking the final official encounter between the two leaders, it was notable for its

[90] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 253; Reagan, *American*, 707. Reagan voiced the same highly positive view of Gorbachev even while he was still in Moscow and not long after his return to Washington, acknowledging that he considered Gorbachev a "real friend." Sidey, "Good Chemistry," 17; *Soviet Diplomacy*, 111. See also Morris, *Dutch*, 647.

[91] "Remarks to Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, United Kingdom," 3 June 1988, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 24 (June 6, 1988), 735. 91. By contrast, Vice President Bush was cautioning the public several weeks later that "the Cold War is not over." Cited in Banchoff, *Official Threat*, n. 41.

[92] See Garthoff, *Great Transformation*, 368–71.

[93] Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses*, 91. See also Shultz, *Turmoil*, 365–67.

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cordiality.[94] Moreover, shortly after Gorbachev left the United States, Reagan gave a radio address to the nation in which he discussed their meeting in positive terms, noting that "this has been a period of important change inside the Soviet Union," and praising Gorbachev's vision.[95] Secretary Shultz's assessment after his participation in the opening of the UN General Assembly in September was even more enthusiastic: "The world had changed. Margaret Thatcher had it right . . . [when] she said flatly 'We're not in a Cold War now.' Despite this new reality, many in the United States seemed unable or unwilling to grasp this seminal fact. But to me, it was all over but the shouting."[96]

Explaining Reagan's Change in Threat Perception

By 1988, many of the beliefs underlying Ronald Reagan's perception of the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States had been considerably altered, shifting in response to Soviet behavior. Reagan did not change his own ideology, especially his belief in the pernicious nature of communism.[97] However, he did perceive changes in theirs. Not everyone thought that Reagan's new beliefs were well-grounded. One stumbling block was that these changes had occurred in the absence of any shift in Soviet capabilities.[98] This was enough to prevent a realist like Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci from seeing a decline in the Soviet threat,[99] but it had no effect whatever on Ronald Reagan. Although he first attributed the changes instituted by Gorbachev to the pressures of his situation (the American military buildup, SDI, and Soviet economic weakness), ultimately the president was persuaded that real dispositional change had occurred as well.

What are we to make of these changes in Reagan's perception of the Soviet threat? Most versions of rational choice theory hold that "beliefs are formed and updated on the basis of all received information."[100] This, however, is contrary to the model presented in the psychological literature. Just as realists do not expect changes in threat perception without changes in capabilities, cognitive psychologists do not expect such changes to occur readily under any circumstances. Whether the question is viewed in terms of learning theory,[101] be-

[94] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 371.

[95] "Radio Address to the Nation on Soviet-United States Relations," 10 December 1988, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 24 (December 19, 1988), 1613–14.

[96] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 1131.

[97] Fischer, *Reagan*, 148–49.

[98] Jervis, "Perception and Misperception," 226.

[99] "[W]e must be guided by realism, not wishful thinking. The West's security preparations must be based not on Kremlin declarations, but on actual Soviet military capabilities." Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 533.

[100] Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 38.

[101] Ibid., 34; and Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances," *World Politics* 46 (July 1994): 493–94.

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lief change,[102] schema theory,[103] images,[104] or attitude change,[105] revising beliefs is thought to be slow and difficult, even in the face of disconfirming information. Such change is even more unlikely if the beliefs in question have any, let alone all, of the qualities that characterized Reagan's perception of the Soviet Union as a threat: if, for example, they are particularly important to the person who holds them[106] or central to his or her belief system (and beliefs about the adversary are thought to be particularly central);[107] if they are linked to other beliefs,[108] are strongly held or value-laden,[109] held with great confidence[110] or linked to strong emotion;[111] and if the person has made a public commitment to them.[112]

Thus, Reagan's ability to revise his view of the Soviet threat is something of a puzzle. This might not be true for those with less ideological views like Shultz. But, as we have seen, Reagan initially held essentialist views much like those of Weinberger and Perle, who unquestionably continued to cling to them.[113] Moreover, while learning theory suggests that learning is more likely in the face of failure,[114] Reagan appears to have revised his beliefs in the face of success. What allowed him to make such changes when others with similar views did not? The evidence suggests a combination of Reagan's personal qualities and a belief system that was somewhat more complex than has usually been attributed to him.

[102] Philip E. Tetlock, "Social Psychology and World Politics" in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1998), 880; and "Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (April 1999): 337–38; J. F. Voss, C. R. Wolfe, J. A. Lawrence, and R. A. Engle, "From Representation to Decision: an Analysis of Problem Solving in International Relations" in R. J. Sternberg and P. A. Frensch, eds., *Complex Problem Solving: Principles and Mechanisms* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erbaum, 1991), 131–33; Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 118–23.

[103] Reiter, *Crucible*, 21–24; Stein, "Political Learning," 163–64; Deborah Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision–Making," *Political Psychology* 15 (March 1994): 29.

[104] Martha Cottam and Dorcas E. McCoy, "Image Change and Problem Representation after the Cold War" in Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds., *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 117–18, 123.

[105] Jervis, *Perception*, chap. 7; Jon A. Krosnick, 1988. "Attitude Importance and Attitude Change," *Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology* 24 (1998): 240–55.

[106] Ibid., 240–41; Cottam and McCoy, "Image Change," 118.

[107] Vertzberger, *World*, 118–19, 137.

[108] Krosnick, "Attitude Importance," 240.

[109] Cottam and McCoy, "Image Change," 118.

[110] Tetlock, "Social Psychology," 880; Vertzberger, *World*, 120.

[111] Ibid., 120, 137; Cottam and McCoy, "Image Change," 123; Stein, "Political Learning," 169.

[112] Krosnick, "Attitude Importance," 241.

[113] For a comparison of Reagan's image of the Soviet Union with that of his advisers, see Shimko, *Images*, 233–37, 224–25. On Weinberger, see Weinberger, *Fighting*, 37, n.5, 331–32, 347–51; Garthoff, *Great Transformation*, 531–32.

[114] Reiter, *Crucible*, 35, 39 and "Learning," 490; Stein, "Political Learning," 173.

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Ideology

Ironically, Reagan's democratic, anti-Soviet ideology, which many considered a fault, may in fact have had the virtue of helping him to perceive change in the Soviet Union. It gave him the sense that the tide of history was moving away from the Soviets and toward democratic freedom. As he said in a 1982 speech in London, "In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis. . . . But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It is also in deep economic difficulty."[115]

This may have been a simple view of the world, but as Michael Mandelbaum has pointed out, it was not necessarily wrong.[116] It seems to have made Reagan more receptive to change in the Soviet Union than he might otherwise have been.[117] For one thing, it sensitized him to the role of ideology in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and perhaps to the significance of ideological change for Soviet foreign policy. For another, it made him more open to the possibility of change altogether. That is to say, Reagan was in some sense primed to accept the reality of change because he already believed it possible, even likely.[118] This, in turn, contributed to his "unquenchable optimism" about the future.[119]

Dual Threats/Dual Goals

Reagan's conviction that the Soviet Union was far from being the only serious threat was as relevant as his ideology in helping him to revise his thinking about the Soviet threat. The notion that nuclear weapons were also a grave danger provided Reagan with more than one goal in the security field, and he was un-

[115] Cited in Banchoff, "Changing," 88. See also Shultz's remarks in an interview with Peter Schweizer: "President Reagan just had an innate sense that the Soviet Union would not, or could not, survive. . . . That feeling was not based on a detailed learned knowledge of the Soviet Union; it was just instinct." *Victory* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994).

[116] Michael Mandelbaum, "The Luck of the President" in William G. Hyland, ed., *The Reagan Foreign Policy* (New York: New American Library, 1987),140–41, 132.

[117] For quite a different view, see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who, writing in 1983, recognizes the ideological basis of Reagan's thought, but has nothing good to say about it and does not foresee a capacity for change. "Foreign Policy and the American Character," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall 1983): 5–7. Gary Wills, too, has scant respect for Reagan's ability to think historically: "He has a skill for striking 'historical' attitudes combined with a striking lack of historical attentiveness." *Reagan's America* (New York: Penguin, 1988), 63, 446–47. For Reagan's lack of historical understanding during the Bitburg controversy, see Cannon, *President Reagan*, 588.

[118] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 549; Matlock in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 22; Dallin, "Learning," 416. Fischer uses the concept of priming somewhat differently to explain how Reagan's reaction to the events of the fall of 1983 "primed" him to take the nuclear threat more seriously. *Reagan*, 110–12.

[119] Cannon, *President Reagan*, 179; Cannon, *Reagan*, 319, 337, 347–48; U.S. Congress, *Soviet Diplomacy*, 69, 114.

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troubled by any sense that his goals were in some way incompatible.[120] Rather, he was able to perceive changes in Soviet behavior that a more consistent person might have dismissed as contradictions.[121]

Some who fail to note the dual nature of Reagan's goals have argued that his inconsistent attitudes toward the Soviet Union were actually due to contradictory beliefs: on the one hand, a "simplistic hardline image of the Soviet Union. . .; and on the other hand, . . . an equally simplistic, even naïve, liberal faith in the existence of an underlying harmony of interests among men and nations."[122] An uncommited thinker, Reagan oscillated between the two views according to changes in the situation and the pressure of his advisers.[123] However, Reagan was not only deeply committed to his basic principles and consistently unwilling to listen to any advice intended to diminish his support for them, but also, rather than vacillate between two sets of incompatible views of the Soviet Union, from at least 1984 he was increasingly concerned about serious threats emanating from both the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons. He may not have been cognitively complex, but he did see the problem of threat as having more than one dimension.

Nor did he waver between contradictory policies directed at these threats. Rather, he felt able to concentrate on the nuclear danger, which included attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union, only after he had, in his own mind at least, neutralized the Soviet threat by rebuilding America's military strength. Thus, Dobrynin, who was always intrigued by "the paradox of Ronald Reagan," seems closer to the mark in directing us to the "fascinating story of how Reagan's vision of nuclear apocalypse and his deeply rooted but almost hidden conviction that nuclear weapons should ultimately be abolished, would ultimately prove more powerful than his visceral anti-communism."[124]

Strong Principles and Determination

Closely connected to Reagan's belief structure about threat were his firm principles and determination to implement them. There is abundant testimony as

[120] See the remarks of Ambassador Ridgway in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 18. On Reagan's general trait of harboring contradictory convictions and commitments, see Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 277–78. Gary Wills, referring to both conservative and liberal elements in Reagan's political belief system, notes that "All these personae were always present in him, and were not felt to be at odds. Like much of America, he contained contradictions, but never experienced them." *Reagan's America*, 307. See also Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 22; Neustadt, "Presidents," 19.

[121] Fischer explains this in terms of increased cognitive complexity, which allowed him to distinguish the Soviet leaders who shared his "concerns about international security and nuclear war" from communists in general. *Reagan*, 149.

[122] Shimko, "Reagan," 354–57, 359, 374.

[123] John D. Steinbruner, *Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 129–31; Shimko, *Images*, 240–42. For evidence to the contrary, see Cannon, *President Reagan*, 481.

[124] Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 606–608.

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to the strength of his "unshakable commitment to a limited number of positions,"[125] including his belief about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Reagan treated these as long-term goals and was not deflected from them by apparent setbacks; nor was he concerned that they violated the "conventional wisdom."[126] Moreover, despite criticism that he was often captive to his advisers, when it came to his principles, Reagan remained in control.[127]

This commitment to principle may have contributed to Reagan's ability to appreciate changes in the Soviet Union in the sense that he perceived and responded to a similar quality in Gorbachev. According to Alexander Bessmertnykh, Reagan and Gorbachev "each had their own ideals which they tried to follow all through their lives. Their ideals were not similar, but the dedication to those ideals was similar. They both believed in something. . . . This is what they sensed in each other and this is why they made good partners."[128]

Openness, Attitude to the Future, and Intuition

Other aspects of Reagan's personal style also contributed to his ability to perceive change. For a "putative ideologue," he was strikingly open-minded.[129] By all accounts, Reagan was a good listener and willing to do considerable amounts of homework when the subject interested him.[130] He could also accept criticism gracefully[131] and was capable of a certain amount of empathy. For example, while initially Reagan seemed to have difficulty understanding why the Soviets should see the United States as threatening in any way,[132] after the nuclear scares of 1983, he became sensitive to that possibility.[133]

[125] Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 157–58, 257; McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 106; Speakes, *Speaking*, 301; Cannon, *Reagan*, 372–73; George and George, *Presidential Personality*, 225; Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 165–57.

[126] Shultz in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 104. See also George and George, *Presidential Personality*, 224. As Secretary Shultz and others have pointed out, this quality had its down side and was regarded as obstinacy by those who wanted Reagan to change his mind. Shultz, *Turmoil*, 145; and remarks in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 104. For a striking example of this stubbornness during the Iran-contra crisis, see Cannon, *President Reagan*, 630.

[127] Fischer, *Reagan*, 155–56; Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 154–55.

[128] All quotations are from Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 107. On the importance of this kind of connection between Reagan and Gorbachev, see Fred Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War," 218–19, remarks of Ridgway and Shultz, 115, 104. Both Greenstein and Ridgway include Secretary Shultz as a kindred spirit of the two leaders in this regard.

[129] Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan," 214; see also Matlock's remarks in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 114.

[130] "Ronald Reagan knew what he didn't know, and he was willing to listen." Matlock in ibid., 114. See also McFarlane's testimony about Reagan's preparations for the Geneva summit, above; and Speakes, *Speaking*, 301; Cannon, *Reagan*, 372, and *President Reagan*, 748–49, 763.

[131] Ibid., 140, 372; see also Matlock's comments in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 114.

[132] Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 105, 139; see also, Fischer, *Reagan*, 21. As Stein and others have pointed out, decision makers often have difficulty in empathizing with the other side. "Building," 250–51.

[133] See Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 139; Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 67. Shimko finds evidence of this attitude even earlier in "Reagan," 365, 369–70, and *Images*, 107. See also Reagan, *American*, 595, 588–89.

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Closely related to Reagan's openness was his sense of optimism about the future and his willingness to put forward original ideas. Although Reagan was often accused of being doctrinaire, he possessed other qualities, such as a willingness to adopt new ways of thinking that belied that characterization. Some even thought of Reagan as "visionary,"[134] a man whose approach was anything but incremental and who had "a bold approach and a keen intuition, even if he did not understand many of the important details."[135]

Nor was Reagan hidebound. He had a sense of history, yet he was oriented toward the future. Although Reagan's reasoning was clearly less sophisticated and his ability to follow through more limited, Oberdorfer's characterization of Secretary Shultz as one of "the rare policymakers who takes a long view, seeing and thinking in 'time streams' beyond the current day" can in some sense be applied to Reagan as well.[136] Moreover, François Mitterand, at first "taken aback by Reagan's intellectual emptiness," later concluded that ". . . beneath the surface you find somone who isn't stupid, who has great good sense and profoundly good intentions. What he does not perceive with his intelligence, he feels by nature." This view of Reagan as "a man of finer instincts than intelligence" was also shared by those who believed with Dobrynin that he "grasped matters in an instinctive way but not necessarily in a simple one."[137] Nor were Reagan's intuitions about trivial matters. Rather, they concerned issues like the viability of the Soviet Union and dangers of nuclear weapons.[138]

This notion of intuition as a source of insight recalls Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences, which suggests that people have many different types of ability not covered by the traditional definition of intelligence.[139] Reagan, for example, has been said to possess "emotional intelligence," which guides his intuitions.[140] Thus, his strong emotional reaction to the dangers of

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Garthoff, however, criticizes Reagan for his lack of insight into the impact of his harsh words on the Soviet leaders. See *Great Transition*, 105.

[134] Shultz, *Turmoil*, 263; Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 156–57; Cannon, *Reagan*, 372, *President Reagan*, 281, 740.

[135] Soviet journalist, Aleksandr Bovin, cited in Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 438; and Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan," 215.

[136] Oberdorfer, *Turn*, 439.

[137] Morris, *Dutch*, 442, 445, 495; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 494; Wills, *Reagan's America*, 384; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 309, and "Presidents," 16–23; Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 157; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 133–36, 140. For evidence of Reagan's intuitive approach earlier in his career, see Cannon, *Reagan*, 155. On the possible virtues of simplicity, see Peter Suedfeld, "Are Simple Decision Always Worse?" *Society* 25 (1988): 25–27.

[138] On the former, see Shultz in an interview with Schweizer, *Victory*, xiii; and Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 467. On the latter, see Jervis, "Perception," 227; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Soviet Diplomacy*, 115.

[139] Cannon, *Reagan*, 137–38.

[140] According to Greenstein, emotional intelligence is a person's "ability to manage his emotions and turn them to constructive purposes, rather than being dominated by them and allowing them to diminish his leadership." *Presidential Difference*, 6; as applied to Reagan, see 157; and Greenstein, "Reckoning with Reagan," *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (Spring 2000): 121–22. On the connection between emotion and intuition, see Deborah Larson, "Good Judgment in Foreign Policy" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 1996), 5–6.

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nuclear weapons led him to press for their reduction when almost everyone else was content to work for limitation. What is more, he sought a defense against them, which had among other things the consequence of making the Soviets more cooperative "by threatening to impose unacceptable costs on the already strained Soviet economy."[141] The same emotion was also partly responsible for his desire to negotiate with the Soviets in the first place, helping him to overcome his equally strong anti-Soviet feelings. Moreover, it seems likely that Reagan's characteristic devotion to his principles and his determination to see them carried out were also fired by emotion.

Reagan has been praised for political intelligence as well. This manifested itself in a number of ways. First of all, it affected the cues he responded to. For example, in assessing the Soviet threat, Reagan looked not so much at capabilities as at intentions. In doing so, he was able to focus on the impact of political changes in the Soviet Union that others assessing only capabilities missed.[142] Second, his political sensitivity made him responsive to Gorbachev's political problems. As Matlock has described it, ". . . [W]here Reagan had a real instinct . . . was as a politician. He understood politicians. We could say about Gorbachev, for example, particularly after he got to know him, 'Hey, Gorbachev's got a problem at home. . . .' He would pay attention to that, he would be willing to take it into account."[143]

Finally, Reagan understood his own political constituency. He was able to use his popularity and conservative credentials to make his moves toward Gorbachev more acceptable to conservatives.[144] Furthermore, he understood the political climate in the United States well enough to be able to parlay the public's nuclear fears into increasing its acceptance of both negotiations and arms control agreements, instinctively trusting that the American people would follow the path that he himself had traveled.

It seems likely that Reagan's openness and intuitive intelligence contributed substantially to his ability to perceive changes in the Soviet threat.[145] Moreover, the same may be said of his capacity to be more flexible and pragmatic than his "rhetoric" would have suggested possible.[146]

[141] Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 154.

[142] See above. This political sensitivity was also seen in President Franklin Roosevelt's diagnosis of the German threat after he had observed Hitler's behavior during the Munich crisis. Barbara R. Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 5.

[143] Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 114; see also Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 301.

[144] See Shultz's remarks in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 104–105. See also Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 155. On Reagan's ability to handle his right-wing supporters on the domestic front, see Cannon, *Reagan*, 316. On political decision makers' responses to the problem of acceptability, see Farnham, *Roosevelt*, chap. 2.

[145] As Vertzberger has pointed out, the opposite is true for those with closed cognitive systems. *World*, 134.

[146] See Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 610; Anderson, *Revolution*, 284; Speakes, *Speaking*, 301; Cannon, *Reagan*, 186, 309; Mandelbaum, "Luck," 134.

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Experiential Learning

While the way Reagan came by his knowledge of the world has often been criticized,[147] in terms of the questions we are addressing here, its effect seems to have been positive. His beliefs flowed "from his life, from personal history rather than study."[148] To make sense of the world, Reagan "crave[d] discourse, not briefing papers." Narrative and experience, rather than analysis and deductive logic were his tools.[149]

The role stories played in Reagan's thinking has often been remarked; he learned by them and told them in order to convey meaning.[150] Some have objected that his "impressionable" belief system resulted in ill-grounded beliefs, easily changed by the next personal experience.[151] It is not, however, universally agreed that the capacity to learn from one's experience is a handicap. Reagan's and Gorbachev's ability to learn from and about one another advanced the dialogue between them and moved the relations between their countries to a new plane, which many had longed for but few had ever expected to see.

Belief in Personal Contact

Of course, none of these positive results could have occurred without personal contact between Reagan and Gorbachev, and Reagan was determined that it should take place as often as possible. To him "personal experience counted for everything, and strong personalities could change the world." As Reagan explained in an interview at the time of the Moscow summit, "Systems may be brutish, bureaucrats may fail. But men can sometimes transcend all that, transcend even the forces of history that seem destined to keep them apart."[152] If, as is widely believed, a person's own experiences facilitate learning,[153] then in this case Reagan's instincts served him well.

[147] Morris, *Dutch*, 414–15; Shimko, *Images,* 120; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 290–91.

[148] Leslie Gelb, quoted in Shimko, *Images*, 120; see also, Cannon, *President Reagan*, 134.

[149] Cannon, *President Reagan*, 376, 139; George and George, *Presidential Personality*, 224. As Howard Gardner concluded: "Reagan's good with language, but not logically. . . . He makes sense of the world narratively. Scientists can be deductive and understand logic but often can't tell stories. Stories are not necessarily logical." Cannon, *President Reagan*, 138; also noted in Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 157.

[150] Secretary Shultz, at first irritated by Reagan's love of stories, began to see a positive side: "he used a story to impart a larger message—and sometimes that message was simply more important to him than the facts. He was a gifted storyteller, who could use a story effectively to make his point take on a deeper and more vivid meaning or to defuse a tense situation. People, he felt, believe in and act on the stories they hear and tell about the past. Stories create meaning." *Turmoil*, 1133.

[151] Shimko, *Images*, 116, 120.

[152] Mandelbaum and Talbot, *Reagan*, 5; Sidey, "Good Chemistry," 17; Reagan, *American*, 14; Matlock, *Autopsy*, 77; Shultz, *Turmoil*, 145; Carlucci in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 46; Dallin, "Learning," 415. On the positive impact of the two leaders' mutual bluntness, see Shultz, *Turmoil*, 8, 16.

[153] Jervis, *Perception*, 239–49; Reiter, *Crucible*, 34–35, 37, 39.

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Moreover, Reagan believed in the efficacy of his own powers of persuasion,[154] and this was linked to his self-confidence—in both the validity of his own convictions and his ability to implement them.[155] If Reagan was able to see change in the Soviet Union, it is at least partly because he firmly believed that he could help make it happen through personal contact and was confident enough to resist the naysayers among his advisers.[156] Ultimately, his faith was justified by the reaction of the one person who really counted. As Gorbachev himself told the Politburo in December 1987:

> In Washington, perhaps for the first time, we understood so clearly how important the human factor is in international politics. . . . For us, Reagan appeared as a representative of and a spokesman for the most conservative part of the most conservative segment of American capitalism and the military-industrial complex. But . . . policy makers . . . also represent purely human qualities, the interests and the aspirations of common people, and that they can be guided by purely normal human feeling and aspirations. . . . This is an important aspect of the new international thinking, and it has now produced results.[157]

Conclusion

Ronald Reagan was able to perceive change in the Soviet Union and revise his perception of the Soviet threat accordingly. Moreover, his interpretation was supported by contemporary observers like Shultz and Matlock, as well as the verdict of later analysts. There is considerable evidence that Reagan's initial beliefs about the threat[158] and the nature and timing of his revision of those beliefs were reasonably sound. That evidence supports both Reagan's caution before late 1987 and his acceptance of the importance of the changes instituted by Gorbachev thereafter.[159]

[154] Cannon, *Reagan*, 745.

[155] On the former, see Shultz in Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 103–105; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 608; Anderson, *Revolution*, 286; George and George, *Presidential Personality,* 224–225. On the latter, see Thatcher, *Downing Street*, 157; Shultz, *Turmoil*, 262–63; Wills, *Reagan's America*, 383, 392; Mandelbaum and Talbott, *Reagan*, 129.

[156] Greenstein, "Reckoning," 121.

[157] Quoted by Chernyaev in Wolhforth, *Witnesses*, 49.

[158] "In reassessing the origins and dynamics of the Cold War from the admittedly one-sided evidence that is currently available, several fundamental conclusions emerge. American officials on occasion did exaggerate the magnitude of the Soviet threat and the malignant intent of Soviet leaders, but . . . it is incorrect to contend that there was no serious threat. A Soviet challenge to a stable world and to U.S. interests in democratic political systems and open economies clearly existed." Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security During the Cold War" in Hogan, ed., *End*, 64–66; and Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 752–57.

[159] See Matlock, *Autopsy*, 148; Mandebaum and Talbott, *Reagan*, 86–87; William J. Jackson, "Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (Winter 1998–99): 629–42; Philip Zelikow and Condolezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 15–16, 19; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 753; Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm," 41. This view is contrary to Glad's analysis of Reagan as a black and white thinker who might be able to change his perceptions, but only after an inordinate amount of "negative evidence." "Black and White," 72. For evidence of the contrast between Reagan's ability to perceive change in the Soviet

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Reagan not only recognized Soviet change; he also, as he himself believed, contributed to it. His ideology led him to promote such policies as the U.S. military buildup, SDI, negotiating with the Soviet Union, and broadening the discussion to include human rights and other issues, in the belief that the Soviets would respond to changes in *American* behavior. Many former Soviet officials now agree that these steps did often contribute to the result Reagan desired. For example, Reagan's conciliatory policies toward the Soviet Union enabled Gorbachev to forge ahead in his domestic and international initiatives. As Dobrynin noted, "If Reagan had stuck to his hard-line policies in 1985 and 1986 . . . Gorbachev would have been accused by the rest of the Politburo of giving everything away to a fellow who does not want to negotiate. We would have been forced to tighten our belts and spend even more on defense."[160] The success of Reagan's moves in turn encouraged him to continue along the path of trying to influence the Soviet Union, convinced that "it could change if subjected to sufficient pressure and his personal negotiating skill."[161]

What does the success of Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union tell us about his abilities as a leader? Since good outcomes can be the result of any number of factors, including luck, it is unwise to infer automatically that they are a consequence of good processes. In addition to the qualities that allowed Reagan to perceive change, therefore, we must briefly explore the other traits that may have contributed to his effectiveness in this case. This is particularly necessary in view of the widespread skepticism cited earlier about his intellectual abilities, and his lack of experience, knowledge, and training in foreign policy. He could also be passive, incurious, uninterested in detail, ignorant of the nuances of policy, and stubborn, all of which contributed to a hands-off management style that left him vulnerable to his advisers. The question is whether other qualities of mind could have compensated in part for these failings.

Earlier we noted Reagan's strong principles and determination to implement them. What also mattered was his ability to do so. Certainly, there is little doubt about his impressive "people skills." These were what gave Reagan confidence in personal contact and made it an effective tool for him. His powers of persuasion have been widely recognized,[162] as have his negotiating skills.[163] Moreover, Reagan's openness to information and his capacity to be a good listener must also be noted. The qualities that helped him to perceive Soviet change often facilitated his efforts to effect change himself.

Union and the inability of the C.I.A. to do so, see Philip Taubman, "How the C.I.A.'s Judgments Were Distorted by Cold War Catechisms," *New York Times*, 18 March 2001.

[160] Cited in Greenstein, "Reckoning," 121; see also Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 609; Jackson, "Soviet Reassessment" Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 47–48, 164–166, 193, 244, 249.

[161] Matlock, *Autopsy*, 77; see also Jervis, "Perception and Misperception," n14.

[162] See, for example, Cannon, *Reagan*, 333, 371; Speakes, *Speaking*, 301; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 122.

[163] See Bessmertnykh in Wolhforth, *Witnesses*, 107; Shultz, *Turmoil*, 145. See also, Anderson, *Revolution*, 241, 284–86; and Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 150–51, 156, and "Ronald Reagan," 122.

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While Reagan's skill as the "great communicator" has frequently been acknowledged, his ability as a politician has been less often remarked. As we have seen, he was more flexible, pragmatic, and willing to compromise than his ideological orientation led many to expect. Moreover, he was able to sell his policies to the public and use his popularity to get them through Congress—an ability of which he was fully aware.[164] As Fred Greenstein points out, ". . . Reagan was far more than a political front man. He was a politically skilled chief executive whose talents were insufficiently recognized because he was cut from a different cloth from most of those who rise to the nation's highest office."[165]

A number of other qualities that enabled Reagan to be effective have been noted earlier. His clearly defined goals allowed him to concentrate his energies on what was important to him, and his consistency in pursuing them left his subordinates in no doubt about his priorities.[166] Reagan was confident about his own judgment and for the most part made decisions easily. Moreover, when his goals were at stake, he could often assert himself and resist the temptation to delegate his responsibilities.[167]

When he was not so engaged, however, there could be trouble, as Reagan, encouraged by his dislike of detail and content to focus on the big picture, left to others the task of bringing his ideas to fruition. His management style was distinctly hands off. As a former aide described it, "He made no demands, and gave almost no instructions. . . . Rarely did he ask searching questions and demand to know why someone had or had not done something. He just sat back in a supremely calm, relaxed manner and waited until important things were brought to him." This put Reagan at the mercy of his advisers, with the inevitable result that the system worked well when the his aides were competent and loyal,[168] like Secretary Shultz who "enabled Reagan to implement the unexpectedly visionary aspect of his world view." When they were not such paragons, "disaster [could] strike." At such times, as in the Iran-contra crisis, not even Reagan's "first class temperament" could save him.

What, then does this singular mix of attributes and skills tell us about Reagan's leadership abilities? What was it that allowed him to recognize and promote change in the Soviet Union, yet failed him so badly in the Iran-contra situation? In fact, what stands out is how context dependent Reagan's performance was. When the nature of the problem played to his particular strengths, it could be quite good. But in other situations, these skills could not compensate for Reagan's failings, and some of his strengths became weaknesses.

[164] Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 156; Anderson, *Revolution*, 284; Cannon, *Reagan*, 319 and *President Reagan*, 102, 116.

[165] Greenstein, "Reckoning," 122. This assessment has been echoed by Russians like Bessmertnykh and Evgeniy Primakov ("he is a great political leader"). U.S. Congress, *Soviet Diplomacy*, 116; Wohlforth, *Witnesses*, 108. On Reagan's political skill, see also Neustadt, "Presidents," 17–23.

[166] Greenstein, "Reckoning," 122; and "Ronald Reagan," 215; Neustadt, "Presidents," 17.

[167] Anderson, *Revolution*, 286; Fischer, *Reagan*, 80–81, 155–56.

[168] Anderson, *Revolution*, 289–92; Reagan, *For the Record*, 266–69, 294.

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In perceiving and encouraging change in the Soviet Union, Reagan was able to draw on his strengths. In contrast to Iran-contra, what the situation demanded of him was something he could do. When it came to perceiving and encouraging change in the Soviet Union, what was required was openness, insight, persuasion, and negotiation. Unlike the abilities demanded by the Iran-contra situation (guiding and controlling staff and a detailed understanding of policy), these were skills that Reagan possessed, and he exercised them willingly. In this case, persuasion and communication *were* the essential tasks, and Reagan had no need to delegate them.

Long ago, Machiavelli observed that particular combinations of talents may produce success in some situations, but failure in others.[169] Reagan provides a classic example of this, though not all leaders are likely to exhibit such a huge gap between strengths and weaknesses as he did.[170] As Lou Cannon describes it, "The paradox of the Reagan presidency was that it depended entirely on Reagan for its ideological inspiration while he depended upon others for all aspects of governance except his core ideas and his powerful performances. In the many arenas of the office where ideology did not apply or the performances had no bearing, Reagan was at a loss."[171] He could lead the nation and influence his counterparts on the world stage, yet fail spectacularly at keeping his own house in order.*

[169] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 131–32.

[170] Of course, President Jimmy Carter did exhibit such a gap between his analytical ability and his lack of political sensitivity. See Greenstein, *Presidential Difference*, 141–42; Farnham, *Roosevelt*, 240 n 47.

[171] Cited in George and George, *Presidential Personality*, 225.

* I would like to thank the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University for supporting this research and Deborah Larson and Robert Jervis for their helpful comments.

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The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN
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The Republican party took control of the U.S. Congress in 1995, promising to make dramatic changes in American government. Whole federal departments were scheduled for elimination; hundreds of federal grant-in-aid programs were slated for termination or reform; large reductions in federal spending were advocated; and sweeping regulatory reforms were proposed. As Newt Gingrich, the architect of the new Republican majority, put it: "We are going to rethink the entire structure of American society, and the entire structure of American government. . . . This is a real revolution."[1] Academic observers agreed that big changes were underway. Richard Nathan dubbed the Republican program a "devolution revolution," because of its proposed reductions in the size and power of the federal government and the anticipated return of governmental responsibilities to the states. Even President Bill Clinton conceded in early 1996 that "the era of big government is over."

In the end, the Republican revolt stalled and its revolutionary changes were avoided. Bill Clinton was reelected president, while Newt Gingrich ultimately lost his leadership position and left office. Few federal programs and agencies were abolished during the aborted revolution, and federal spending growth resumed.

Away from the spotlight of attention on Congress and the White House, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had opened a second front in the devolution battles of the 1990s. In recent years, the Supreme Court has overturned a grow-

[1] Quoted in Timothy J. Conlan, *From New Federalism to Devolution* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 1.

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ing list of congressional statutes on the grounds that they intruded into protected spheres of state sovereignty or exceeded Congress's delegated powers under the Constitution. These decisions have been all the more significant because for most of the past sixty years the Court had been an energetic agent of governmental centralization, ever since the last so-called revolution in constitutional interpretation during the New Deal. For this reason, one political scientist has argued that the Court has launched "the most fundamental debate over federalism since the 1930s."[2]

Has the Supreme Court truly embarked on a new constitutional revolution, rewriting the rules of American federalism as the United States enters its third century? If so, what do recent cases tell us about the core tenets of this new judicial federalism? If not, how much significance should be attached to the Court's recent decisions? This article will examine these questions, beginning with a brief synopsis of the Supreme Court's doctrines shaping federalism during the twentieth century, an assessment of the recent cases decided by the Rehnquist Court, and an analysis of their significance for American federalism and the Court's own role in our constitutional framework.

The Supreme Court and the Centralization of American Federalism

The American federal system has evolved dramatically over the past two-hundred years. With surprisingly few formal amendments to the Constitution, the national government has grown from a tiny federal establishment "out of sight and out of mind"[3] into the nerve center of a military superpower and the dominant partner of a domestic welfare state. It transfers nearly $300 billion annually to state and local governments, which in turn have become the chief agents of implementation for scores of federal programs.

Many of the members of the founding generation did not believe that institutional changes of this magnitude would be possible without major amendments to the Constitution. Antifederalist opponents of the federal Constitution, early presidents like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their successors in the early Democratic party all believed and sometimes insisted that formal constitutional amendments were required to go beyond a literal, minimalist reading of Congress's powers in Article I, section 8. Jefferson, for example, questioned the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States and sought a constitutional amendment to legitimate the purchase of Louisiana from the French. Madison and James Monroe vetoed bills for "internal improvements," which they otherwise supported, out of deference to their narrow view of the national government's authority under the Constitution. Both

[2] Donald Kettl, "Governor Rehnquist," *Governing*, August 1999, 10.

[3] The term comes from James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community, 1800-1828* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1968).

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called for passage of amendments to the Constitution to permit such projects in the future.[4]

In contrast, the early Supreme Court, especially under Chief Justice John Marshall, took a more expansive view of the powers of Congress and the new national government. Equally important, the court proceeded to address such issues through the process of judicial review—seeking to settle such policy differences through its interpretation of the Constitution's expansive and often ambiguous language.[5] Ultimately, all parties came to accept this judicial role as legitimate, and subsequent constitutional battles typically focused—not on formal amendments to the Constitution—but on issues like the scope of the interstate commerce clause, the meaning of the elastic clause, whether the tax and spending powers comprised independent grants of power, and the substance of the Tenth Amendment.[6]

Within the latitude afforded by the Constitution's broad language, great swings have occurred in the Court's reigning doctrines. The Supreme Court was an agent of nationalization under John Marshall. It assumed the role of protector of property rights and defender of capitalism in the post-Civil War era. By the early 1930s, the court was the last bastion of conservative opposition to policies ameliorating the problems of industrialization.

The Court's modern era began in the mid-1930s, when it once again became an engine of nationalization. It did so first in a permissive way, interpreting key provisions of the Constitution expansively and allowing the elected branches of government to proceed with the construction of a modern welfare state. Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, which had previously been deemed to exclude manufacturing, wages and working conditions, and other indirect effects on the exchange of goods and services, now came to be read broadly. This allowed Congress to regulate such areas as collective bargaining, industrial and agricultural production, and wage and hour restrictions. By 1942, Congress's reach over interstate commerce was read so expansively that it applied even to a farmer who grew grain to feed to his own livestock.[7] The powers to lay and collect taxes and spend for the general welfare were upheld as independent grants of power, allowing Congress to establish and fund a social secu-

[4] For a richly detailed analysis of this constitutional debate in the early Republic, see Michael J. Lacey, "Federalism and National Planning: The Nineteenth Century Legacy" in Robert Fishman, ed., *The American Planning Tradition: Culture and Policy* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press, 1999).

[5] The historical case for judicial review is critically analyzed in Sylvia Snowiss, *Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

[6] Clearly there are important exceptions to this rule. There have been twenty-seven amendments to the U.S. Constitution, including fifteen since the founding era. Many have dealt with expansion of suffrage or changes in the structure of government that could not be accomplished through interpretation. Nevertheless, the federal Constitution, at 7,800 words, remains much shorter than the median state constitution at 22,500 words—even after decades of state constitutional reform and simplification. See Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob, *Politics in the American States*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1996), 257.

[7] *Wickard v. Filburn*, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

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rity system.[8] And the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was held no longer to constitute an independent check on Congress's power but was reduced to a mere "truism."[9] In short, the Court now permitted an activist Congress great latitude, limited only by its ability to demonstrate a rational basis for its regulations. As Martin Shapiro put it: "The New Deal Court had effectively announced the constitutional demise of federalism as a limit on the power of the national government."[10]

Following World War II, the Court became a powerful nationalizing force in its own right. It increasingly viewed its role as a defender of minority rights, a protector of civil liberties, and a promoter of political equality. In the process, it ventured aggressively into spheres that had heretofore been the province of state policy making. In the words of Philip Kurland: "The Warren Court stands in the great tradition of its predecessors in its efforts at transferring areas of governmental control from the states to the nation. Every one of its major constitutional developments falls in this category. The school desegregation cases, the criminal procedure cases, the reapportionment cases, all emphasize this single theme of restraint on state power."[11]

Partly as a result of these constitutional developments, the contours of American federalism were greatly altered from their pre-New Deal outlines. Between 1929 and 1980, federal expenditures rose from less than 3 percent of GNP to over 21 percent of GNP, and the federal share of government spending rose from 34 percent of state and local expenditures to 197 percent of state and local expenditures. During this same period, the number of federal grant programs went from approximately thirty to over 490, the number of federal regulatory agencies increased from fifteen to forty-one, and the number of intergovernmental regulatory statutes grew from zero to thirty-seven.[12] Thus, by the 1960s and 1970s, some scholars went so far as to argue that "In fact, if not in form, we live today under a national, not a federal, Constitution."[13]

The Rediscovery of Federalism in the 1990s

Today, such assessments are being reassessed. Since 1991, a slim majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has engaged in a concerted effort to restructure the

[8] *Helvering v. Davis*, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).

[9] *United States v. Darby*, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

[10] Martin Shapiro, "The Supreme Court from Early Burger to Early Rehnquist" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990), 66.

[11] Philip Kurland, *Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 59.

[12] U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *A Crisis of Confidence and Competence*, A-77 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 78, 79, 112.

[13] C. Peter Magrath, "The Supreme Court and a National Constitution" in Murray Stedman, ed., *Modernizing American Government* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 64. See also Theodore J. Lowi, "Europeanization of America? From United States to United State" in Theodore J. Lowi and Alan Stone, eds., *Nationalizing Government: Public Policies in America* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978).

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post-New Deal balance of power and authority in the American federal system. In a series of rulings, a narrow Court majority has begun to constrict Congress's authority on a number of fronts, overturning all or portions of federal statutes that were deemed to:

- commandeer the policy-making and administrative apparatus of state and local governments;
- infringe on state sovereign immunity;
- exceed Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce; or
- exceed Congress's power to regulate state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

As Paul Gewirtz has observed: "Something very large is at work. . . . The judicial branch is [engaged in] an across-the-board restriction on national government power on every front and a bolstering of state sovereign authority."[14]

Transition to the Rehnquist Era

These new cases follow in the wake of a transitional era between the expansive nationalism of the Warren Court and the contemporary Rehnquist Court. This transitional period, from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, was marked by inconsistency and indecision in the Court's federalism rulings. Nothing underscored this period of ambivalence more than the noted case of *National League of Cities (NLC) v. Usery*. Here, the Court held that Congress's attempt to apply the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state and local government employees was an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment. Overturning an earlier case and challenging the reigning post-New Deal dictum that the Tenth Amendment was merely "a truism," the Court held in *NLC* that the Tenth Amendment protects the "integral government functions" of state and local governments: "Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the states' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.' . . . This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution."[15]

This was a bold decision that attracted great attention at the time, since it seemed to portend a sharp turn from the Court's philosophy on the Tenth Amendment. Yet that potential went unfulfilled as the Supreme Court declined to apply or extend its ruling in subsequent cases. Over the next several years, the Court rejected Tenth Amendment challenges to federal surface mining regulations, energy conservation requirements, and age discrimination laws.[16]

[14] Quoted in Joan Biskupic, "Justice Shifts Federal-State Power Balance: Rehnquist-led Majority Determined to Restrict Washington's Authority," *Washington Post*, 29 March 1996.

[15] *National League of Cities, et al. v. Usery*, 426 U.S. 833, 1976. U.S. Lexis 158 (1976), *152.

[16] *Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association*, 452 U.S. 264; *FERC v. Mississippi*, 456 U.S. 742; and *EEOC v. Wyoming*, 460 U.S. 742.

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Finally, in 1985, the Court reversed *National League of Cities* altogether. In *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*, the Court held that the wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA could be applied to state and local government employees. Most important, the new majority in *Garcia* rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" the attempt in *NLC v. Usery* to carve out a sphere of state government autonomy based on the "'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions."[17] Instead, the Court now sided with legal scholars who had argued that the interests of state governments are protected through political representation in the elected branches of the federal government rather than by judicial circumscription.[18] As Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued for the Court's five member majority:

> The composition of the Federal government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. . . . States' sovereign interests [are] more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. [Any] substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers [must] be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.' . . . The political process insures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.[19]

Garcia was issued by a sharply divided court in which the switch of a single justice made the difference from the *NLC* decision a decade earlier. The four dissenting justices chastised the majority's rejection of "the basic precepts of our federal system." Other observers questioned whether empirical evidence supported the Court's claim that state interests were adequately protected in the federal legislative process.[20] Most tellingly, however, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said in his dissent that he was "confident" the federalist principles that had been expressed in *National League of Cities* would "in time again command the support of the majority of this Court."[21]

That prediction was not immediately realized. Three years after *Garcia* the Court reiterated its logic in a decision that overturned longstanding precedent and removed the federal income tax immunity for interest earned on state and local bonds.[22] But beginning in 1991, the Rehnquist Court issued the first of

[17] *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al.*, 469 U.S. 528, 1985. U.S. Lexis 48 (1985), *546-*547.

[18] See Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism," *Columbia Law Review* 54 (1954); and Jesse Choper, *Judicial Review and the National Political Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[19] *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al.*, *550-*554.

[20] See, for example, Timothy J. Conlan, "Politics and Governance: Conflicting Intergovernmental Trends in the 1990s?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 509 (May 1990): 128–136.

[21] *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*, *580 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).

[22] *South Carolina v. Baker*, 485 US 505 (1988). For an analysis, see Margaret T. Wrightson, "The Road to South Carolina: Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and the Constitutional Status of Federalism," *Publius* 19 (Summer 1989): 39–55.

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what became a growing and nearly uninterrupted series of decisions that breathed life into the old concept of judicial dual federalism. These cases have touched on issues as diverse as nuclear waste disposal, gun control, religious freedom, and Indian gambling casinos; but they have all developed along two general themes. The first theme involves efforts to define a sphere of state sovereignty that is protected from federal regulation and intrusion. The second involves efforts to limit the scope of Congress's powers under Article 1, section 8 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Resurrecting State Sovereignty

In *Gregory v. Ashcroft* (1991), the Supreme Court began its recent quest to define a sphere of institutional autonomy that lies beyond the reach of congressional authority. This case involved a challenge under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to Missouri's mandatory retirement age for state judges. The Court upheld Missouri's provision, arguing among other things that congressional efforts to overturn a basic attribute of state institutional structure required at least a "plain statement" of Congress's intent to do so. In the process, the majority opinion began to reinvigorate the concept of state sovereignty: "The present case concerns a state constitutional provision through which the people of Missouri establish a qualification for those who sit as their judges. This provision goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign."[23]

The Court continued its quest the following year. In *New York v. United States*,[24] the Court overturned a portion of the Low Level Hazardous Waste Policy Amendments of 1985, declaring that "the Federal Government may not compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."[25] This case involved a law in which Congress sought to encourage states to form interstate compacts for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. Congress provided a set of financial and regulatory incentives for states, or groups of states, to dispose of such wastes that were generated within their borders. As a last resort, the law required states to "take title" and assume the costs and responsibility for all low-level wastes generated within their borders if they had not established an acceptable disposal site by 1996. New York objected to this provision and sued.

In its decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court accepted the law's system of financial incentives to the states as "an unexceptional expression of Congress's power." It also upheld Congress's power to allow

[23] *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 111 S.Ct. 2791 (1991).
[24] 112 S.Ct. 2408; 1992. U.S. Lexis 3693.
[25] Ibid., *188.

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compact members and other compliant states to discriminate against non-compliant states. But the "take title" provision was deemed to be "of a different character": "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.' . . . While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions."[26]

This anticommandeering theme was reiterated in the 1996 case of *Printz v. United States.* This case involved Congress's attempt, under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, to require that local law enforcement authorities conduct background checks of prospective gun purchasers. Once again, the Court declared that: "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."[27]

State Sovereign Immunity

New York and *Printz* were based in part on the Tenth Amendment and in part on a broader structural and historical interpretation of the Constitution as a system of divided sovereignty. As these cases made clear, one attribute of state sovereignty involves judicial protection of states' legislative and administrative apparatus from federal usurpation. A related set of cases has sought to strengthen the concept of state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits. In particular, the Court has sought to restrict Congress's authority to make states liable to private rights of action under federal law.

In *Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida*, the Supreme Court voided provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that authorized Indian tribes to sue states in federal court if they failed to negotiate in good faith the establishment of a tribal-state compact to regulate Indian gambling within the state. A majority of the Court held that Congress lacked power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: "The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in Federal court. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting states."[28]

[26] Ibid., *161–162.

[27] *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 98 1997. U.S. Lexis 4044 (1997), *935.

[28] *Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, et al.*, 517 U.S. 44, 1996. U.S. Lexis 2165 (1996), *72, *76.

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Seminole Tribe, which overturned an earlier Supreme Court decision granting Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the interstate commerce clause,[29] was reinforced in the 1999 decisions, *Alden v. Maine*, *Florida v. College Savings Bank*, and *College Savings Bank v. Florida. Alden v. Maine* has attracted the most attention. It dealt with a group of state employees who were suing Maine under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. They had first brought their suit in federal court, but after the *Seminole Tribe* decision, they switched to the state court system, as authorized under the FLSA. Thus in *Alden*, the Court was asked to consider whether Congress has the power under Article I to authorize private suits against the states in their own courts. This is a question not addressed in the language of the Eleventh Amendment.[30]

The Supreme Court's response was in keeping with its other recent decisions touching on state sovereignty. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that, in the absence of explicit text, the answer could be found in the "structure and history" of the Constitution: "We hold that the powers delegated to Congress . . . do not include the power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts. . . . The Constitution's structure and history . . . make clear that States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty they enjoyed before the Constitution's ratification and still retain today."[31] Despite the Eleventh Amendment's silence on the issue, he argued that: "a congressional power to authorize suits against States in their own courts would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a power to authorize suits in a federal forum."[32]

Limitations on Delegated Powers

Another important development in recent federalism jurisprudence involves limitations on the scope of Congress's constitutional powers. Unlike the state autonomy and state immunity cases, where Congress's authority is circumscribed because it is deemed to invade a constitutionally protected sphere of state sovereignty, these cases deal with limits inherent within the very powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution.

The most prominent of these cases was the 1995 decision in *U.S. v. Lopez*, which involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990. Alfonzo Lopez was convicted under the act for carrying a concealed handgun to his school, and his lawyers challenged the law for transcending the scope of Congress's powers under the Constitution. A majority of the Supreme Court agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that "the Act exceeds the authority of

[29] *Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.*, 491 U.S. 1 (1989).

[30] The Amendment reads: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."

[31] *Alden, et al., v. Maine*, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 1999. U.S. Lexis 4374 (1999), *2246

[32] Ibid.

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Congress 'to regulate Commerce... among the several States.'"[33] As was widely noted at the time, this marked the first occasion since the New Deal when the Court had invalidated a congressional statute for exceeding the scope of the Commerce power.

Writing for a sharply divided Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the decision was grounded in the constitutional "first principle" of enumerated powers. The law in question exceeded those powers because it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce."[34] According to Rehnquist, prior decisions of the Court had defined three categories of activities that Congress could regulate under the Commerce power: the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Historically, this last category has been the most controversial and difficult to define, but the Court declared that the Gun-Free School Zone Act had overstepped the boundaries, however vague: "We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process. That authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools."[35]

The reasoning in *Lopez* was strengthened and reaffirmed by the Court's May 2000 decision in *United States v. Morrison, et al.* This case dealt with a portion of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, which established a federal cause of action against any person "who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender."[36] Congress based this provision in part on its powers to regulate interstate commerce under Article 1, section 8. The court rejected this authorization by the same 5-4 margin that decided *Lopez.* It also disposed of liberal hopes that *Lopez* established a mere procedural test. One interpretation of the *Lopez* decision suggested that Congress had simply failed to establish a legislative history that demonstrated a rational relationship between guns, schools, and the economy. In contrast, the economic effects of gender-based violence were abundantly illustrated in the legislative history of the Violence Against Women Act, but to no avail. After applying the test laid out in *Lopez* for determining the scope of interstate commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that: "We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. . . . In recognizing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been consistent since the Clause was adopted. The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that

[33] *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 1995. U.S. Lexis 3039 (1995), *551.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., *565.
[36] 42 U.S.C. §3981.

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is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States."[37]

Limiting Congress's Enforcement Powers Under the Fourteenth Amendment

A fourth line of cases with important federalism implications involves Court-imposed limits on Congress's authority to interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. This issue was posed most directly in the 1997 case of *City of Boerne v. Flores*,[38] but it subsequently has become intertwined with other strands of the Court's federalism jurisprudence as Congress has attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to use its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to circumvent the Court's Commerce Power and Eleventh Amendment holdings.

City of Boerne v. Flores involved a case brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which prohibited governments, including state and local governments, from "'substantially burdening' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'"[39]

In enacting this law, Congress sought to reestablish and strengthen via statute a 1963 Supreme Court holding in *Sherbert v. Verner*, which established a stringent test for evaluating state laws—even of general applicability—that substantially affect a person's free exercise of religion. The Court itself had rejected the application of this test in a 1990 case, *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*, in which it upheld an Oregon law criminalizing peyote use despite its consequences for native American religious practice. Accordingly, the Court saw passage of the RFRA as a congressional intrusion into its own prerogatives, and it declared the law to be in violation of the constitutional framework of separation of powers.

According to the Court's fragmented majority (there were two concurring and three dissenting opinions), RFRA violated both the vertical and horizontal separation of powers. First, the Court rejected Congress's attempt to "decree the substance of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's restrictions on the states. . . . Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."[40] Congress has only the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment and must leave "the power to interpret the Constitution . . . in the Judiciary."[41] Concerning federalism and the vertical separation of powers, the majority held

[37] *United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 17, 18 (2000).
[38] *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507; 1997 U.S. Lexis 4035.
[39] Ibid., ***14.
[40] Ibid., ***20–21.
[41] Ibid., ***29.

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that: "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. . . . Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law. . . . This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens."[42]

Three subsequent cases have dealt with Congress's attempts to use its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to circumvent the Court's other federalism rulings. In *Kimel et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al.*, the Court rejected Congress's attempt to subject states to employee lawsuits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.[43] The Court held earlier that states, as employers, are covered by federal regulations under the ADEA and are subject to enforcement actions by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission.[44] But enforcement of the act by abrogating state sovereign immunity was rejected in this case. Because age has not been considered a suspect classification under the Fourteenth Amendment, "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."[45] Given this context, the majority held in a discussion marked by careful distinctions and considerable second guessing that the ADEA's sweep was too broad and that Congress had not developed a sufficiently strong case to justify the abrogation of sovereign immunity in this particular instance.

The Supreme Court employed similar logic in the recent case of *Board of Trustees v. Garrett.*[46] This decision held that Congress's authorization of private law suits for monetary damages against state governments by state employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violated the Eleventh Amendment and exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment basis for the Violence Against Women Act in *United States v. Morrison*, discussed earlier. The Fourteenth Amendment is directed to state action, not private conduct, and so fails to provide adequate basis for a statute directed at criminal conduct by individuals.[47]

A Devolution Revolution?

What should we make of this rediscovery of federalism on the High Court? Does it constitute a new judicial revolution on a par with that of the 1930s?

[42] Ibid., ***46, 47, 50.
[43] *Kimel et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al.*, 528 U.S. (2000).
[44] *EEOC v. Wyoming*, 460 U.S. 226.
[45] *Kimel et al. v. Florida Board of Regents et al.*, 528 U.S. 19 (2000).
[46] *Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, et al. v. Garrett et al.*, 531 U.S. ____ (2001).
[47] See *United States v. Morrison*, at 19–27.

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Clearly, some observers and participants think so. Justice John Paul Stevens, reading his dissent in a 1999 sovereign immunity case from the bench, compared the Court's new doctrines to the "period of confusion and crisis [under] the Articles of Confederation."[48] *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis called the Court's slim federalist majority, "a band of radical judicial activists determined to impose on the Constitution their notion of a proper system of government."[49] A *New York Times* editorial went so far as to denounce the *Morrison* decision as "Violence against the Constitution."[50]

Given the mounting number of new federalist decisions emanating from the Court since 1991, these predictions of dramatic change ultimately may prove correct. It is important to recognize that the Court's emerging doctrines are works still in progress, however, and this means that any conclusions about their final status are necessarily tentative. At the present time, we would argue that the reach of these cases, both individually and collectively, falls short of a devolution revolution. While undeniably important, the cases decided thus far are subject to a variety of constraints—doctrinal, philosophical, and political—that are critical to understanding their present reach. Moreover, it is important to remember that the Court has not been single minded in its federalism-related cases. In the 1999 term, for example, a seven-member majority in *Dickerson v. United States* upheld the Warren Court's 1966 ruling in *Miranda v. Arizona*, one of the landmarks of judicial activism long targeted by movement conservatives. Similarly, in *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, a unanimous Court rejected state efforts to intrude into the federal government's authority to make foreign policy by barring state agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business in Burma.

Doctrinal Limits

A careful examination of the doctrines being fashioned in many of the Court's recent rulings suggests that in their present form they are too constrained to constitute a full-fledged "anti-federalist revival."[51] These constraints could result from several different causes, however, with very different implications for the future. For example, they might reflect an incremental strategy by the Court's conservatives, who hope to limit opposition to their cause by biting off just a little more national authority with each case. They could instead reflect the political constraints of a narrow conservative majority on the Court, whereby the least conservative member of the coalition determines the scope of the decision. Or they might flow principally from the policy conservatism

[48] Quoted in Linda Greenhouse, "States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court," *New York Times*, 24 June 1999.

[49] Anthony Lewis, "The Supreme Power," *New York Times*, 29 June 1999.

[50] Quoted in Stuart Taylor Jr., "The Tipping Point," *National Journal*, 10 June 2000, 1816.

[51] Gerald Gunther and Kathleen M. Sullivan, *Constitutional Law*, 13th ed. (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1997), 113.

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inherent in *stare decisis*, which sees the Court struggling to carve out room for modest devolution within the framework of precedents from the post New Deal era of nationalization. Regardless of the cause, the Court's current doctrines are fraught with significant, though in some cases shrinking, limits on their current reach.

In *Lopez* and *Morrison*, for example, the chief justice took pains to work around existing precedents, including *Wickard v. Filburn*, which he acknowledged represents "the most far reaching example of commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity."[52] His opinion made no attempt to recreate past distinctions between manufacturing and commerce or other such discredited notions. Rather, he acknowledged that "where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."[53]

Only one justice has openly professed a willingness to go farther and reopen settled law regarding the economic scope of the Commerce Power. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence to *Lopez*, stated that the Court took a "wrong turn" in the 1930s. "At an appropriate juncture," he wrote, "I think we must modify our Commerce Clause jurisprudence."[54] He reaffirmed this position in *Morrison.* Significantly, not one other member of the Court joined him in this opinion.

In contrast, the essence of the chief justice's argument in *Lopez* and *Morrison* was to avoid reading the Commerce Clause so broadly that it constituted a general police power for the federal government.[55] Even some liberal analysts and commentators have been supportive of, or untroubled by, the general thrust of these decisions. For example, Harvard University Law Professor Laurence Tribe has agreed that the *Lopez* decision was "probably right," because to "permit Congress to regulate anything and everything that in any way relates to or affects commerce [would] essentially reject the principle of limited national authority embodied in . . . Constitution."[56] The difficulty, of course, lies in developing an unambiguous test of what constitutes activities with "a substantial relation to interstate commerce."[57] The dissenters in *Morrison* and *Lopez* clearly regard the majority's efforts thus far to be unpersuasive and subjective.

For many, the Court's rulings on state sovereign immunity have raised greater concerns than *Lopez* and *Morrison.* This line of decisions prompted Justice Steven's allusions to the Articles of Confederation, and it has incited

[52] *Lopez*, *560.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., *585 (J. Thomas, concurring).

[55] Ibid., *567.

[56] Quoted in Stuart Taylor, Jr., "A Bridge Too Far on States' Rights," *National Journal*, 24 July 1999, 2137.

[57] *United States v. Morrison*, 9.

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similar objections from outside observers.[58] Yet even here, the Court's rulings have recognized limitations on the sovereign immunity doctrine. For example, the *Alden* decision did not extend immunity to municipalities or other local government jurisdictions, which employ the vast majority of state and local government employees. Nor does protection extend to individual state government employees, who remain subject to lawsuits in their individual capacities. Finally, sovereign immunity does not absolve states from the obligation to comply with federal law. As the Court observed in *Board of Trustees v. Garrett*: "Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief."[59] The federal government's power to enforce laws directly on the states constitutes a more costly and difficult enforcement option for the Congress than the strategy of providing private rights of action under federal law. It is an avenue of remedy that already exists in many areas of public policy, however, and it ultimately may gain acceptance as one of the costs of federalism.[60]

A significant degree of judicial restraint has also been present in the Court's recent Tenth Amendment rulings. These rulings, such as *New York v. United States* and *Printz v. United States*, have attempted to define a sphere of state institutional autonomy into which the federal government may not intrude. In the words of *Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.*,[61] these rulings protect the "states as states," as cosovereign entities in the federal system. The federal government may not "commandeer" their policy-making and administrative machinery.

Significantly, however, these new Tenth Amendment rulings do not attempt to wall off the broader and more consequential sphere of "traditional functions" of state and local governments, such as education and law enforcement. This was the approach that the pre-New Deal Court took in cases such as *Hammer v. Dagenhart* (1918), which struck down a federal ban on child labor, and *U.S. v. Butler*, which overturned the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1936. But it is not the approach that has been adopted by the present Court. When the opportunity to do so presented itself in *Lopez*, the majority opinion chose to focus on the fuzzy outer limits of the Commerce Power rather than attempt to resurrect a wall of functional separation through the Tenth Amendment. Likewise, in *New York v. United States*, the majority acknowledged that "Congress has substantial power to govern the nation *directly*, including in ar-

[58] See Taylor, "A Bridge Too Far on States' Rights," 2137.

[59] *Board of Trustees v. Garret*, 16; see also *Alden v. Maine*, *2266.

[60] For other such "costs," see Paul E. Peterson, *The Price of Federalism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

[61] 452 U.S. 264.

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eas of intimate concern to the States."[62] Thus, the institutional focus of the Court's contemporary dual sovereignty doctrine defines a far smaller orbit of state autonomy than the old judicial concept of dual federalism, with its separate and distinct spheres of national and state governmental responsibility.

Conditional Grants and the Court's New Federalism

Far from restoring constitutional dual federalism, the contemporary Court continues to embrace the concept of "cooperative federalism" in its spending power decisions. The result has been to provide Congress with effective alternatives for accomplishing many of the same objectives that the Court precludes on other grounds. If the Court has been attempting to rebuild a wall of separation between the states and the federal government, it has left a 300 billion dollar hole—in the form of federal grants to state and local governments—in any such wall.

In the 1930s, the Court settled the question of whether the welfare clause of the Constitution is an independent grant of power to the Congress. It is, said the Court, and it allows Congress to spend public funds, directly or through grants to state and local governments, on activities that it otherwise lacks authority to address. This laid a legal foundation for the dramatic post-New Deal expansion of federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments and to the rise of cooperative federalism. Equally important, the Court also has held that Congress is free to attach strings or limitations to the use of such federal grant funds.

Over time, the Supreme Court has consistently given Congress wide latitude in the types of conditions and requirements that it attaches to federal grant funds. This was most recently demonstrated in the 1987 case of *South Dakota v. Dole.* Here the Rehnquist Court upheld, by a 7-2 decision, a congressional requirement that states raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one. If they did not, they would suffer a loss in federal highway funds. South Dakota objected that this amounted to coercive federal interference into a domain of state responsibility, but the Court rejected the argument. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that even "a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants."[63] Although the chief justice acknowledged that "the spending power is of course not unlimited," the restraints placed upon it are very broad and largely undefined. To a great extent, the Court continues to maintain, as it first did in *Massachusetts v. Mellon* (1923), that states are free to avoid restrictive grant conditions simply by refusing to accept the grant.

[62] *New York v. United States*, *162. (Emphasis added.)
[63] *South Dakota v. Dole*, 483 U.S. 203, 1987. U.S. Lexis 2871 (1987), *210.

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Because the Rehnquist Court continues to accept spending power doctrines that give Congress the ability to regulate states through conditions of aid, in ways that it could not do directly, a major loophole exists in the Court's state autonomy exclusions. Justice O'Connor emphasized this in her dissent to *South Dakota v. Dole.* She acknowledged this point, as well, in her majority opinion in *New York v. United States.* Her opinion in that case upheld the provisions of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Amendments that were based on conditional incentives to the states, while it rejected the law's direct order that states "take title" of their radioactive wastes: "Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. . . . First, under Congress' spending power, 'Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.'"[64] It appears quite likely, therefore, that if Congress had made the Brady bill's background check requirements—which were overturned in *Lopez*—a condition of existing federal aid to law enforcement agencies rather than a simple mandate to police, they would have survived constitutional challenge before the Court. If so, then the Court has left Congress an escape route broad enough to accommodate a very ambitious policy agenda.

Philosophical Constraints

In addition to the substantive, doctrinal limits embodied within its federalism decisions, the Rehnquist Court confronts deeper philosophical constraints on its devolutionary leanings. In particular, recent Court doctrines on federalism are rooted in a concept of dual sovereignty that, although it is not new, is inherently paradoxical and unstable. Sovereignty can be defined as "supremacy of authority or rule." Both conceptually and historically, it is a unitary and absolutist doctrine of authority. Yet federalism, by its very nature, rests on the division of governmental powers between two or more levels of government. Thus, building a theory of federalism based on the concept of sovereignty—especially divided sovereignty—poses inherent intellectual problems.[65] In one recent case, for example, Justice Kennedy was reduced to arguing that states retain "the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty"—a pale version of the concept.

One traditional solution to this problem was merely to embrace it. Under the system of dual federalism, the powers of government were to be clearly divided between the national government and the states, and each level would be "supreme within its sphere." This concept found expression in many of the classic decisions of the Supreme Court during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of the clearest statements was the 1859 decision of *Ableman*

[64] *New York v. United States*, *166–167.

[65] For more on this, see Patrick Riley, "The Origins of Federal Theory in International Relations Ideas," *Polity* 6 (Fall 1973): 87–121.

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v. Booth, in which the Court declared: "The powers of the general government, and of the state, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separate and independent of each other, within their respective spheres."[66]

Although this system did not solve the conceptual problem, and a source of higher authority in the Court or the Constitution had ultimately to be drawn upon to deal with conflicts between the spheres, it did help to reduce friction and manage the conflicts inherent in divided sovereignty. But complete dual federalism was never practical nor fully practiced. Although scholars debate how well the concept ever described the realities of nineteenth-century American federalism, there were important departures from the model almost from the beginning.[67] More importantly, the idea of a rigid division of governmental power and responsibilities between the federal government and the states has been thoroughly discarded in twentieth-century practice, and it would be tremendously difficult and unpopular to attempt a restoration. Nor, as our earlier discussion of Tenth Amendment cases makes clear, does the current Court, Justice Thomas excepted, wish to do so. Even among the Court's new federalists, this is a "solution" with few advocates.

There is a second approach to addressing the problem of sovereignty in a federal system that has enjoyed support over the course of American history. This is the concept of popular sovereignty. As the name suggests, it is the people who hold sovereignty under this theory, not the federal or state governments. The people choose through their Constitution to divide the powers and functions of government between the nation and the states. But they retain the ultimate source of authority and can alter the arrangements from time to time as they see fit.

This theory resonates deeply with American political culture, and it has been present in some form from the nation's very beginning. As Madison wrote in *The Federalist Papers*, No. 46: "The Federal and State governments are, in fact, but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed with different purposes."[68] A modern variation can be drawn from Samuel Beer: "My argument is that this curious arrangement of a constitutionally protected vertical division of power is an intentional and functional institution—not an historical accident or the upshot of mere compromise—of the self-governing American people as they seek over time to make and remake themselves as a nation."[69]

For all its theoretical power and political energy, the model of popular sovereignty generally begs the question of providing guidance to the Court in most instances when it is called upon to settle specific disputes arising under the Con-

[66] 21 Howard 506 (1859).

[67] Daniel Elazar, *The American Partnership* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[68] *The Federalist*, No. 46, Modern Library edition, 304–305.

[69] Samuel H. Beer, *To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 1993), 20.

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stitution. Accordingly, new federalists on the Court have been prone to fall back on a constricted version of dual federalism. Their decisions refer to "attributes of state sovereignty,"[70] the "Constitutional system of dual sovereignty,"[71] and, states' retention of "the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."[72]

On the one recent occasion when the Court did draw directly on the theory of popular sovereignty, it failed miserably to reach consensus about the implications of this theory for the federal system. In *U.S. Term Limits Inc v. Thornton*, the Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether a state or its voters could impose term limits on members of Congress from that state. The majority held that only a constitutional amendment could impose such limits, because the Constitution derives its authority from the people as a whole and "gives the representatives of all the people the final say in judging the qualifications of the representatives of any one state."[73] In his dissent, which was joined by three other members of the Court, Justice Thomas argued that "nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each state of the power to prescribe the eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress." He based this conclusion in part on a very different view of popular sovereignty: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."[74] With such "dueling sovereignties" on the Court, even the concept of popular sovereignty has failed to quiet the contradictions inherent in melding the institution of federalism with doctrines of sovereignty. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy—voting with the liberals in this case—observed that the task before the Court required it to "split the atom of sovereignty." The explosive potential of this metaphor speaks volumes about the philosophical tension that inhabits the Court's new federalist rulings.

Political Limits on the Court's New Federalism

Finally, two sets of political constraints have limited the scope of the Supreme Court's contemporary federalism rulings. The most obvious of these political limits has been the narrowness of the new federalist majority on the Court, which has been vulnerable to the loss of any single member of the coalition. Less obvious, but also important, has been the lack of public support for returning to a judicially-policed system of dual federalism. Both sets of constraints were significantly affected by the 2000 presidential elections although, paradoxically, in opposite directions. President George W. Bush will likely have an opportunity to maintain and perhaps expand the Court's new federalist

[70] *New York v. United States*, *155.
[71] *Printz v. United States*, *935.
[72] *Alden v. Maine*, *2247.
[73] 1995 Lexis 3487, *69.
[74] Ibid., 111–112.

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majority, thus eroding, perhaps substantially, the first constraint. On the other hand, public support for any significant change in federal-state relations appears no stronger now than in the past, and arguably it has grown even weaker, thus maintaining one important though indirect constraint on the Court's behavior.

Virtually all of the cases discussed in this article, including *Lopez*, *Printz, Seminole Tribe, Alden, Florida v. College Savings Bank*, *Morrison*, and *Garrett* were decided by narrow five to four margins. The same core of justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) provided the majority in almost every case. Of the major cases, only *New York v. U.S.* was decided by a marginally more comfortable six to three majority.

This pattern means that these decisions are highly vulnerable to erosion or reversal. A single member's change of heart or the replacement of a single justice in the majority block could lead the Court to an abrupt U-turn in its philosophy. This is exactly what happened in 1985, when a single justice—Harry Blackmun—changed his position from *National League of Cities v. Usery* ten years earlier. In *Garcia v. San Antonio*, the Court reversed its Tenth Amendment stand in *National League of Cities* and replaced it with a highly permissive, nationalist doctrine. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's defection from the federalist bloc in *U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton* was responsible for the nationalist outcome in that case.

Consequently, one of the most important outcomes of George W. Bush's electoral victory over Al Gore is the opportunity it provides Bush to solidify and strengthen the new federalist doctrines of the Rehnquist Court. Two of the three members of the current Court who are considered most likely to retire are members of the new federalist majority.[75] This group includes Chief Justice Rehnquist himself, as well as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Thus, had Al Gore been elected, he would have been in a position to reverse the Court's new doctrines through his judicial appointments. Instead, Bush may have an opportunity to embolden and extend the Court's conservative majority, especially since Justice John Paul Stevens—one of the minority's most ardent dissenters—is also a candidate for retirement over the next four years. Given Bush's campaign declarations to favor judges along the lines of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas—who are certainly the most ardent conservatives on the current Court—the potential for a more aggressively conservative Court in coming years has grown very real, although it is balanced somewhat by the Democrats' electoral gains in the U.S. Senate.

Judicial appointments aside, there remains another less obvious but vitally important political constraint on the Court's federalist majority. This constraint is imposed by the absence of public support for a return to a strict system of dual federalism. Since the 1960s, it has been clear that large majorities of Americans support a broad range of federal policy initiatives in education, law enforcement, economic development, and other traditional state and local functions.

[75] For more discussion of this, see Taylor, "The Tipping Point."

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This is true even among many Americans who consider themselves to be philosophical conservatives.[76] The continuing strength of such views is evident in contemporary polls and levels of popular support for many of President Clinton's initiatives in these policy areas. It is evident, as well, in the ease with which conservative Republicans in Washington are willing to make traditionally local policy domains the focus of national policy initiatives and campaign proposals. This was the case with George W. Bush promising to make education his number one policy priority and with congressional Republicans' efforts to federalize criminal sentencing. Although public dissatisfaction with the national government reached serious levels in the mid-1990s, this pattern of support for "cooperative" federalism remains as firmly ingrained in the hearts of Americans as it does in the structure of domestic programs.[77]

The Supreme Court's Role in the Federal System

To date, one would have to conclude that the Rehnquist Court has not yet accomplished a devolution revolution in constitutional interpretation. The specific holdings and doctrines developed by the Court thus far are too limited to constitute such a change. However, the realm of state institutional autonomy is being expanded consistently, and Congress's powers are being concomitantly narrowed, so the potential for a significant change in the constitutional balance of power is very real. The election of George W. Bush has strengthened that potential.

Realization of this prospect will depend in part on how current and future justices view their role—and the Court's institutional role—in shaping the contours of the federal system. In particular, they face the central question of how active the Court should be in reshaping the constitutional boundaries of American federalism. Historically, the Supreme Court has adopted very different roles in different contexts. The Marshall Court, for example, self-consciously defined its role as an instrument of national cohesion, and it promoted the powers of the national government—and the Supreme Court itself—vis-á-vis the states. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Warren Court embraced the role of defending "discrete and insular minorities" along the lines that had been laid out in Justice Harlan Stone's famous footnote in *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*[78] Throughout the Court's history, both judges and observers alike have embraced the concept that the Court should play the role of neutral arbiter and umpire of the federal system. As Lord James Bryce envisioned it, the Supreme Court was "an independent body" which served almost mystically and apolitically as the "living voice of the Constitution."[79]

[76] See Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion* (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

[77] See, for example, Tom W. Smith, "Public Support for Spending, 1983–1994," *The Public Perspective* 6 (April/May 1995).

[78] *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); reprinted in Gunther and Sullivan, *Constitutional Law*, 484.

[79] Quoted in Kurland, *Politics and the Constitution*, 56.

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Today, however, members of the Supreme Court are almost evenly divided between two additional competing visions of the Court's role in intergovernmental relations, which hold very different prospects for the future of American federalism. One vision is akin to the economic concept of laissez faire. In this view, the Court should keep its hands off disputes between the national government and the states, treating such controversies as political questions to be worked out by the elected branches of government at all levels. In academic circles, this interpretation holds great currency. It has been argued straightforwardly by Jesse Choper, among others, who has written that: "The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-à-vis the States; rather, the constitutional issue of whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates 'states' rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political branches."[80]

This approach is also favored by the four member minority in most federalism cases on the present Court (Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens). The late Justice Harry Blackmun enunciated it expressly in the 1985 case of *Garcia v. San Antonio*, when the Court declared: "States' sovereign interests [are] more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." It is probably safe to conclude that this role would have been restored as official Court doctrine if Al Gore had been elected president in 2000 and had been given the opportunity to appoint even one additional, like-minded judge to replace a member of the current Rehnquist majority.

A final role, and the one that best characterizes the Rehnquist majority's own conception of its new federalism rulings, focuses on maintaining the balance of power in the federal system. Although it may initially appear to be similar to the "neutral arbiter" concept, the balance of power role implies a more energetic Court—one that actively polices the boundaries of the federal system and weighs the institutional and systemic consequences of each decision. Metaphorically speaking, judges who adopt this role shed their blindfolds in order to see precisely how to tip the scales of justice in favor of the weaker party. Conceivably, a power-balancing Court could lean in favor of either level of government, but after two generations of political and governmental centralization, the current Court majority is tilted clearly toward the states.

Recent majority opinions are replete with references to the Court as stabilizer of the federal system. In the words of Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court has a duty to maintain a "healthy balance of power between the states and the

[80] Choper, *Judicial Review and the National Political Process*, 175. See also Larry Kramer, "Dazed and Confused : Federalism in the United States Supreme Court" (unpublished paper, *Conference on Le fédéralisme américain et ses implications pour l'Europe*, Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales, Paris, 10–11 December 1998).

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federal government."[81] Justice Kennedy defined the Court's role in similar terms in his concurrence in the *Lopez* decision: "while the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, . . . [it] contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce."[82] Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has referred to this judicial role as well, and she has justified the Court's tilt in favor of the states: [The] Court has been increasingly generous in its interpretation of the commerce power of Congress, primarily to assure that the National Government would be able to deal with national economic problems. . . . The Court [should] enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate commerce power."[83]

Given the structure of the American Constitution, this balancing act is a natural and perhaps necessary role for the Court to play. In a system where, as James Madison put it in *The Federalist*, No. 51, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition," the Court's role might well include ensuring that no level of government becomes so powerful as to keep the mechanism of mutually assured ambition from operating effectively. However, "balance" is a subjective judgment. It is not unfair as one description of what the Court has sought to accomplish thus far, but implementing the concept in specific cases and precedential contexts requires considerable intellectual dexterity and doctrinal subtlety. It also implies a healthy dose of self-restraint. If one pushes too hard on one side of the scale, the goal of balance can easily be lost again. If it is not careful, the Supreme Court risks becoming an agent of states rights—a rare position in the Court's history and one associated with its darkest moments.

This, ultimately, is the dilemma facing the new federalists on the Rehnquist Court. They may seek to restore what they perceive to be a greater degree of balance in the American federal system, but in doing so they are involved in an institutional balancing act of their own. In American government, the horizontal and vertical separation of powers are inextricably linked, and the Supreme Court can never afford to forget that hard-won lesson of the past.*

[81] Quoted in David Savage, "High Court Bolsters States Rights," *State Legislatures* 23 (September 1997): 11.

[82] *United States v. Lopez*, (Justice Kennedy concurring), *1642.

[83] Quoted in Peter A. Lauricella, "Comment on the Real 'Contract with America': The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause," 60 *Albany Law Review* (1997): 1394.

* This article was initially prepared while Conlan was a guest scholar at the French Center on the United States, which published a version of this essay in a monograph entitled *The Challenge of Dual Sovereignty: The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism* (http://www.cfe-ifri.org/). Particular thanks are owed to Guillaume Parmentier, head of the center, and to Thierry de Montbrial, director of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI). Portions of this article were presented earlier at the Conference on Constitutional Reform and Constitutional Jurisprudence in Canada and the United States, Augsburg, Germany, 21–23 October 1999, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 31 August—3 September 2000.

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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 4, June 2001

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Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis

FIONA B. ADAMSON

The claim that democracies do not go to war with one another has become one of the most widely accepted propositions in the field of international relations.[1] This proposition may be true for stable and highly institutionalized democracies, but to what extent is the claim generalizable to the full range of "democratic" regime types around the globe? Recent research that examines the relationship between democratization and war has argued that a number of boundary conditions must be placed on the general proposition that democracies do not fight each other.[2] Since fully half of the new democracies in today's world can be classified as "illiberal," and most democratizing regimes are composed of a variety of democratic and undemocratic, liberal and illiberal elements, the relationship between domestic processes of democratization and their foreign policy outcomes is worth exploring in more detail through structured case studies.[3] In this article, I take up this task by examining Turkish foreign policy making during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. I argue that evidence from the Turkish case lends support to much of the causal logic of the democratization and war argument, and it further demonstrates that both structural and normative explanations for the "democratic peace" may only be valid under limited sets of conditions.

[1] Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 205–235, 323–353.

[2] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 5–38.

[3] Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November/December 1997): 22–43.

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In July 1974, Turkey had a democratically elected government. Following a Greek-sponsored coup on the independent island of Cyprus, Turkey intervened militarily, justifying its actions as necessary to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority. Greece was governed by a military regime at the beginning of the crisis, but the military government fell after the intervention. Although popular elections had not yet been held, the government was undertaking political liberalization in preparation for elections, and the fall of the junta was widely viewed as marking a return to democracy in Greece.[4] Between Turkey's initial intervention in Cyprus in mid-July 1974 and Turkey's 14 August intervention, which led to a de facto occupation of the northern portion of the island and a partition along ethnic lines, both Turkey and Greece were governed by democratizing regimes.

Using the logic of the democratic peace, one would expect that the transition of Greece toward democracy would have presented a window of opportunity for both Turkey and Greece to resolve the 1974 crisis through diplomatic channels. Instead, the opposite was the case. Despite two rounds of peace talks in Geneva and international pressure to find a diplomatic solution, the governments of these NATO allies faced severe domestic constraints on their ability to reach an agreement on the Cyprus issue. Unstable coalitions, public opinion favoring an aggressive stance on Cyprus, an outpouring of nationalist sentiment in the press, and the fear of a return to military rule all combined to place restrictions on the ability of Turkish and Greek leaders to reach a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

In the following pages, I analyze the relationship between domestic processes of democratization and foreign policy making in the case of Turkey and its 1974 decision to intervene in Cyprus. First, I briefly summarize the democratic peace debate and discuss recent research on the relationship between democratization and war. Second, I describe domestic processes of democratization in Turkey prior to the 1974 Cyprus crisis. After providing background information on the historical role of the Cyprus issue in Turkish domestic politics, I discuss Turkish foreign policy decision making during the 1974 crisis, placing it within the context of democratization processes in Turkey at the time. I explore alternative explanations for the 1974 intervention, and conclude by arguing that many of the dynamics of Turkish decision making during the 1974 crisis can only be explained by taking into account the key role that domestic processes of democratization played in shaping foreign policy.

Democratic Peace or Democratization and War?

Statistical studies that show a correlation between democracy and peace[5] have led scholars to refer to the "democratic peace" as being "as close to anything we

[4] Charles Mohr, "Rejoicing Athenians Chant "Demokratia!," *New York Times*, 24 July 1974.

[5] See, for example, Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–1169; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Bruce Russett,

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have to an empirical law in international relations."[6] Several causal mechanisms have been suggested to explain this seemingly robust statistical finding. Structural explanations emphasize the role of democratic institutions in restraining political elites from engaging in reckless foreign policy. Bruce Russett argues that "checks and balances, division of power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large-scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made."[7] Normative explanations for the democratic peace, on the other hand, emphasize how domestic norms of nonviolent conflict resolution spill over into the foreign policy process. According to this explanation, liberal ideas that place a high value on pluralism, tolerance, and rational discussion may have an impact on how democratic countries conduct their foreign relations with each other.[8]

Recent research, however, argues that the causal explanations for the existence of peace between mature democracies may not be applicable to weak democracies in the throes of democratic consolidation: "In newly democratizing states without strong parties, independent courts, a free press, and untainted electoral procedures, there is no reason to expect that mass politics will produce the same impact on foreign policy as it does in mature democracies."[9] According to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, a very different set of causal mechanisms comes into play in weak or unconsolidated democracies during the democratization process. Democratizing countries, it is claimed, reach a political impasse caused by a rapid widening of the political spectrum. In the absence of the strong democratic institutions necessary for integrating diverse social groups into the political process, political elites resort to populist tactics and employ nationalist or other unifying ideologies as a means of mobilizing the public, forging stable political coalitions, and amassing enough support to remain in power.[10] In an environment characterized by rapid change and weak institutions, political elites are concerned primarily with their own political survival and forge policies based on short time horizons.[11] Statistical studies show that democratizing states are approximately two-thirds more likely to go to war than states not undergoing a regime change.[12]

Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace—And Yet It Moves," *International Security* 19 (Spring 1995): 164–175.

[6] Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War" in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989) cited in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface" in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996).

[7] Russett, "Grasping the Democratic Peace," 40.

[8] Ibid., 30–38; John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (Fall 1994): 87–125.

[9] Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and War," 22.

[10] Ibid., 23.

[11] Ibid., 26–30.

[12] Ibid., 12.

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The distinction between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies is a relatively new feature of the democratic peace debate. Most of the statistical studies that examine the relationship between democratic regime type and war rely on a binary classification of regime types into democracies or nondemocracies, liberal or illiberal regimes. The problem with such binary types of classification is that immature democracies may be classified as either democracies or nondemocracies according to the argument presented and the criteria at hand. For example, Turkey in 1974 is classified as a coherent democracy on the Russett-Oneal index, yet is referred to by Russett on another occasion as "dictatorial," and is not included in Michael Doyle's listing of "liberal" regimes.[13] While Russett's labeling of the government as dictatorial can be viewed as an oversight, the case is difficult to classify. Electoral democracy had been restored in 1973 after a brief period of military rule, but democratic institutions were weak, coalitions were unstable, and the domestic power concentration in the new regime was very low.[14] Most regimes are in reality composed of a variety of democratic and undemocratic, liberal and illiberal elements. Therefore, binary classification schemes may not be suitable for exploring the causal relationship between democracy/democratization and war. In this regard, there is particular value in analyzing concrete instances of democratization in order to trace the specific relationship between democratization processes and foreign policy making.

One of the most noticeable deficits in the democratic peace debate is the absence of qualitative case studies.[15] The relationship between democracy and war, Joseph Nye has noted, "need[s] exploration via detailed case studies to look at what actually happened in particular cases."[16] Too much of the democracy and war debate has relied on statistical correlations[17] or abstract deductive arguments; too little attention has been paid to structured case studies that explore the domestic sources of foreign policy in both weak and mature democracies. The ensuing case study is an attempt to rectify this imbalance by using a process-tracing methodology to trace the influence of democratization pro-

[13] John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (June 1997): 267–294; Russett, "Grasping the Democratic Peace," 20; Doyle, "Liberalism and Politics."

[14] Ted Robert Gurr, *Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800–1986*, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research No. 9263 (1990).

[15] For notable exceptions, see Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); and John M. Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[16] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 40, as cited in Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Peace," 91.

[17] For critiques of the statistical support for the democratic peace, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (Fall 1994): 5–49; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security* 19 (Fall 1994): 50–86.

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cesses on Turkey's 1974 intervention(s) in Cyprus.[18] Before turning to the events of the summer of 1974, I first discuss patterns of democratization in Turkey during the 1960s and early 1970s, paying particular attention to the rapid increase in participation during this time, which occurred in the absence of strong institutional structures for channeling such participation. One result of this process was political fractionalization in the country, accompanied by major changes in the political party system.

Democratization in Turkey, 1961–1974

The 1960s was marked by a widening of the political spectrum in Turkey. This expansion was brought about by the tremendous social, economic, and political changes Turkey experienced during that decade. Turkish industry, for example, grew at an average rate of 9 percent per year between 1963 and 1971, and the economy received an additional boost from the influx of foreign remittances from Turkish workers in Europe. The country also experienced a demographic shift. Between 1960 and 1970, urban population increased by five million, reaching 39 percent of the total population of the country. Istanbul and Ankara doubled in size, and half of those two cities' populations lived in shantytowns. Employment in the service sector increased by 1.5 million, with most of these jobs in the informal sector.[19] The number of students in higher education increased between 1965 and 1969 from 100,000 to 150,000, and religious colleges quadrupled their student population to 40,000.[20]

The economic and social changes of the decade were accompanied by political liberalization. Political freedoms had been broadened in the 1961 constitution, which led to an influx of new segments of society into political life. The mid-1960s saw a growth in leftist parties and union activity at a level that had previously not been tolerated by the political elite. During the 1940s the two main parties, Republican People's party (RPP) and Democrat party (DP) had collaborated to "ruthlessly crush" opposing parties of the Left.[21] It was only in the early 1960s that leftist parties were allowed to function.[22] Between 1963 and 1971, national membership in labor unions increased from 296,000 to 1.2 million.[23] The leftist Workers' party (WPT) was also established in the 1960s, and was successful in winning seats in parliament.

[18] On the use of the process-tracing method, see Alexander George and Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985).

[19] Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy" in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 27–65.

[20] Ahmet Samin, "The Left" in Schick and Tonak, "Turkey in Transition," 147–177.

[21] English translations of the names and abbreviations of Turkish political parties are used throughout the text.

[22] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 109–110.

[23] Keyder, "Political Economy."

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The widening of the political spectrum in Turkey took place within a context of weak democratic institutions, which were the result in part of an historically top-down pattern of democratization. Turkish political parties were elite-based, and in earlier periods of democratization,[24] had relied on "a network of patron-client relations, the appeal to religious sentiment, and populism . . . rewarding regional cliques, kinship ties, religious demands, and personal influence networks."[25] In villages "local factions that had persisted for generations were simply recruited by party organizers."[26] The 1961 constitution greatly expanded political freedom without introducing a corresponding change in the structure of participatory institutions.

The widening of the political spectrum in the absence of strong democratic institutions able to incorporate new social groups into the political process was undoubtedly a contributing factor to the increased radicalism, political violence, and overall weakening and fractionalization of the party system that occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s.[27] In addition to a growth in the political Left, the party system expanded during this period to include newly formed Islamist and extreme nationalist parties. The Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, for example, entered politics in 1968 and founded the National Order party (NOP) in 1970. The NOP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court for violating secularism, and Erbakan went into exile in Switzerland, returning again to Turkey in 1972 to form the National Salvation party (NSP), which then became a member of the ruling coalition that emerged from the 1973 elections—an unstable coalition of opposites that was to be confronted with a severe crisis on the island of Cyprus in the summer of 1974.

The 1960s also saw the rise in popularity of Alparslan Türkeş, a far-right nationalist who took control of the Republican People's Nation party and renamed it National Action party (NAP). The extremist NAP drew its support base from dissatisfied youths and self-employed small entrepreneurs.[28] It also organized commando training camps and carried out a campaign of terror against anyone it identified as a leftist, which included anybody from school teachers to supporters of the Workers' party. The government turned a blind eye to this campaign of terror, implicitly encouraging the NAP to combat and suppress the Left through its violent tactics.

[24] Turkey's first wave of democratization occurred in 1946, with competitive elections. Since 1946 Turkey's democratization process has been punctuated by three military coups—1960, 1971, 1980.

[25] Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Experiences in Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 173.

[26] Frank Tachau, *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 122.

[27] This is the classical argument made in Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[28] Only 10 percent of high school graduates, for example, were able to continue on to university, thus resulting in a class of frustrated young people. See Keyder, "Political Economy."

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The result, however, was not a suppression of the Left, but rather its increased radicalization, which resulted in a turn to violence and the use of extra-systemic tactics. The radical Left was characterized by an anti-Americanism which was exacerbated by America's handling of Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis. In 1968, leftist youths attacked U.S. soldiers, and in late 1970 the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (TPLA) and the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey were established by well-known political leaders, who "openly and publicly discussed" the "best choices of armed strategy to quickly bring Turkey to revolution."[29] As the party system spun out of control and the country was increasingly enmeshed in political violence, the military took charge of the government in a coup on 12 March 1971.

The 1971–1973 military governments in Turkey are best remembered for the harsh political repression that they meted out on the country and for unpopular decisions, such as the ban on poppy cultivation, which was made under pressure from the United States. The period of military rule was characterized by massive state repression and the introduction of martial law in eleven provinces. Political life was paralyzed, and meetings of civil society groups such as youth organizations, unions, professional associations, teachers' unions, and student clubs were outlawed. Writers and intellectuals were taken into custody, and a number of newspapers and books were banned.

The two-year period of military rule led to a major realignment of the party system in Turkey, which was the culmination of social and political changes that had occurred throughout the late 1960s. Economic growth and rapid industrialization had created a new petty capitalist class, which relied on the labor and markets of the urban poor and shanty towns. This vast sector, in contrast to what is seen as the political role of the petty bourgeoisie in developed countries, was "relatively unorganized" and "politically volatile."[30] "By the late 1960s," write Irvin Schick and Ertuğrul Tonak, "cracks began to appear within the alliance of landowners and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie . . . [L]andowners and small tradesmen founded parties to represent their own interests against those of a fast-developing urban organized industrial bourgeoisie."[31] The previous political power base of the elite bourgeoisie had been split, leaving no single faction with the ability to establish power.

These structural changes came to a head in 1972 when a rift in the RPP transformed the old party of Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, into a left-leaning social-democratic party. Following the 1971 coup, RPP member Nihat Erim had been asked by the military to form a government. Erim's acceptance of this invitation precipitated a major division of the RPP into two wings, one of which supported the military and another led by the social democrat Bülent Ecevit, which was openly critical of the military intervention.

[29] Cem Eroğlu, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945–1971" in Schick and Tonak, *Turkey in Transition*, 136.

[30] Keyder, "Political Economy," 50.

[31] Schick and Tonak, *Turkey in Transition*, 365.

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By the time democratic elections were reinstated in 1973, party fragmentation in Turkey was at an all-time high, with seven political parties competing to mobilize the diverse social groups comprising the Turkish electorate.[32] The political Left in Turkey had not previously had a mainstream party to represent its interests, and the newly reconstituted center-left RPP easily won the largest share of the electorate, with 33 percent of the vote. The political Right was split, with the Justice party (JP) winning 30 percent, the Democrat party winning 12 percent, and the National Salvation party winning 12 percent of the vote. The Reliance party and the National Action party received 5.3 percent and 3.4 percent of the vote, respectively. Despite the victory of the social democratic RPP, the country had overwhelmingly voted to the Right, if the vote for the various right-leaning parties were added together. However, the political Right was internally divided and was not able to form a coalition government.

Under these circumstances, Ecevit was asked by the president to form a coalition government. The most stable coalition would have been between the two center parties RPP and JP, but Süleyman Demirel of the JP refused to join such a coalition. The Democrat party also refused to enter into a coalition. Ecevit therefore approached Erbakan and the Islamist NSP. After more than three months of negotiations, the Ecevit-Erbakan coalition was announced on 25 January 1974. This uneasy coalition was more a product of political opportunism than shared ideology; Ecevit and Erbakan shared little besides a stated desire to stand up to American hegemony in matters of both foreign and domestic policy.[33]

The highly fractionalized party system, combined with a system of proportional representation within the context of a parliamentary system, gave extreme fringe parties like the nationalist-fascist NAP and the Islamist NSP a disproportionate amount of political power within the coalition government. In a parliamentary system where the prime minister's political fate lies in the hands of the parliament, the presence of extremist parties may structurally impact upon foreign policy decision-making in that it serves to decrease the "shadow of the future" for political leaders. In the words of Richard Campany, "In parliamentary systems such as Turkey's, governments may fall during times of crisis. . . . Parochial priorities and perceptions must more readily affect men who can fall from power literally on a day's notice, far more than men who do not

[32] Ergun Özbudun uses Douglas Rae's "index of fractionalization" to measure the degree of fragmentation of votes. The 1973 election was characterized by a large number of parties (seven) and by the highest fragmentation of votes (.767) of all elections from 1950–1977. The two strongest parties won 63.1 percent of the total votes (compared with a range from a low of 71.5 percent in 1961 to a high of 93.2 percent in 1950). Perfect one-party system = 0, Perfect two-party system = .5, fractionalization increases with the approach to 1.0. See Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey" in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 344. Index of fractionalization taken from Douglas Rae, *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

[33] Richard C. Campany, Jr., *Turkey and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 47.

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face a reelection campaign for several years. In foreign policy making in Turkey . . . this parochial view must be even more dominant, especially during a crisis that might adversely affect the position of the armed forces."[34]

The weak social democratic-Islamist "coalition of opposites" that encountered the 1974 Cyprus crisis, therefore, faced a number of institutional constraints on its ability to make foreign policy decisions based on long-term interests. When these constraints came into play within the context of the highly explosive issue of Cyprus, which had been a subject of keen public interest in Turkey since 1955, the coalition was faced with overwhelming pressure to draw on popular nationalist sentiment and to use the Cyprus crisis as a means of maintaining national unity and remaining in power.

The Cyprus Issue in Turkish Domestic Politics

Cyprus first emerged as an important foreign policy issue for Turkey in the mid-1950s, when the Greek-Cypriot *enosis* (union) movement for union with Greece presented a serious challenge to British rule of the island. Only forty miles from Turkey's southern coast, Cyprus had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for three centuries before British rule and still had a sizable ethnically Turkish population. When Greece stepped in and backed the Greek-Cypriot movement for *enosis* in the mid-1950s, Turkey, with the support of Britain and Turkish-Cypriots, demanded recognition as a party with interests in the future of Cyprus. Cyprus soon became an important issue in Turkish foreign and domestic policy. With Turkish public opinion focused on the Cyprus issue, a number of anti-*enosis* demonstrations took place around the country. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also exploited the Cyprus issue as a means of diverting public attention from pressing domestic economic problems during the 1950s and may have even incited anti-Greek riots in Istanbul.[35]

An agreement between Turkey, Greece, and Britain made Cyprus an independent republic in 1960. The agreement included a clause that guaranteed protection of the Turkish-Cypriot minority on the island. Turkey, Greece, and Britain were each awarded a role as Guarantor of the agreements. Tensions on the island, however, heated up again in 1963–1964, when a renewed call for *enosis* by some Greek Cypriots led to fierce ethnic clashes with Turkish Cypriots. Public opinion in Turkey, according to Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, "agitated by stories and pictures in the press . . . strongly supported the idea of military intervention to protect the Turks on the island."[36]

[34] Ibid., 42–43.

[35] Tozun Bahcheli, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey since 1955" in Norma Salem, ed., *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 64; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 416.

[36] Ibid., 430.

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During the period of ethnic clashes in 1963–1964 Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü used the Cyprus crisis as a means of creating a sense of unity between the disparate elements in his newly-formed coalition government. Inönü announced to the Assembly that "his principal concern would be the crisis." Writes Feroz Ahmad, "temporarily at least, internal politics were shelved and a sense of national solidarity was created."[37] In March, the coalition government threatened unilateral military action on Cyprus. By this time, "Turkish public opinion had become so outraged by the events on the island and was so convinced of the righteousness of the Turkish cause that there was overwhelming support for military intervention."[38] When Turkey informed the United States and its other NATO allies of its intent to intervene, the response was a harshly worded letter from President Lyndon Johnson—the infamous Johnson letter—which warned Turkey that the United States would not be obliged to come to Turkey's aid should the Cyprus intervention provoke a Soviet response. Inönü backed down under U.S. pressure, but paid a high domestic price for this action. The Johnson letter had a very significant impact on Turkish domestic politics, setting off a wave of virulent anti-Americanism, which was an important feature of Turkish politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s and was a reference point for future interactions between Turkey and the United States on the Cyprus issue. The letter was seen as both a major source of humiliation and a blatant violation of the principles of the NATO alliance.

A few years later in 1967, the Cyprus issue once again reached crisis levels when the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers from the mainland, attacked Turkish-Cypriot positions on the island. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel this time faced even more intense pressure from the Turkish public to intervene and, with political expansion and liberalization in the country making it more difficult for the government to act unilaterally on issues in defiance of public opinion, he was forced to give at least the appearance of standing up strongly to American pressure on Cyprus. As Ahmad recounts: "The government had become more receptive to an urban public opinion, better educated by a larger and freer press. Demirel was forced to pay lip service to the demand for independence and freedom of action, and, under constant pressure from opposition both inside and outside the National Assembly, he announced that Turkey's Bilateral Agreements with the United States would be discussed and revised."[39]

The 1967 crisis in Cyprus led to "nation-wide demonstrations [in Turkey] and a public clamour for immediate intervention."[40] When U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent his emissary, Cyrus Vance, to persuade Demirel not to intervene, Vance's plane had to be diverted to another airport because of the sever-

[37] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), 221.
[38] Ahmad, "Modern Turkey," 141.
[39] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, 413–414.
[40] Ibid., 414.

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ity of anti-American demonstrations.[41] Demirel, however, toed the American line and aborted a planned intervention in Cyprus, which the public perceived as politicians once again bowing to American pressure in defiance of overwhelming popular support of intervention within the Turkish electorate.[42] Demirel's restraint in the 1967 Cyprus crisis, therefore, cost him dearly at home: not only was he unpopular with the public and harshly criticized by opposition parties on both the right and left ends of the political spectrum, Demirel's actions during the 1967 crisis may have been a key contributing factor to the erosion of domestic stability in Turkey, which occurred under his rule during the late 1960s: "So intimately was Demirel identified with the U.S. that he no longer had the prestige to heal wounds at home. He was unable to establish a new consensus on foreign policy or to curb increasing anti-Americanism, except by coercion. In the end, the armed forces intervened on 12 March 1971 to cope with a situation Demirel found impossible to resolve."[43] The fate of Demirel was a lesson that did not go unheeded by Ecevit when he, as leader of the first democratically elected government since the 1971–1973 period of military rule, was faced with yet another crisis in Cyprus in the summer of 1974.

Domestic Constraints and Foreign Policy Making in 1974

The 1973 elections in Turkey produced a shaky coalition between Bülent Ecevit's Republican Peoples' party and Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation party. The two parties shared little in common, but both Ecevit and Erbakan were determined to take a more assertive stance towards the United States by lifting the American-imposed ban on poppy production and by placing Turkish-American bases under Turkish control.[44] The ban on poppy production, agreed to by the previous military government, was extremely unpopular with the Turkish public, and rescinding the ban had been a theme common to all the parties' election campaigns. Ahmad summarizes the situation in the following manner:

> The Erim government [had] faced neither the problem of a majority in the Assembly . . . nor public opinion. . . . Public reaction was shame and dismay: the government, most people believed, had succumbed to U.S. pressure and "bribery." . . . Thus in the country as a whole Erim's decision was very unpopular, one which all parties promised to overturn if they were elected to power in the 1973 general election. It was a decision only a government unconcerned about popular support or popular discontent could pass. . . . The question was viewed not only as a matter of restoring the cultivator's right to grow opium poppies but of regaining Turkey's right to exercise autonomy. The parties promised to rectify this situation and restore the independence, dignity and prestige of Turkey.[45]

[41] Ibid., 415.
[42] Ibid., 416.
[43] Ibid., 416.
[44] Campany, "Turkey and the United States," 47.
[45] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, 418–419.

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The RPP-NSP coalition government restored poppy cultivation in March. This was followed by an amnesty bill that released hundreds of political prisoners from jail. The bill, however, was unpopular with Erbakan, who started to act more ideologically and began to distance himself from Ecevit's policies. Erbakan started to take up conservative issues of public morality, which were antithetical to Ecevit's liberalism. In July 1974, the coalition was in a deep crisis, and Ecevit was forced to the very brink of resignation.

Within this context, the weak coalition government was faced with a major foreign policy crisis on 15 July 1974. The National Guard in Cyprus, acting under the orders of the Greek junta in Athens, overthrew President Archbishop Makarios III and replaced him with Nikos Sampson. Sampson was "one of about two dozen powerful right-wing 'warlords' who maintained small private armies for attacks on Turkish enclaves."[46] The coup could easily be viewed as a violation of the 1960 Zurich and London accords, of which Turkey was a guarantor, and there appeared to be legitimate reason to believe that the Turkish-Cypriot minority of the island was in danger.

World reaction to the Greek coup was immediately one of overwhelming condemnation. The *New York Times*, for example, commented, ". . . there can be no doubt that the responsibility for this barbaric putsch rests with the squalid military dictatorship in Greece. . . . It is almost beyond belief that the Greek officers would attempt to install as President of Cyprus one Nikos Sampson, confessed murderer, professional bully boy and fanatical supporter of *enosis*. . . ."[47] Even much of the Greek population blamed their own government for actions that appeared to isolate Greece from every country in the world.[48]

Under these circumstances, the pressure on Ecevit to intervene in Cyprus was intense. As Ecevit flew to London to try to pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the public, opposition parties, and the press all called for military action. Newspaper headlines asked why military intervention had not yet occurred, with one newspaper boldly asserting that Turkey would soon land on Cyprus.[49] Several opposition political parties in Turkey, as well as the coalition partner, the National Salvation party, called for intervention while Ecevit was in London.[50] As the *New York Times* reported, "The Turkish Parliament openly fretted when Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, apparently seeking a peaceful solution, flew off to London. . . . Turks feared that Ecevit might buckle once again, as Turkey has twice done in the past decade, rather than go to war over

[46] "Big Troubles over a Small Island," *Time*, 29 July 1974, 31. On Nikos Sampson, see also Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 131; and Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 85.

[47] "Greek Gift to Cyprus," *New York Times*, 16 July 1974. This editorial was reprinted in the Turkish press in *Cumhuriyet*, 17 July 1974. Also see "Showdown in Cyprus. . .," *New York Times*, 18 July 1974; "Off Course in Cyprus," *New York Times*, 19 July 1974; and Bahcheli, "Greek-Turkish Relations," 95.

[48] "Greeks Upset by Rumors of Changes in Leadership," *New York Times*, 23 July 1974.

[49] "Turks Try to End Crisis by Diplomacy," ibid., 18 July 1974.

[50] "Turkey's Parliament is Briefed About Cyprus at Secret Session," ibid., 19 July 1974.

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Cyprus. . . . With Turkish passions for action running so high, Ecevit was certain that his government would fall if it backed down."[51]

When the trip to London failed to produce a resolution of the Cyprus issue, Ecevit returned to Turkey facing severe pressure from parliament to intervene.[52] Military operations were launched against Cyprus on 20 July 1974, and heavy fighting continued for several days. The Turkish public's reaction to the intervention was immediate and unanimous. As troops left southern Turkey for the operation, "Turks reacted with delight rather than alarm at the sight of war preparations. People cheered as ships, carrying equipment obviously designed for amphibious operations, gathered in the Turkish port of Mersin."[53] The frenzy of popular support for the military action was described in the American press in the following manner: ". . . men and women along the highway cheered the troops, blowing kisses and handing slices of watermelon to the soldiers whenever the convoys stopped. . . . Nearly all shops and many homes were displaying Turkey's flag, red with a crescent and star. This show of patriotic fervor was matched by radio messages urging Turkish mothers to be proud that their sons were at war. Cafes were crowded with men discussing the battle reports printed in newspapers under headlines proclaiming, 'Victory, Victory!'"[54]

Following the intervention, the newspapers published a second edition and, according to the *New York Times*, "there was intense relief that, this time, there had been no repetition of the unhappy farce of embarking and disembarking and cancelling operations at the last minute."[55] A "celebratory mood" prevailed in the country. In the cities, "Young men and women sang, clapped, and almost pranced in marches . . . brandishing the Turkish flags. Crowds gathered wherever the premier went, shouting, 'People's Ecevit! People's Ecevit!'"[56] The intervention, it seemed, had brought a sense of national unity to the country, which cut across political, economic, and social lines. One Turkish journalist remarked that "disagreements between workers, villagers, youths, strikers, and all groups were removed."[57] An American observer in Turkey at the time of the intervention noted that:

> All major parties . . . supported the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. The domestic press, well known for its sensationalism and general irresponsibility, supported the Cyprus operation without notable exception. There were no editorials in any major newspaper or magazine calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. No important or well-known religious or business leader ever made

[51] "Big Troubles over a Small Island," *Time*, 29 July 1974, 34–35.

[52] "Premier Ecevit Asserts Coup 'Forced' Decision," *New York Times*, 20 July 1974.

[53] "Big Troubles over a Small Island," 34.

[54] "For Turks Going to War: Cheers and Watermelon," *New York Times*, 22 July 1974.

[55] Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Hot Days* (Nicosia: Rustem and Brother, 1985), 22.

[56] "Turkey Says Talks Fail to Solve Crisis," *New York Times*, 21 July 1974.

[57] Yılmaz Gümüşbaş, "Dün sabah güneş daha onurlu doğdu," ["Yesterday morning even the sun rose with more self-respect"], *Cumhuriyet*, 21 July 1974.

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> a public statement opposing the continued occupation of Cyprus. . . . There was no other issue, domestic or foreign, on which there was so much unanimity in Turkey.[58]

The enthusiasm for the Turkish army's actions in Cyprus was so great that the public began to send in donations to Aid-the-Army funds set up by national newspapers. A variety of civil society groups, ranging from soccer teams, to private companies, to Turkish migrant associations in Europe donated money to the funds. At the height of the collection frenzy, Turkish workers in Germany contributed a million German marks to the fund in a single day.[59]

Prime Minister Ecevit became a national hero overnight, and was compared with Atatürk, founder of the Turkish republic. In parliament, Ecevit received standing ovations. "To the man in the street he had become an idolised leader. Messages expressing gratitude to the armed forces and congratulations to Ecevit poured in from organizations and institutions everywhere."[60] Perhaps more importantly, though, Ecevit, had "won the favor of the Turkish armed forces that he had alienated in 1971, when he was the only politician to protest publicly the grasping of political power and the imposition of martial law by the generals."[61] Writes William Hale, "The military success of the Cyprus invasion restored the army's public prestige, besides reinforcing its morale. For the first time in many years, the army had a serious military job to do, and (from the Turkish viewpoint) . . . it had done it reasonably well, with minimal casualties. . . . In the broader context, the episode almost certainly increased the generals' confidence in the civilian politicians' ability to cope with critical situations, and thus strengthened their preference at this time for a policy of non-interference in politics."[62]

Ecevit clearly viewed Turkey's intervention in Cyprus as a test of the strength of Turkish democracy. The intervention, he argued, showed that very diverse parties could work together in a time of national crisis, and proved that a democratic regime posed no obstacle to dealing with external threats or other national crises.[63] Ecevit's 20 July 1974 speech to the Turkish National Assembly portrays military intervention in Cyprus as a triumph for democracy. The speech rather boldly calls into question some of the logic of the democratic peace and is worth quoting at length:

> Some people maintain that, in times of crisis, only a dictatorial regime can unite the entire nation in the national cause. They are under the impression that such unity cannot be achieved under a democratic government because of the wide di-

[58] Campany, "Turkey and the United States," 52.

[59] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 50, 58; "Orduya bağış ve yardımlar sürüyor," ["Donations and Help to the Army Continues"], *Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1974; "Ordu'ya yardim . . ." ["Help to the army . . ."], *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1974.

[60] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 50.

[61] "Ecevit: The Poet Premier," *Time*, 12 August 1974, 29.

[62] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 219.

[63] See the 17 August 1974 interview in Bülent Ecevit, *Dış Politika* [*Foreign Policy*] (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1976), 46.

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> vergences of opinion and freedom of discussion and association which Democracy tolerates. That this is contrary to the truth is proved by current events. On the one side, we see Greece ruled by a dictatorship but always divided and at loggerheads with each other; on the other, our own parliament whose members can, and do, disagree violently over economic and social problems, but who can unite as one body and soul when the national interest demands. This is as much a triumph for Democracy as for Turkey. The victory to be achieved in Cyprus will not be a victory for the Turkish nation alone, but will be a victory of democracy over dictatorship as well; it will be a triumph of freedom over oppression. . . . Until today, even our friends failed to attach any real weight to Turkey's word. This failure has been responsible for many of the hardships which the people of Cyprus, and our other friends with them, have suffered. I hope that, on this occasion, they will recognise the moral foundations of Turkey's actions.[64]

Ecevit's belief that Turkey's intervention was an act that would strengthen democracy in the region appeared to be confirmed when the military regime in Greece fell on 23 July 1974, only a few days after the Turkish intervention. The fall prompted an outburst of emotional celebration in Athens, and some Greeks even declared their gratitude to Turkey for bringing on the conditions that had led to the regime's downfall.[65] Greek Americans also overlooked the initial Turkish landing in Cyprus "amid general approval of the return of Greek democracy."[66] In Turkey ". . . some of those in government circles were heard to boast that 'we have brought democracy to Greece.'"[67] Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit declared, "I predicted that we would bring democracy and freedom to Athens and Cyprus. . . ."[68] A political cartoon in the 26 July 1974 edition of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* depicts Ecevit holding out olive branches to Greece and Cyprus, with the caption, "Bülent Ecevit: The man who brings democracy not only to us, but also to Cyprus and Greece."

After the fall of the junta in Greece, Ecevit welcomed the change of government in Athens and appeared to believe that it would lead to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict. He announced, "I am convinced that this heralds the beginning of a new era of democracy and freedom in our region. We can easily bury the memories of the past."[69] In optimistic terms he added, "I have strong hopes that developments toward establishing a democratic way of life in Cyprus, as well as in Greece will facilitate closer cooperation and friendly relations between us, for we shall be speaking the same political language."[70] In reality,

[64] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 28.

[65] "I am with You, Democracy Is with You," *Time*, 5 August 1974, 30; Mohr, "Rejoicing Athenians."

[66] Hart, "Two NATO Allies," 132.

[67] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 53.

[68] "Başbakan Ecevit: Atina ve Kıbrıs'a da demokrasi ve özgürlük getireceğimizi tahmin etmiştim," ["Prime Minister Ecevit: I Had Predicted that We Would Bring Democracy and Freedom to both Athens and Cyprus"] *Cumhuriyet*, 25 July 1974.

[69] "I am with You," 33.

[70] Juan de Onis, "Turkish Chief Hails Athens Shift As Step to New Era of Freedom," *New York Times*, 25 July 1974.

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Greece's transition toward democracy only served to constrain the new Greek government's ability to bargain with Turkey in ensuing peace talks.

Both Greece and Turkey came to the bargaining table of three-way talks between Britain, Greece, and Turkey in Geneva on 25 July constrained by domestic factors in their ability to negotiate a solution to the crisis.[71] In Ankara, for example, decision making was marked by a dispute within the RPP-NSP coalition concerning the proper response to the United Nations' call for a cease-fire:

> [Ecevit argued], "we can lessen the diplomatic pressure on us by announcing our acceptance of the U.N. resolution in principle, but specifying an effective time that is in accordance with the strategic requirements of the General Staff." . . . But Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan immediately objected: "With God's help we have exercised our right of conquest. We cannot halt our heroic Mehmetçiks who have landed on our Green Island." Ecevit: "Necmettin Bey, what you have said does not tally with the facts. There is no need for us to behave like a nation that rejects U.N. resolutions and defies the entire world."[72]

Ecevit prevailed, but after the cease-fire was agreed to, "it soon became clear," according to Mehmet Ali Birand, "that the suspension of hostilities in Cyprus was the signal for a resumption of political skirmishing between the various parties."[73] Erbakan's public statements were much more extreme than Ecevit's, and some accused the government of speaking in two voices. Erbakan's National Salvation party declared that "partition is the only way to a permanent solution. We must reject any form of settlement that offers ostensible advantages but lends itself to devious interpretations."[74] Whereas Ecevit carefully tried to use moderate language that would not offend the Greeks or needlessly damage Turkey's standing in the court of world public opinion, Erbakan was more concerned with the impact of his statements on Turkish domestic public opinion. This prompted both President Korutürk and the chief of the General Staff to ask Erbakan to tone down his rhetoric, but to no avail.[75] When the cease-fire that was agreed to early on at the Geneva conference was broken by Turkish troops, international public opinion, which had been supportive of the initial 20 July intervention, began to shift away from Turkey and to turn toward the new civilian government in Greece.[76]

At some points in the conference, Turkish negotiators indicated to the other parties that they were constrained in their ability to make concessions

[71] A useful analysis of the domestic constraints that both Ecevit and Karamanlis were operating under throughout the crisis is provided in "Domestic Politics and National Pride Limit Their Options," *New York Times*, 18 August 1974.

[72] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 40.

[73] Ibid., 50.

[74] Ibid., 50.

[75] Ibid., 51.

[76] See "Imperative for Cyprus," *New York Times*, 20 July 1974; "To Halt the Bloodshed," ibid., 21 July 1974; "Turkey's 'Cease-fire,'" ibid., 27 July 1974.

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due to the limitations placed on them by domestic considerations. In one conversation, the Turkish (Coşkun Kirca) and British (Charles Wiggin) conference delegates discussed the domestic constraints facing Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş: ". . . Wiggin drew Kirca aside and asked: 'Why are you taking such a hard line on this section of the communiqué?' Kirca explained: 'Mr. Wiggin, in Turkey we have both democracy and public opinion. Only one-tenth of the Turkish-Cypriots live in the area now held by the Turkish armed forces; nine-tenths can be annihilated by the Greek army any time it wishes. If the Turkish Foreign Minister goes back to Ankara without ensuring their safety, he will be hanged upside down. I can't therefore, ask Güneş to sign this.'"[77]

The Turkish government was also constrained in its ability to bargain because of pressure it felt from the Turkish military, which was "dizzy from success" and still retained "a veto over Premier Bülent Ecevit, forcing him to insist that Turkey's right to maintain and reinforce its units on Cyprus [was] 'irrevocable.'"[78]

Greece, as well, was hampered by domestic constraints during the Geneva conference negotiations. Following the change in the Greek government, there were public demonstrations in Greece that supported military action in Cyprus. "[S]tudent demonstrators were shouting, 'We want to fight in Cyprus.'[79] In addition to being hemmed in by public opinion, the new Greek government had to contend with the threat of a potential counter-coup: ". . . with the Junta lying in ambush, waiting for a chance to return to power [Constantine Karamanlis] could not afford to absent himself from Athens even for a few hours. Moreover, the Greek press was already calling Ecevit 'an imperialist warmonger' and it was clear that even the minutest concession made to Turkey would be magnified and used against him."[80]

At the conclusion of the first round of Geneva negotiations, it was accepted that Turkey had emerged as the winner. Turkey had not been required to return the territory captured after the cease-fire, and no definite arrangements had been made for a Turkish withdrawal of troops from the island. Ecevit's popularity continued to soar in Turkey, and upon his return to Ankara following the conference, Foreign Minister Turan "Güneş was given such a tumultuous welcome that he felt it necessary to emphasise that they were still only at the beginning of things."[81] However, inside the government many felt that Turkey hadn't taken a hard enough line. Erbakan, for example, refused to attend the welcoming ceremonies and was known to be displeased with the outcome of the Geneva talks. His views were diametrically opposed to those of Ecevit and reflected the sentiments of almost all the opposition parties, which had taken to repeating slogans such as "Partition is essential," "We want the Dode-

[77] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 70.
[78] "Turkish Withdrawal," *New York Times*, 25 July 1974.
[79] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 67.
[80] Ibid., 71.
[81] Ibid., 77.

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canese," "We want Salonika," sometimes appearing to come close to even demanding an occupation of the Greek mainland.[82]

The fact that the outcome of the first talks had been favorable to the Turkish position, combined with the fact that following the conclusion of the talks Turkey continued to expand its position in Cyprus and refused to work with UN peacekeeping troops, bode poorly for Turkey's standing in world opinion, which was continually becoming more sympathetic to the Greek position. Reports of atrocities committed by Turkish soldiers grew.[83] It was expected that Greece would refuse to negotiate with Turkey, since Turkish troops continued to expand their hold on the island. To many people's surprise, however, Greece came to the negotiating table for a second round of peace talks in Geneva in August.[84]

Turkey took a hard line at the second round of talks, and both the Americans and the British were concerned that Turkey's position might help to bring about conditions that would lead to the collapse of the civilian government in Greece. The new regime in Greece had been damaged by the outcome of the first Geneva conference: "The left-wing parties and the papers—which were not entirely happy over the selection of Karamanlis—began to describe the agreement as a disgrace, while the Greek-Cypriots took the view that "Greece has let us down." . . . As the spate of criticism increased, Karamanlis, whose first concern was the survival of his regime, found his freedom of manoeuvre severely restricted."[85] It was widely thought that the Greek armed forces would topple the Karamanlis government if Turkey continued to expand its position in Cyprus.[86] The fact that accepting any far-reaching solution to the Cyprus problem "would have appeared to Greek public opinion as a capitulation, as yet another acknowledgment of military humiliation by the Turks" placed a severe constraint on the ability of the Greek delegation to negotiate a compromise solution.[87] British Foreign Minister James Callaghan tried to convince the Turkish delegation to take into consideration the weak position of the Greek government. However, he was only confronted with the Turkish claim that its government was also subject to tight constraints. Birand recorded the conversation that took place, which gives insights into the ways in which domestic constraints may have shaped the decision-making process at the Geneva peace talks:

[82] Ibid., 77–78.

[83] See, for example, "Villagers Driven From Cyprus Homes Charge Murder and Rape by Turks," *New York Times*, 6 August 1974.

[84] Craig R. Whitney, "Three-Power Parley on Cyprus Resumes Effort to End Conflict," ibid., 9 August 1974.

[85] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 77.

[86] "Good Start in Greece," *New York Times*, 5 August 1974. See also "Looking for Paradise Lost," *Time*, 2 September 1974, 29; and Bahcheli, "Greek-Turkish," 98.

[87] Craig R. Whitney, "A Post-Mortem on Geneva Talks," *New York Times*, 18 August 1974.

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> Callaghan: Clerides is in a difficult position and cannot possibly accept your plan at present. If he were to sign such an agreement, he would be overthrown as soon as he returned to Cyprus. He must have time to think.
>
> Güneş: If this issue is not resolved by tonight, I shall be thrown out, too.
>
> Callaghan: The internal situation in Greece is grave. A positive reply would generate internal problems that might even threaten the Greek Government. I don't think you can have a reply by tonight.
>
> Güneş: I don't think the Karamanlis Government is likely to fall. Even if it did, we have already had experience of the extremists who might resume power. The Junta was a fair sample. It was planning to attack Turkey but could not muster enough courage, and it fell. Our allies will have to choose between Greece and Turkey. For five consecutive days, we have tried hard to avert a deadlock and maintain a calm atmosphere. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish public is also awaiting a settlement. If we fail to come to terms, everyone will share the responsibility.[88]

Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş later told an American news magazine, "We're getting a little tired of Mr. Callaghan's argument that we are undermining Greece's newborn democracy. Ecevit may also have some problems at home, for our military is strong as well."[89] In Turkey the national press accused the West of wanting Turkey to foot the bill for the survival of Greek democracy.[90]

Both Ecevit and Erbakan continued to take a very hard line throughout the entire second round of talks in Geneva, even when the Greek negotiating team began to make some concessions.[91] When Turkey seemed to ignore the goodwill gestures of Greece and began to issue deadlines and ultimatums, its actions appeared less and less justifiable in the eyes of world opinion.[92] Talks broke down on 13 August 1974, and British Foreign Minister Callaghan placed the entire blame on Turkey. He was reported to be furious with Foreign Minister Güneş.[93] Turkey then launched its second intervention in Cyprus, consolidating and expanding its position to take control of the northern 34 percent of the island. In response, Greece temporarily withdrew itself from the NATO alliance, and the United States soon began to consider measures to implement an arms embargo against Turkey. Public opinion in Turkey, although supportive of the new intervention, "was not as ebullient" as after the 20 July landing, al-

[88] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 97.

[89] "Blunt Voice From Turkey," *Time*, 26 August 1974, 38.

[90] Ahmet Şükrü Esmèr, "Batı, Yunanistan'da Demokrasinin yaşama faturasını, Türkiye'ye ödetmek istiyor," ["The West Wants Turkey to Foot the Bill for the Survival of Greek Democracy"] *Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1974, 5.

[91] Craig R. Whitney, "Some Progress on Cyprus Is Reported at the Geneva Talks on Peace for Island," *New York Times*, 12 August 1974.

[92] "To Restrain Turkey," ibid., 13 August 1974.

[93] "Cyprus Fighting Resumes As Peace Talks Collapse; UN Called Into Session," ibid., 14 August 1974.

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though there was a sense that Turkey had "won the war," a fact that continued to give Ecevit a high level of popularity.[94]

Turkey proposed new talks after the second intervention, which Greece refused to join. The RPP-NSP coalition fell apart a few months later. When asked what effect the Cyprus intervention had had on the coalition, Bülent Ecevit claimed that the intervention had served to temporarily prop up the coalition, which would likely have had fallen apart earlier had the July and August interventions not occurred.[95]

Competing Explanations for the Turkish Intervention

The realist model of international politics provides a plausible explanation for many of the dynamics of the Cyprus crisis.[96] The Greek-sponsored coup can be seen as having constituted a legitimate national security concern for Turkey, since the island of Cyprus is only 40 miles off the Turkish coast and is of strategic importance. In addition, Nikos Sampson had a history of anti-Turkish violence. Turkey thus had reason to believe that the Greek coup was not only changing the regional balance of power in Greece's favor, but was also creating a real threat to the Turkish-Cypriot population of the island, which would in turn lead to instability that could potentially spread to the Turkish mainland.[97]

Beyond the regional level of Greek-Turkish power balancing, Turkey could also be seen as manipulating a changing balance of power at the level of the international system. The United States had been able to impose its will on the Turkish political elite in 1964 and 1967, in part because Turkey was so reliant on the United States as its primary ally. Following the 1967 Cyprus crisis, however, Turkish leaders began to make overtures to and expand ties with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, U.S.–Soviet détente created an opening that Turkey could exploit in order to gain more power within the Western alliance system. The Cyprus issue can thus be interpreted as a bargaining chip that Turkey used to increase its standing within NATO. Following the Greek coup in Cyprus, the Soviets gave the Turkish leadership clear signs that they would not interfere if the Turks chose to intervene.[98] This signal from the Soviets gave Turkey additional impetus to take a strong stance vis-à-vis the United States, as Turkey was assured that intervention in Cyprus would not lead to an attack on the Western alliance. In addition, the United States was hindered in its ability to fully engage

[94] "Turkish Premier Is Blaming Greece," ibid., 15 August 1974; and Juan de Onis, "Turks Cite Objective," ibid., 16 August 1974.

[95] *Ecevit'in Açıklamaları 1976* [*Statements by Ecevit 1976*] (Ankara: CHP Genel Merkezi, 1976), 91.

[96] For the realist model, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

[97] For the importance of threat perception, see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[98] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 23.

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with the Cyprus crisis, which occurred during the final days of President Richard Nixon's administration.[99]

While the realist model provides a plausible explanation for Turkey's actions on 20 July, the model is of less use in explaining the decision-making process between 20 July and the final partition and occupation of the island by Turkey in mid-August. Dankwart Rustow writes that "The second intervention carried the intervention far beyond the area of solid Turkish settlement; and it came after any acute danger to the Cypriot-Turkish minority had passed and democracy in Greece had been restored. Hence it was this second intervention far more than the first that, immediately and over the years, subjected Ankara to severe criticism in Greece and among its friends in Europe, America and the world."[100]

A two-step military intervention may have been predetermined, of course, and it would be naïve to take all statements made at the negotiating table regarding domestic constraints solely at face value. However, Turkey had emerged from the first set of talks in Geneva in a very strong position and was therefore well-placed for achieving a favorable peaceful settlement at the second Geneva talks, which would have strengthened its position in the NATO alliance. The fact that Turkey, as a NATO ally, broke off talks after the major threat to its national security interests was apparently over and chose instead to become embroiled in an expensive and intractable military operation, is less understandable from the realist perspective. The second intervention led to an American arms embargo against Turkey between 1975 and 1978. Given that America was scheduled to provide Turkey with $170 million per year in military aid,[101] it is evident that Turkey did not embark on the second Cyprus intervention solely for the purpose of strengthening its position in the Western alliance and was not calculating according to a simple version of long-term national interests.

Yet another explanation for Turkey's intervention is an irredentist account based on Turkey's affinity for the ethnically Turkish population of the island.[102] Since the Turkish-Cypriot population did in fact face a potential threat under the anti-Turkish Sampson regime installed by Greece, this is a plausible argument. Much of the nationalist sentiment in the press and public opinion could be interpreted as evidence of strong primordial ethnic ties that existed between the mainland and Turkish-Cypriot populations.[103] Here again there are a num-

[99] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1982), 1188–1193.

[100] Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), 96.

[101] Laurence Halley, *Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 56.

[102] For a primordialist argument, see Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (London: Free Press, 1963).

[103] For arguments that stress the contemporary political salience of ties based on language, religion, and culture, see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986); and

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ber of problems with this line of argument. First, neither the Turkish government nor Turkish public opinion had been concerned with the Turkish-Cypriot minority of the island when it was under British rule, and Turkey had consistently had a nonirredentist policy toward ethnic Turks outside the Turkish republic. This policy had its roots in Atatürk's renunciation of any pan-Turkic claims at the time of the founding of the republic. Turkish officials during the crisis made efforts to explicitly disclaim any expansionist ambitions based on ethnic solidarity. Foreign Minister Güneş said, for example, in a meeting with Soviet Ambassador V. F. Grubyakov, "Turkey is not seeking territorial expansion: what we have already is quite enough for us. Have we interfered with the Turks in Bulgaria? Have we threatened Syria? Have we demanded Salonika?"[104] The Turkish negotiating team at the Geneva conferences pressed for a federal solution and not annexation of the Turkish portions of Cyprus with Turkey. Finally, the 14 August partition of the island took place after any substantial danger to the Turkish-Cypriot minority had already passed.

Two more alternative explanations are worth mentioning, but can be more easily dismissed. The first explains the intervention in terms of Turkey's legal obligations under the 1960 agreements. In this line of argumentation, neither domestic pressures nor national security interests led to the intervention, but rather the interests Turkey had as party to a binding agreement under international law. There are a number of immediate problems with this argument. First, Turkey was one of three guarantors to the agreement, the other two being Britain and Greece. Turkey did approach Britain as a fellow-guarantor before proceeding with its initial intervention, but there is no evidence that all diplomatic channels were exhausted before the intervention. Furthermore, Turkey had legal obligations (and national interests) as a member of NATO, which conflicted with and could be presumed to override its interests in adhering to the 1960 accords. The fact that Greece and Turkey were both members of NATO, and that Turkey defied American State Department requests to call off the intervention, speaks to the weaknesses of this explanation.

Finally, psychological theories that examine the personality traits and psychological make-up of individual leaders could be employed to shed light on Ecevit's decision to intervene. Yet there is no evidence that anything in Ecevit's character or beliefs would have made him as an individual particularly susceptible to pursuing an aggressive foreign policy stance on the Cyprus issue. A poet and progressive social democrat, Ecevit was one of the least militaristic politicians on the Turkish scene at the time, and had pronounced his support for Greek-Turkish friendship on several occasions.[105] If anything, Ecevit was constrained in his ability to pursue a more moderate course of action in Cyprus by

Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a . . . ," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1 (October 1978): 377–400.

[104] Birand, "30 Hot Days," 23.

[105] "Ecevit: The Poet Premier," *Time*, 12 August 1974, 29. See also "Ecevit's 28th July Press Conference" in *SWB: Summary of World Broadcasts* (Reading, UK: British Broadcasting System, 1974).

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the radical demands voiced by Erbakan, a number of opposition parties, and the public at large.

Although both the realist and irredentist explanations provide plausible frameworks for understanding the initial 20 July Turkish intervention, they are less useful for understanding the motivations behind the 14 August intervention. In contrast, the use of the Cyprus issue to foster national unity and appease the military, the role of public opinion and the press in constraining the choices of political elites, and the ways in which both Greek and Turkish leaders were constrained by short time horizons in the Geneva talks all support the causal logic underlying many of Mansfield and Snyder's claims about the ways in which democratization processes can lead to belligerent foreign policies.

Democratization as a Factor in the Intervention

Evidence from this case study points to the usefulness of many elements of the democratization and war explanation for understanding Turkey's decision to intervene in Cyprus. It also demonstrates that structural and normative explanations for the democratic peace are limited in their applicability across the full range of "democratic" regime types. Structural explanations for the democratic peace claim that democratic institutions and popular participation serve to restrain decision makers and lead to moderation in foreign policy making. However, in the Turkish case, extreme political fractionalization and weak political parties, together with a parliamentary system that produced short-time horizons for political elites, all combined to provide incentives for a more aggressive stance on Cyprus than might have been taken under a more centralized regime. Normative explanations for the democratic peace argue that popular participation in the decision-making process leads to liberal and more tolerant identities, and an acceptance of pluralism that spills over into the foreign policy-making process. In the case at hand, however, the evidence shows that the press, public opinion, and opposition parties all had a radicalizing effect and may have hindered rather than helped political elites in their quest to find a more optimal resolution to the crisis.[106]

Public support in Turkey for a tough stance on the Cyprus issue had reached such high levels by the 1970s that, as one commentator argues, "no government in Ankara could have sat on its hands—as they had done in the 1960's—and survived."[107] A strong nationalist position on Cyprus was perhaps the only issue that was able to unite the fragmented social interests in Turkish society at the time. After an expansion of political participation had widened the political spectrum in the mid-1960s, only to collapse into a spiral of political violence and eventually military repression, Turkish society was very ideologi-

[106] See Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 5–40.

[107] Ahmad, cited in Bahcheli, "Cyprus in Turkey," 67.

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cally divided in the early 1970s. The high degree of party fragmentation in the 1973 elections, the unstable coalition between leftists and Islamists that emerged from those elections, and the disproportional influence that parties such as the extreme nationalist National Action party had under Turkey's parliamentary system, all combined to create an incentive to seek national unity on foreign policy issues. A tough stance on Cyprus provided a means of "squaring the circle" in the coalition of opposites that emerged from the 1973 elections.[108]

The Cyprus issue had the ability to win support across the political spectrum. To the Left, a firm stance on Cyprus meant a democratic Turkey asserting itself in the face of American hegemony. To the Right, Cyprus was a matter of Turkish national pride and a chance for a military victory abroad. Perhaps more importantly, a military solution to the Cyprus issue had the additional advantages of winning military support for the civilian government and giving the military a job to do that would keep it from meddling in domestic politics. Both Ecevit, who was the only Turkish politician to have opposed the 1971 military takeover, and Erbakan, whose Islamist ideology was a challenge to Turkish secularism, were seen by the military as threats to its position as the guardian of the Turkish state. A strong position on Cyprus served the dual function of squaring the circle in the coalition and satisfying the old military elite. In an environment in which the military could take over at any time, ideological divisions could erupt into political violence, and going against the grain of public opinion could result in the destruction of the ruling coalition, political elites were operating under constraints of very short time horizons.

The Turkish case study demonstrates the degree to which political elites were constrained by both the press and public opinion in their ability to maneuver. Ecevit's tough stance on Cyprus bolstered his popularity, but the initial intervention created such a wave of national fervor in Turkey that Ecevit found himself severely restricted in his ability to reach a peaceful resolution to the crisis in negotiations with Greece at Geneva. This occurred despite initial indications from Ecevit that he expected Greece's transition toward democracy to lead to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Michael McFaul has argued that "weak and partial democratic institutions along with interest groups that lose from transition may be necessary conditions for producing belligerent foreign policies in democratizing states, but they are not sufficient conditions."[109] Democratization is a politically desirable good, and the fact that democratization processes may at times encourage aggressive foreign policies is an uncomfortable proposition. For this reason, it is especially important to look at the specific features of individual cases. In the Turkish case, there are a number of other features that stand out in addition to the inter-

[108] See Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and War," 32–33.

[109] Michael McFaul, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," *International Security* 22 (Winter 1997/98): 34.

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action between Turkey's parliamentary system and the extreme political fractionalization of the time, or the role of the press and public opinion. The role of the military in Turkish domestic politics, and international systemic factors relating to the nature of American hegemony and its impact on Turkish domestic politics at the time both appeared to have played a key role.

It is clear that the potential threat of yet another military coup in Turkey was a factor that affected elite decision making throughout the Cyprus crisis.[110] The Turkish military has traditionally been a powerful force both throughout the Ottoman period and in the modern Turkish state. Yet, the disproportionate strength of the Turkish military in contemporary times is also attributable to cold war patterns of American foreign aid and the conditions of the NATO alliance, which made Turkey the recipient of $5.6 billion in American military assistance between 1947–1974.[111] American military aid provided the Turkish military with the resources to use repressive measures to suppress dissent and to manage political violence. While this had the effect of keeping a measure of political stability in society, the consequence was a pattern of dealing with political divisions in Turkish society through the use of military repression rather than through democratic institution-building. In addition, the NATO alliance may have actually increased regional instability in the Eastern Mediterranean by providing security guarantees to both Turkey and Greece, while at the same time strengthening the two countries' military capabilities. This allowed the two NATO members to focus on regional rivalries rather than the primary Soviet threat.[112]

The close association of the United States with the government repression of the Left in the late 1960s and the brutal period of military rule between 1971 and 1973 explain both the extent of anti-American sentiment of the time, as well as the degree of symbolic importance attached to the gesture of a democratically-elected government standing up strongly to United States pressure to not intervene in Cyprus. The removal of the poppy-growing ban by the Ecevit-Erbakan coalition and the pursuit of an independent Cyprus policy were viewed by democratizing elites and the public alike as signs that the civilian government was designing Turkish policy in accordance with popular rather than elite or foreign interests. The Cyprus policy was also popular with military elites, since it boosted their prestige in the country. This explains in part why nationalist appeals resonated with both the material and normative interests of such a broad sector of Turkish society. Both the domestic and international contexts in which democratization takes place are of crucial importance for understanding when democratization may result in a more belligerent foreign policy.

[110] See Ahmad, "Making Turkey"; Hale, "Turkish Politics"; Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy, and the Military* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); Huntington, "Political Order."

[111] Halley, "Ancient Affections," 62.

[112] Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53 (Spring 1999): 343–377.

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CONCLUSIONS

The case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus provides an illustration of how democratization can create domestic incentives and constraints that facilitate the militarization of international disputes. The case also challenges some of the central assumptions of the democratic peace literature; there is no indication that popular participation in the form of elections, a free press, or public debate did anything more than sensitize the elected government to nationalist sentiment. The democratic peace argument assumes that popularly elected democratic elites will be constrained in their ability to pursue reckless foreign policy adventures by the interests of the average voter, by the checks placed on them by other institutions such as parliament, and by a free press. In the case of Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus, democratically-elected political elites were actually hampered, not helped, by the press, parliament, and public opinion in their pursuit of diplomatic solutions to the crisis. These aspects of the Turkish case demonstrate that, at the minimum, it is necessary to set clear boundary conditions on structural and normative explanations for the democratic peace, and that these explanations may not be applicable across the full range of "democratic" regime types. The fact that democratization in Greece did not create conditions that in any way facilitated a peaceful resolution of the crisis also calls into question the role that perceptions play in fostering the democratic peace: the Greek transition toward democracy does not appear to have had a significant impact on the opinion or policy preferences of the Turkish public, press, or political opposition.[113]

These findings suggest that in contrast to the claims of the democratic peace literature, elections and an increase in popular participation do not necessarily lead to more peaceful foreign relations. The findings also point to the advantages of exploring in more detail the causal mechanisms at work in specific case studies as an alternative to relying solely on statistical correlations or formal arguments to demonstrate the relationship between democracy and foreign policy outcomes. When specific case studies are examined in more detail, much of the causal logic behind the theory of the democratic peace begins to break down.[114]

Multiparty elections and a free press may be desirable political goals in and of themselves. It may also be the case that democratization produces increased stability in the international system over the long term. But, it would be incorrect to view elections and a free press as institutions that automatically promote less aggressive foreign policies, since they may just as easily be used as avenues for the popular expression of nationalist sentiment as for pluralistic foreign policy debates. This is particularly important to keep in mind, since most of the world's democracies are institutionally weak and are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of domestic fragmentation and fractionalization, which are being

[113] On the role of perceptions, see Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Peace."

[114] See Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace.*

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produced around the world by processes of globalization. Furthermore, it would be wrong to make generalizations about the foreign policy outcomes of domestic processes of democratization without taking into account the way in which international systemic factors—including American hegemony—are played out in domestic political contexts around the globe.*

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 16–20 February 1999. The author acknowledges the financial support of the Social Science Research Council and MacArthur Foundation, and thanks Alexander Cooley, Jacqueline Klopp, Martin Malin, Daniel Markey, Rainer Muenz, Jack Snyder, Mehmet Tabak, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and Elke Zuern for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.

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Book Reviews

The Strategic Constitution *by Robert D. Cooter. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 412 pp. $45.00.*

Robert D. Cooter has written a clear and comprehensive introduction to modern work in political economy and rational choice as it applies to the strategic analysis of government structure. The book blends normative and positive concerns in an enlightening way and would be an excellent text for an advanced undergraduate course or a law school seminar. The book presumes a willingness to work through theoretical arguments derived from economics and game theory, but it does not presuppose a background in the fields of public choice and positive political theory. Cooter introduces each chapter with a list of examples that will be illuminated by the chapter to follow, and he sprinkles intriguing and thought-provoking questions throughout the book in a way that will help engage students.

Legal scholars of the American constitution will find this book outside the mainstream of their interests, but as Cooter himself claims, that is all to the good. The book has an admirable emphasis on constitutional structure and on the strategic opportunities created by alternative ways of organizing government. It is less United States-centered than most work in constitutional law, and it is not particularly interested in the bread and butter of constitutional scholarship—Supreme Court opinions. Thus, legal scholars may find this book frustrating, but they should take it on its own terms as series of arguments about how government structure matters.

The Strategic Constitution is not, however, primarily a textbook. It is an opinionated, closely argued defense of a set of particular normative positions and empirical claims. Although I disagree with many of Cooter's conclusions, his arguments are always provocative and interesting. To illustrate the nature of my difficulties, let me discuss two of the book's important conclusions concerning the separation of powers and the goals of public policy. My first problem concerns Cooter's status quo bias. He is worried about the instability of democratic voting schemes. This leads him to favor bargaining over voting and to favor methods that privilege the status quo. At the same time, he expresses special concern about "political conspiracies" (p. 213). Like a number of other scholars in this tradition, he is particularly concerned that government will be

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captured by unrepresentative groups. He seems unconcerned that government inaction can also privilege narrow groups. Therefore, in discussing the separation of powers, he favors constitutional structures, such as the American model, with many veto points in the form of courts, House, Senate, and president. Such a system privileges the status quo and, according to Cooter, limits rent-seeking. Cooter does not deal adequately with the possibly unrepresentative character of such systems and with their weaknesses when the status quo is stable but unjust or inefficient.

As a substantive policy goal for democracies, Cooter favors wealth maximization as the goal most compatible with human welfare. This is said to express "no values of its own apart from market values" and to imply "a cost-benefit analysis of constitutional rights" (pp. 266–267). I applaud the effort to go beyond absolutist discussions of rights, but the wealth maximization standard demands much more justification. According to Cooter, the standard implies that a role for the state is protecting rights consistent with other values, and it allows the state only a limited role in redistributing resources. This fits with Cooter's belief that the state is likely to redistribute from the poor to the rich. Thus, his position represents not libertarian triumphalism but a deep skepticism about democracy. Cooter, however, has not proved his pessimistic hunches empirically. I am not so skeptical of giving democratic governments more room to maneuver.

Furthermore, wealth maximization is incoherent as a national principle of action. Cost-benefit analysis can be carried out for particular programs on the assumption that the rest of the world is held constant. However, as an overall standard, it provides no guidance for how to pick the prices at which to value various combinations of good, services, and rights. Consider all the feasible, efficient output combinations and their distribution across the public. Without a set of prices, no one can determine which one maximizes wealth.

In short, Cooter's normative position has not been justified either as a matter of social justice or as a necessary response to an imperfect world. Thus, I urge readers to learn what they can from Cooter's excellent presentation of a body of important material without uncritically accepting his conclusions in favor of constitutional systems with a status quo bias and a goal of wealth maximization.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
Yale University

The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization *by Timothy J. Power. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. 284 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

What difference has the orientation and behavior of the political Right in Brazil had for the consolidation of democracy in the years that have followed the tran-

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sition from military rule in 1985? Timothy Power argues that Brazil's political Right had a strong anti-institutionalist and anti-legislative orientation, contributing to weaken Brazil's parliamentary and partisan institutions in the 1980s and 1990s, thus making it more difficult to deepen and consolidate democratic practices and outcomes.

Brazil's military rulers retained a nearly powerless national congress almost uninterruptedly between 1964 and 1985. Power studies the parliamentary veterans of those years who were elected to congress again in the years following military rule. For the years after 1985, he compares those parliamentarians who supported the military government to those parliamentarians who opposed it. The Right is defined behaviorally; therefore, it is constituted of politicians who supported military rule. Politician socialization explains why the authoritarian legacy endured during constitutional government. Even after the regime transition, parliamentary supporters of authoritarian rule are likely to be weaker supporters of democratic institutions than those parliamentarians who once opposed authoritarian rule.

Power's empirical findings support his expectations. He discovers that rightwing politicians hide their ideological orientations. Right-wing politicians, however, have distinct views and behaviors compared to parliamentary veterans who had opposed military rule. They are more likely to support the high prerogatives that the armed forces retained. They are more likely to believe that they won office in the late 1980s and 1990s through their personal efforts, not their party membership, and less likely to vote the party line, preferring to vote according to local constituency interests. Rightwing parties, therefore, show lower levels of party discipline than other parties. One in three members of congress changed parties during each of the first three legislative sessions under constitutional government, 1987–1999. Right-wing parliamentary veterans are also less supportive of democratic values and institutions, and they are much less active in congress than veterans from other parties. They contribute less than other parliamentarians, therefore, to the consolidation of democratic practices.

At times Power overplays his hand, however. He argues that "the preferences of ex-authoritarians for executive office were uniquely intense" (p. 89). In support, he compares the prior office-holding experience of both sets of veterans elected to congress in three different post-1985 elections. And yet, eighteen of the twenty-four tests on p. 91 are not statistically significant at the .10 level. Similarly, Power argues that former authoritarians are "less active in parliamentary activities" (p. 169). In support, he compares various possible parliamentary activities. And yet, eleven of the eighteen tests on p. 171 are not statistically significant at the .05 level. In both instances, the significant relationships that do exist are in accord with Power's hypotheses, but the full statistical analysis is less categorical than his verbal argument.

Assessments of the Right's role may also differ. The political Right sees itself as the party of order. It supports the government of the day, no matter

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who is president. Given Brazil's stunning macroeconomic policy challenges in the 1980s and 1990s, this party of order probably did contribute to democratic consolidation, enabling President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to enact key economic reforms constitutionally. Power gives the political Right too little credit for this outcome.

Nonetheless, Power's research is careful and well designed. His analysis is intelligent and nuanced. His results are persuasive. The book is well written. This work is a subtle and effective analysis of a key political actor—dominant in Brazil under dictatorship, powerful still under constitutional government, and theoretically significant for understanding the prospects for democratic consolidation in a great many countries.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait *by Mary Ann Tétreault. New York, Columbia University Press, 2000. 326 pp. Paper, $18.50.*

Tétreault's point of departure for this study is a rather ingenious parallel between the original conception of democracy in the Athenian city-state and politics in the modern Kuwaiti city-state. In particular, the author draws upon Hannah Arendt's images of a "space of appearance" in ancient Greece forged by individuals "acting together." The parallels to the idealized Western genesis of democracy in an early historical urban context are mitigated by the insertion of a concept of modernity as a global project that in Kuwait means looking toward the future, not the past. The second adroit maneuver Tétreault makes in framing her study provides the title and logic of the inquiry: she is not describing democracy as an operative political system, but rather as narratives, legends, and iconographic renderings of democracy. The notions of political space, modern reflexivity, and story-telling enable the author to find ways in which political agents invent, imagine, or project new identities and carve out real or metaphoric arenas for action within the constraints of their system. The stories that Kuwaiti rulers and politicians tell about democracy represent paradigmatic myths that help to define the realm of the possible. Like parables, they have meaning independent of verification. Although in the end, Tétreault acknowledges that "the myths and the reality are still far apart" (p. 238), she also maintains that the contest of narratives represents a process of clearing shared political space in which democracy can not only be imagined but perhaps some day achieved.

The book is thus about contending myths in Kuwaiti political discourse—the legends the Sabah ruling family recite about their origins and intentions, the parables of constitutionalism, the allegories of elections, the memoirs of "insiders" who stayed and the "outsiders" who fled during the Iraqi occupation,

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the rival claims of democrats and autocrats, the ways political actors recount and reflect on their parliamentary experiences, opposition politicians' accusations of electoral orchestration. Through the device of relating stories, the author delivers a readable, quite human chronicle of Kuwaiti political and parliamentary history that can be interpreted as the annals of a pro-democracy movement, perhaps even of movement in the direction of democracy. One of the book's most appealing traits is its voice, the ways quotations and vignettes allow Kuwaitis to speak directly to the reader about their experiences. They come alive as a result.

Yet it might be said that the ingenious also occasionally verges on the disingenuous. Tétreault's own narrative device does permit her to pronounce negative judgments, for instance when monarchs dissolve parliaments or engage in various forms of electoral tampering. And certainly the book is not so much a collection of tales that it lacks empirical distance or purely factual evidence, including tabular data on election results. But the larger story set forth is one that Kuwaiti elites, including the ruling family, would want to have told. For instance, "anti-Kuwaiti myths" are dismissed with a categorical declaration that "Kuwaiti nationalism is, in fact, far more fully formed and realized than Iraqi nationalism" (p. 43)—and this despite an earlier observation that "a distinctly Kuwaiti national identity first began to coalesce around the defeat and expulsion of an invading army" (p. 28). Another passage almost seems to turn the notion of political space as the antidote to authoritarianism on its head in portraying the drama of Kuwaiti history as "a series of attempts by rulers to carve out a space for autonomous action for themselves . . ." against countervailing efforts (p. 219). The conclusion reassures readers and rulers alike that citizens see the Sabah family as partners in a common national project in which Kuwait, Kuwaitiness, and monarchy are transcendently "given." Among the alternative futures Kuwaitis may imagine, therefore, radical departures from the status quo seem entirely beyond the pale.

SHEILA CARAPICO
University of Richmond

Robert Kennedy: His Life *by Evan Thomas. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000. 509 pp. $28.00.*

Toward the end of his entrancing biography of Robert Kennedy, in a chapter entitled "Courage"—the third from last in a book of over 500 pages, including well over 100 pages of source notes, an index, and the like—Evan Thomas puts to himself and his readers for final resolution "the debate over whether RFK became a new man after his brother's death" (p. 345). Thomas himself calls the debate, which in many ways is manufactured for his own artistic purposes, "in some ways unresolvable, if not fatuous" (p. 345). Yet he does resolve it for him-

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self, in the next paragraph, saying Kennedy's "changes were real, but they were not radical, more an evolution than a transformation" (p. 345).

For the next few pages, and then in the final two chapters, called "Quest" and "Legend," Thomas tells his version of the story of the then Senator Kennedy's decision to run for president in 1968, the campaign itself (pretty briefly, and focused on California), its outcome including the senator's death in Los Angeles, and some poignant reactions to it. Thomas' own premises are perhaps best summarized in these sentences: "In a time of moral uncertainty, Kennedy did not lose sight of the right thing to do. The real question was whether he could summon the courage to do it" (p. 348). In the context of the rhetoric of the book, the "right thing to do" included acting in accordance with the demands of the Kennedy family's Catholic faith.

Analysis of this kind is typical of the great strength of Thomas's biography, which I called "entrancing" at the start of these comments, but also its weakness. As a whole, the book seemed to me to veer from psychological profiles of Robert Kennedy at particular important parts of his life, as Thomas sees them (such as in the recurring theme of an unsatisfied search by Bob Kennedy, boy and man, for his father's approval) and carefully gathered and well-documented specific instances, revealing to Thomas, of incidents involving the interaction of others with Kennedy. These latter examples of biography writing show Thomas's extraordinary journalistic talents and experience, as do his previous books.

It is hard for someone like me, who was very close to Robert Kennedy during the most public and most important parts of his life—as attorney general, as senator, and as candidate for the presidency—but not really a part of his staff or constant companions (like, for example, John Siegenthaler, Ed Guthman, or Joe Dolan), to review a biography like this. I admire greatly the writing skills, the attention to detail, the fair and open reporting, the sense of history, and the ability to present the very busy and somewhat cluttered life of a great political figure that emerges so clearly in *Robert Kennedy: His Life.* Yet I and many others who knew Bob Kennedy as a man and as a wonderful friend tend to wince at efforts, such as this biography as a whole, to romanticize him so that to some inescapable degree he loses to the demands of political history his personal appeal, his warmth, his humor, his fundamental humanity.

There are a lot of books about Robert Kennedy. Aside from Arthur Schlesinger's early biography, this is in my eyes and emotions (not having read them all) the best. It is good to read; it is well organized both in the short and in the long run; it superbly takes in a period of American political history that is fading from the personal American memory. I hope that everyone interested in the realities of the Kennedy years, of the 1960s particularly, and not just in the myths about them, will read this book and profit from it, as I have. Once started it cannot be resisted.

BURKE MARSHALL
Yale University

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Communication in the Presidential Primaries: Candidates and the Media, 1912–2000 *by Kathleen Kendall. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2000. 272 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

In politics, as in sports, much emphasis is placed on the "Big Mo"—momentum. Maintaining momentum can bulldoze a candidate to victory, and the earlier one establishes the Big Mo, the better. This is why presidential primaries—the early period of the political game—have become so important in the American political process.

One good way to capture momentum during the primaries is through effective political communication. Both the news coverage a candidate receives and the media a candidate produces can either animate a campaign or doom it to failure. Hence, a study of political communication in the presidential primary season is particularly germane. Kathleen Kendall's contribution to the Praeger series in political communication is a carefully detailed and well-organized examination of communication patterns and strategies used during the presidential primary season. Kendall concentrates her attentions on five primary seasons separated by twenty-year intervals. Beginning with the 1912 presidential campaign, Kendall tracks the development of the primary system, the expansion of political communication technologies, and the increasing influence of the media. The result is an historical comparison of twentieth-century presidential primaries that is well documented with thorough research and thoughtful analysis.

After a comprehensive examination of the relationship between primary rules and communication techniques, Kendall presents separate chapters on political speeches, advertisements, and the news media's campaign coverage, methodically tracing the developments of each of these subjects through the five primary contests. In doing so, the author makes a compelling argument that there are communication strategies and patterns that have not changed in almost 100 years, despite primary system reorganizations.

Kendall allows that campaigns have changed with the times, yet she proves more forcefully that many communication patterns seen during the primaries of the past century are well established. Take, for example, candidate speeches during the primaries. While it is true that network television coverage of candidate speeches has declined in recent years and candidates have adapted to these time limitations, Kendall argues that "candidates have *always* adapted to the media of the times, shaping their speeches accordingly" (p. 89). Another example is found in political advertising, where the emphasis on the horse race, on winners and losers, and on the imagery of slogan ads that address style over substance has remained constant throughout the century.

Other consistencies are found in the news media coverage of the campaigns themselves. Since the presidential primary season is by definition and design the true start of a campaign, coverage during these primaries is crucial to a campaign. The multitude of candidates vying for attention, the large number of me-

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dia events, and the natural winnowing process of the primaries give credence to Kendall's contention that the primaries are "ideally suited to the news media's needs for a colorful story" (p. 159). What results is significant but shallow political coverage—the quick news bites that voters grab at their convenience, paying attention to the segments that are, in the words of Doris Graber, "made interesting and relevant to them" (p. 222). Critics of the current primary system argue that this superficial coverage hinders the candidate selection process, and improvements in the system are required.

As greater attention is paid to the primaries and front loading continues in election campaigns, it is important to reexamine this part of our political system that was established a century ago. Kendall forcefully argues that reform of the primary system is possible, but also proves that certain communications models have endured throughout the years and will be difficult to change. Her book is an important contribution to the political science fields of campaigns and communications.

ALISON D. DAGNES
St. Lawrence University

The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond *by Bradley H. Patterson, Jr. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 492 pp. $30.00.*

In 1988, Bradley H. Patterson, Jr. published *Ring Of Power*, which crafted a skillful analysis of each of the major staffing units within the White House. This book updates the changes in White House staffing units that recent presidents have made since publication of *Ring of Power.* It includes additional material from the Bush and Clinton presidencies. Patterson, who served in the White House for Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, is one of the nation's leading authorities on the inner workings of the White House staff and of the executive branch. He also worked in the Department of State, the Peace Corps, and the Treasury Department and served as president of the American Society for Public Administration. His distinguished federal career provided a wealth of information as he wrote this outstanding book.

Each chapter carefully examines the major offices within the White House, such as the chief of staff, national security adviser, domestic policy adviser, and legislative affairs director. The strength of the book is that each chapter provides detailed background on when the staffing unit was created, why it was created by the president, and how it has evolved. Patterson, who has either worked with or knows most of the major players in the White House since the Eisenhower administration, interviewed hundreds of White House staffers as he was preparing the manuscript. In addition, he used the archival works from the presidential libraries for more detailed discussions of projects undertaken

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by the staffing units. The interviews, however, provide a treasure of candid discussions that are liberally sprinkled throughout the book. The Clinton staff members were particularly open with Patterson, providing information on how policy decisions were reached and the players who were part of those policy decisions. Few current books have the Clinton years as well documented as does this work.

Every staffing unit within the White House is thoroughly chronicled, with attention not only to the reasons for its inception, but also the reasons that various presidents enhanced or reduced the units' political power within the organizational structure of the White House. In some cases, as Patterson notes, the personality of the staffing unit's director moved the unit into a premier position, as Robert Rubin managed with the newly created Economic Policy Council or Henry Kissinger managed with the National Security staff. In other cases, the president's agenda empowered the staffing unit, as did the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs under Jimmy Carter or the Personnel Office under Ronald Reagan. Patterson also notes that some offices, such as scheduling, advance, and press must be handled by seasoned professionals to ensure that the daily activities of the president move without incident.

In addition to the traditional White House staffing units, Patterson includes chapters on the first lady as "first special counselor" and on the vice president "as second special counselor." Patterson views first ladies, no matter how visible, as significant counselors to the president. He also notes that "within the White House environment, the president's second and highly valued special counselor can be—and since 1977 has been—the vice president" (p 300). My only criticism is that this chapter was not longer, for its thirteen pages only touch on the relationship of presidents and vice presidents.

In sum, this is an extraordinary book that tremendously enhances the literature on presidential decision making and on White House staffing and organizational behavior. It is difficult to find fault with this work, given the author's attention to detail throughout the fifty years that the White House staff has developed.

SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW
Gettysburg College

The New Public Service *by Paul C. Light, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 190 pp. Paper, $12.95.*

Recent years have not been quiet ones for the nation's public service. The attitudes of most Americans toward the public sector have always been ambivalent. Desiring more and better services, the public exhibits perennial distrust of government institutions and the bureaucratic agencies that implement public policy. Particularly at the federal level, it appears that a nation that has grown

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ever more dependent on the federal government for services ranging from retirement security to health care to education has at the same time become ever more distrustful of public servants.

While we expect world class services from our public sector, Paul Light's important book raises serious questions about whether our public sector has the tools it needs to bring this about. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the competition for talented people. Whether it be low pay or overbureaucratized job structures, Light shows why the federal government is finding it increasingly difficult to compete for the best and brightest and retain them; he focuses on the career aspirations of the top graduates of schools of public policy and administration.

Based on a survey of five cohorts of the graduates of public policy and administration programs between 1973 and 1993, this study reveals that these students are turning away from the traditional careers in government service that their predecessors pursued. We learn that less than half of the most recent cohorts choose government as their first job after graduation, a sharp drop from twenty years earlier when over three-quarters of graduates chose government jobs. However, graduates have not given up on the idea of public service, but have realized that this calling can be pursued in a wider range of more heterogeneous organizational environments.

In this respect, they are not only the leading edge of what Light calls the new public service; they reflect emerging trends in governance. As government at all levels has come to rely on third parties—private profit and nonprofit entities—to deliver public services, these entities become a new venue for talented people interested in public service. When compared to traditional governmental agencies, Light's survey documents that public policy graduates value nonprofits for their sense of mission and flexibility and private companies for their opportunities for advancement. Clearly, government faces a more competitive environment, and Light argues that thick hierarchies, rule-bound processes, and limited opportunities for meaningful work keep government from offering the kind of challenging work necessary to draw and retain top people. The challenge for government, Light argues, is to recognize the inevitability of these trends and become more entrepreneurial and agile in adapting to both the new expectations of students and the changing face of the public sector.

Graduate public policy and administration programs face challenges as well. One of the book's best chapters analyzes the students' perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of their academic preparation for their careers. Most gave high marks to their programs overall and to the value of their degrees. Ironically, while students reported that their programs prepared them best for policy analysis, this dimension ranked seventh in the skills found to be most important in succeeding in their subsequent careers. Clear gaps in training existed, as graduates revealed important areas such as information technology and change management, which were not covered well in their programs.

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Moreover, only a minority of students working in nonprofit and private sectors found their graduate training to be adequate to prepare them for these sectors. Light concludes that graduate public policy programs need to emphasize these other sectors more explicitly in their courses lest they lose students to other academic competitors such as business schools or social work programs.

Light presents a grim portrait of the prospects for government, and his challenges are largely well framed. However, several caveats are in order. First, his analysis of government careers focuses exclusively on the federal government, even though many graduates work at the state and local level. One wonders whether his rather pessimistic assessment of federal careers carries through at the state and local level. Second, I found his conclusions about government agencies to be at times overdrawn. Although he suggests several times that government jobs are "dead-end" jobs, his survey reveals that government careers are still valued by graduates as providing opportunities to work on important and challenging issues. Many switch from nonprofit and private sectors to pursue these issues. Moreover, over 70 percent of the graduates of public administration programs still choose government as their first job.

Nonetheless, Light has shown in this book why he is among the leading scholars in public policy and administration today. This book goes beyond the description of the challenges to offer clear and compelling recommendations to the many sectors involved with the new public service. Although these prescriptions will hopefully prove convincing to many, we should not understate the formidable task facing government, in particular, in adapting to this new, more competitive public service. Improving compensation packages and promoting greater discretion for government agencies to design more flexible personnel systems are not readily embraced by legislatures and the public even in times of budgetary surpluses. The challenges facing government are even more daunting when peering into the future: facing an aging workforce, government agencies will be faced with an exodus of their most senior and knowledgeable staff, accentuating the need to attract new cadres of people into their ranks. The silver lining for government is that it has no choice but to change its practices. The emergence of third-party government means that government has lost not only its monopoly over service provision but also its grip over interesting work in the public sector, ironically to the sectors that it has empowered to act on its behalf. This newly competitive "new public service" may ultimately provide the impetus for the kind of public service reforms that have long been needed in government.

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Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona and California *by Beth Reingold. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 338 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

The study of women's role in politics is often motivated by the premise that "women make a difference." Beth Reingold challenges this premise. In a careful study of two state legislatures (California and Arizona) in 1990, Reingold uses survey data as well as contextual data to examine whether men and women legislators differ in their attitudes and behaviors. The answer is: sometimes, but not very often.

Reingold begins her book with an interesting and thorough review of what it means to say that "women in politics make a difference." Drawing on large and divergent literatures, Reingold presents dueling arguments regarding whether women legislators should be expected to act differently from their male colleagues. Some scholars argue that women's distinct experiences at home and in the workplace will lead women legislators to behave differently than men. However, other scholars disagree by explaining that women's interests are not monolithic and women's experiences are not identical. Therefore, it is overly simplistic to assume that the sex of the legislator will influence legislative action.

With these two opposing arguments carefully argued, Reingold sets out to see whether women make a difference. Her study is based on a comparison of state legislators in Arizona and California. The advantages of studying these two legislatures, according to Reingold, are their striking differences. For example, Reingold contrasts the political culture and the ideological profile of the two states as well as differences in the size and professionalization of the two legislatures.

Reingold spends the bulk of the book examining gender differences in various types of representational activities of men and women. For example, she looks at the amount of time men and women legislators spend on constituent-related activities. Contrary to her expectations, she finds that women legislators do not spend more time weighing the concerns, needs, or demands of their constituents, compared to their male colleagues. Similarly, she examines the roll-call voting of men and women legislators and finds more similarities than differences.

While the main message of Reingold's book is the lack of differences between men and women legislators, Reingold does find two instances of significant differences. First, in both California and Arizona, women legislators perceived more support from their female constituents, compared to the male legislators. The women legislators were also more likely to view themselves as representatives of women and women's issues. In addition, Reingold finds dramatic differences in the policy priorities of men and women legislators. Especially in Arizona, women in the legislature were more likely to be involved in "women issues" like education and health; while male legislators were more likely to work on "men's issues" like taxes, budget, and agriculture.

Reingold's book offers a very thorough and careful examination of the be-

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havior of men and women legislators in California and Arizona. I do have a few quibbles with the book. For example, Reingold does not spend enough time explaining why she fails to find gender differences when prior researchers have found clear differences between male and female elected officials. In addition, sometimes Reingold's analysis is based on a very small number of cases. For example, the analysis of legislative activities in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1) is based on eight female and twelve male California legislators. Therefore, it is difficult to control for important demographic information like party, ideology, and seniority. Finally, as Reingold admits, the study is limited because it is a case study of two state legislatures. Nevertheless, Reingold's book is a careful and important study that should be read by students and scholars of women and politics.

KIM KAHN
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Smelter Smoke in North America: The Politics of Transborder Pollution *by John D. Wirth. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2000. 264 pp. $35.00.*

John D. Wirth examines two historical transborder air pollution disputes—the Trail smelter case in British Columbia and the Phelps Dodge (PD) smelter in Arizona. The lead and zinc smelter in Trail, British Columbia, Canada was sued by farmers and landowners in Stevens County, Washington for damaged crops and forests in an action that was initially launched in 1926 and finally settled in 1941. Some forty-five years later, the Douglas Reduction Works (DRW) of the Phelps Dodge in Douglas, Arizona, was closed (1986) as a result of pressure exerted by environmentalists and environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs). The author overviews the underlying issues and players involved and compares how these disputes were resolved in two eras. This comparison allows John Wirth to determine whether or not there have been changes in dispute resolutions and outcomes in the forty-five years between these two cases.

The first three chapters of the book are devoted to an in-depth analysis of the Trail smelter dispute, which lasted from 1926 until its resolution in 1941. Wirth describes the conflict as a "David and Goliath dynamic . . . and when all is said and done, differences in political culture between Canadians and Americans were a factor" (p. 17). "David" referred to American settlers in Stevens County, Washington and "Goliath" was the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company in Trail, a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The International Joint Commission (IJC) awarded an initial damage award of $350,000 to the farmers in 1931, and a subsequent award of $78,000 was made in 1938 by a three-member arbitral tribunal. This package fell far short of the U.S. government's demand for more than $1 million in compensation. One of the more

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intriguing stories in this book is Wirth's explanation of why the IJP sided with Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company and its ally, the Canadian government. Wirth argues that the key factor explaining the outcome of the Trail smelter case was the "continentalization" of the mining and smelting industry. Trained Canadian and American mining engineers crossed the borders in both directions, exchanging and sharing technical information and management processes. This helped to explain that when Trail broke, the smelters hung together. Further, the acrimony that existed between the scientific teams of the United States and Canada was also very important. Rather than working together in determining the effect of smelter smoke on vegetation, U.S. and Canadian scientists discredited each other's scientific data. In the end, financial support of the Canadian scientists by Consolidated Mining and Smelting, while ethically flawed, was more forthcoming than government support for the American team. Despite all appearances of failure, there was an up side to the Trail dispute. This decision extended the polluter-pays doctrine to transborder cases. Moreover, concerned that future liability action might be forthcoming, Consolidated Mining and Smelting responded by introducing new methods for recovering waste by-products and limiting the air pollution problem. The significance of this was that it established a prevailing intellectual framework favouring a technical solution, rather than a regulatory one.

The PD case involved smelter smoke pollution on the Arizona–Sonora border from its DRW operation. This dispute developed against the backdrop of a much different time and revolved around the health effects associated with air pollution. The 1970 Clean Air Act enhanced the status and authority of science. This time around, there was a lead federal environmental agency—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—and a large number of ENGOs. Despite these new tools and actors, what transpired in the 1986 public hearings reflected that not much had changed in the forty-five years since the Trail dispute. Although there was more opposition than had been the case in Trail, the "old world was still there, as revealed in petitions from Douglas smelter workers, many of whom had Spanish surnames, asking the EPA to allow DRW to continue operations" despite being America's biggest polluter (p. 156). Moreover, this case revealed that neither Mexico nor the United States, as co-polluters, had any interest in invoking the polluter-pay doctrine that had been established as a precedent arising out of the Trail smelter dispute many years before.

This book is a well-written historical record of transboundary pollution disputes that not only established a number of important legal precedents but also revealed government reticence in going after industrial polluters. This does not bode well for future disputes arising from transborder environmental disputes among the three participant countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

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Johnson's War/Johnson's Great Society *by Jeffrey W. Helsing. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2000. 279 pp. $59.95.*

The central tension of Lyndon Johnson's presidency was his determination to build the Great Society programs in the face of the escalating Vietnam War. LBJ believed that World War II had stunted Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and Korea had gutted Harry Truman's Fair Deal. He was not about to let Vietnam destroy his Great Society.

That accounts for much of the way the war was waged—authorized by the congressional Tonkin Gulf Resolution, military actions tightly controlled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Johnson himself, costs hidden as long as possible. This strategy helped Johnson drive through Congress programs like Medicare and Medicaid, the first Aid to Elementary and Secondary Education Act, clean air and water legislation, the last massive housing program, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Endowment for the Arts, Office of Economic Opportunity poverty programs, and three monumental civil rights acts (employment and public access in 1964, voting rights in 1965, and fair housing in 1968).

In a detailed narrative of paper trails and meeting memos, the author chronicles the impact of Johnson's guns and butter commitment on economic policy. The president and Defense Secretary McNamara would have to accept the author's charge that by withholding information on the cost of the Vietnam War they seeded the inflation that eventually overtook the economy in the Nixon administration.

Unfortunately, the book is written in a vacuum that fails to capture the social and political context of these decisions: the civil rights movement; urbanization and mobility, which required creation of two new cabinet departments; nationalization of industry and finance, which made legislation (auto safety, truth in lending and packaging, wholesome meat, toy and other product safety) essential to protect the consumer; lack of health care for the elderly and poor. Nor does the author understand the race against time that the Great Society's crackle of hope set off. What the poor and black once accepted as inevitable became intolerable when LBJ showed them there was light at the end of the tunnel of their oppression.

The author naively upbraids Johnson for not seeking a tax increase when key congressional leaders repeatedly made it clear the Congress would never pass one. At one meeting I attended, when House Majority Leader Carl Albert told Johnson he could not get more than fifteen votes for such a measure, Minority Leader Gerald Ford snapped, "Not even that many!"

The book's fatal flaw is its conclusion that LBJ ended up "losing the war and his Great Society" (p. 256). Where does Jeffrey Helsing live? The civil rights laws have reshaped the nation; affirmative action, still controversial, nevertheless guides much academic and commercial activity; Medicare and Medicaid help millions of Americans; 60 percent of college students have grants and

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loans seeded in the 1965 Higher Education Act; public television and radio flourish; eleven of the twelve Office of Economic Opportunity programs are alive, well, and funded at $10 billion annually; each year more Head Start programs and community health centers are opened.

The political debate today is not whether to continue Great Society programs, but how to make them more effective. It's hard to think of any president who has left as enduring a mark on the nation. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith said in a speech at the LBJ Library on 23 November 1999, "Next only to Roosevelt, and in some respects more so, Lyndon Johnson was the most effective advocate of humane social change in the United States in this century."

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
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The Secret War Against Hanoi *by Richard Shultz. New York, HarperCollins, 2000. 408 pp. Paper, $15.00.*

Richard Shultz's subject is the eight-year-long covert war waged between 1964 and 1972 by the innocuously named Studies and Observation Group (SOG), which was part of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The book is based on both archival records and oral history interviews. The former consist of several thousand pages of MACVSOG records that had been released by 1995, plus an additional 1,500 pages that were declassified by the Defense Department and the CIA for Shultz's use. These are supplemented by interviews with more than sixty officers who ran SOG's various covert programs. Shultz also interviewed senior civilian officials charged with oversight of the covert war.

Shultz's account begins with President John Kennedy's January 1961 order to the CIA to initiate covert operations against North Vietnam. Kennedy's goal was a guerrilla campaign that would convince North Vietnam's rulers that it was not in their interest to sponsor insurgencies outside their borders. By the summer of 1962, Kennedy had grown so frustrated with the agency's inability to execute that mission that he ordered the U.S. military to take over and to expand the covert war. Chapter One tells the story of how the military took control of the covert war and describes SOG's Operational Plan 34A. Chapter Two describes the difficulties involved in creating SOG and launching the covert war.

Chapters Three through Six focus on SOG's four operational divisions, each of which was responsible for one part of the covert war: inserting agent teams into North Vietnam, psychological warfare, maritime operations, and cross-border operations in Laos and Cambodia. Chapter Seven considers the

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covert war's place in MACV's overall strategy for the war in Vietnam, while Chapter Eight focuses on civilian control of the covert war.

One question raised by Shultz's book is: Why did anyone believe that covert operations against North Vietnam would work, much less affect the outcome of the war in South Vietnam? Shultz himself notes that pre-1961 paramilitary operations of the kind that Kennedy wanted to conduct against North Vietnam had yielded few successes. Communist states were tough targets to penetrate, much less subvert. In effect, Kennedy was asking the CIA and later the military to undertake a mission that had failed repeatedly when tried against other communist states.

Shultz's admiration for the covert operators comes through clearly, as does his contempt for the "geostrategists" at the State Department, whom he sees as the principal impediment to the success of the covert war. But it was hardly the State Department's fault that most of the agent teams inserted into North Vietnam were captured almost immediately, before they could gather intelligence or engage in sabotage. Nor was it the State Department's fault that the maritime operations were mostly aborted by South Vietnamese commandos who collected their bonuses merely for leaving port, whether they reached their target or not. And it was hardly State's fault that SOG's South Vietnamese counterpart organization was so penetrated by communist spies that the North Vietnamese often knew about SOG's planned operations before they were even launched.

On balance, Shultz's book suggests that the covert war amounted to a lot of activity that produced little by way of results. There isn't a shred of evidence that anyone in Hanoi changed his mind about fighting on as a result of these operations. Compared to the ground war in the South and the air war over the North, the covert war amounted to little more than pinpricks. The North Vietnamese may have found these covert operations annoying, but hardly threatening.

WALLACE J. THIES
Catholic University of America

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 *by Qiang Zhai. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 304 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

Qiang Zhai's engaging study of China's involvement in Vietnam during the time of America's longest war is packed with new information, much of it gleaned from recently opened Chinese sources. And, as Marilyn Young did, Zhai uses his title to allude not just to the war in Vietnam, but to a host of other, often intertwined, conflicts attached to the bloody fighting there: to the

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ideological competition between China and the Soviet Union for socialist supremacy; to Mao Zedong's domestic political maneuvering as he faced criticisms of and challenges to his rule; to the tensions in the relationship between the Chinese and Vietnamese; and to the Sino-American antagonism (and its waning over time) that constituted the background for those two countries' involvements in Southeast Asia. Zhai includes extensive discussions of events in Laos and Cambodia during the period under investigation. The result is a well-rounded treatment of the complexities, nuances, and various intricacies between Chinese international and domestic affairs.

At the heart of the book is the story of China's first two and a half decades under communist leadership. Zhai explains Mao's decision to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam shortly after its creation in 1950 by concluding, "[w]hen Mao committed himself to revolution, he was determined to transform not only China but also the world" (p. 20). Revolution in Vietnam would help achieve that goal.

Four years later, the situation was different. With the substantial aid provided by the Peoples Republic of China, the Viet Minh had defeated the French. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, however, the Vietnamese suddenly found themselves without the backing of their two ideological allies, China and the Soviet Union, when it came to pressing their demands for control over all of Vietnam. The Soviets had their own reasons, principally their wish to ease tensions with the West. For their part, Mao and Zhou Enlai, smarting from the high costs of the recently concluded war in Korea and anxious that the Vietnamese had designs of their own for Laos and Cambodia, were in no mood to fight the Americans again. They pressured Pham Van Dong to accept a compromise settlement, not the last time the Chinese and Vietnamese would differ over what course of action to pursue.

Later that decade, Mao was prepared to reassert a radical line, both domestically and internationally. With the Great Leap Forward (GLF), Mao moved to undercut his critics at home. Abroad, he sought to put China ahead of the Soviet Union in appealing to national liberation movements. Mao disagreed with the Soviet leadership's decision to ease tensions with the United States. By the early 1960s, however, China was backing away from its radical position, largely because of changed domestic circumstances, mainly the famine and starvation caused by the GLF. And so it went throughout the war—"the close linkage between Mao's domestic politics and international policy" (p. 221). Interestingly enough, Zhai concludes that like the United States, "China also failed in Vietnam" (p. 220), since after 1975 the relationship between China and Vietnam took a drastic turn for the worse.

Although Zhai includes two maps and one table illustrating the extent of China's military assistance to Vietnam from 1964 to 1975, the entire focus of the sixteen other illustrations is of Chinese and Vietnamese leaders meeting (even hugging) at airports, toasting each other at banquets, or pictures of Chi-

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nese advisers in Vietnam. Zhai's emphasizes the decisions made by political leaders in China, particularly Mao Zedong, and elucidates their reasons for acting as they did. By concluding as he does, Zhai raises the provocative question of how differently China's involvement in Vietnam might have been under other leadership.

T. CHRISTOPHER JESPERSEN
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Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy *by Tony Smith. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000. 190 pp. $35.00.*

Who speaks for America in world affairs? This is the question that preoccupies Tony Smith in his new and provocative book. Smith argues that ethnic groups in America play a larger role than is often appreciated by students of U.S. foreign policy and that the negative consequences of that role may well outweigh the positive effects of their activism. Smith's treatment of these issues is nuanced and complex, rooted more in the ponderings of democratic theory than in the empiricism of social science. He does not challenge the right of ethnic groups to pursue their interests, but he does wish to see that pursuit tempered by the obligations we all share to the national community. Smith sees himself as a pluralist, a bridge between the unbridled optimism of multiculturalists and the unending pessimism of their nationalist critics. He spends much of his time examining an enduring problem of democratic citizenship: "how to balance the rights and interests of the organized few against the rights and interests of the often inattentive many" (p. 3). This is made even more difficult today, Smith argues, because "the end of the Cold War has weakened the American state relative to the society so that in many domains interest groups are gaining in strength" (p. 30).

Smith examines the historic roots of ethnic group activism in twentieth-century America, noting that between the 1910s and the 1930s ethnic groups "acted as a drag on American involvement in world affairs" (p. 47). Conversely, these groups became part of America's internationalist majority during the cold war. Since then, Smith argues that ethnic-group internationalism has increased at the same time that bipartisanship in foreign policy and consensus about U.S. foreign policy priorities has decreased. This, plus "the reassertion of the power of society relative to the state," has combined to lead more than ever before to "the ethnic group moment in the making of American foreign policy" (p. 48). Smith draws on a wide range of examples to show this pattern of ethnic interest group activism and to examine how ethnic groups bring pressure to bear on the political establishment.

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Smith concludes that ethnic groups have every right to organize and make themselves heard in the U.S. foreign policy arena, but "they do not have exclusive and unlimited license to determine that policy" (p. 133). His book to this point presents a full slate of examples that look very much like such a license. He posits that in the absence of a real crisis the answer to the question "who speaks for America?" is likely: "special interests do" (p. 94). Smith cannot be blamed if his book is better at identifying the problem than mapping its solution. At least he points in the right direction: Madisonian democratic theory.

This is a balanced and thoughtful book, even if it lacks some of the systematic treatment of cases and evidence that one might like to see. Smith should also say more about two related points he raises: the extent to which elites rouse ethnic activism in support of their preferred policies (rather than the other way around), and the relative power of ethnic and business interest groups. Several times Smith seems to suggest that ethnic interest groups may not be the most powerful organized interests on the playing field: what, then, are? Despite its shortcomings, this is a very good read and, given the results of the 2000 census, its implications are likely to be even more profoundly felt in the years to come.

PATRICK J. HANEY
Miami University

Conflict Amid Consensus in American Trade Policy *by Martha Gibson. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2000. 213 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $17.95.*

In this book, Martha Gibson both describes and analyzes some of the broad historical patterns of American trade politics, with a particular focus on the U.S. Congress. As she sees it, history poses a puzzle: Why do we see the "persistence of partisan conflict and legislation supporting various forms of protection amid bipartisan support for a liberal trade regime" (p. 2)? Gibson's argument is that legislators are motivated not just by their policy beliefs, but also by electoral considerations and by the decision-making structures of Congress. She sees this as a "nested game" in which "legislators engage as trade policy makers, a role that is nested within a competitive electoral game, which in turn is nested within an institutional context" (p. 20).

Gibson models trade politics in terms of two binary variables: constituency pressures on Congress (either "overlapping" or "polarized") and congressional decision-making structures (either "centralized" or "decentralized"). When constituents are polarized and congressional power is centralized, we see swings in trade politics with shifts in control of Congress, as in the immediate post-world war II era. A "fortuitous alignment" of overlapping constituency interests and centralized institutional structures in Congress explains the rela-

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tive lack of conflict over trade issues in the 1970s (p. 2). Trade became more contentious in the 1980s, when Congress decentralized decision making, thus opening the door to constituency pressures, a process only partly reversed by the reassertion of leadership control in the 1990s.

The strength of Gibson's approach is that it has enough moving parts to capture dynamics missed by more parsimonious models that focus exclusively on international, internal congressional, or societal factors. Clearly, trade policy beliefs, constituency pressures, and institutional structures all affect legislative behavior in trade politics, and the nested games approach allows Gibson to demonstrate the interaction among them. The framework produces an insightful and generally plausible interpretation of a key dynamic at work in American trade politics.

Gibson makes a good case for thinking in terms of nested games, but the framework could be pushed further. Here she uses nested games as broad metaphor, but one could specify more precisely how nesting works. Similarly, Gibson generally treats institutional structure as exogenous. But much of the congressional structure for trade policy making—fast track, for example—is endogenous and could be analyzed profitably in terms of a nested game in which moves in an institutional structure game are also moves in trade policy and electoral politics games.

A necessary hazard of simple taxonomies is that categories are too broad to capture important aspects of what is going on. To her credit, Gibson recognizes this in her historical descriptions, noting, for instance, that in the 1990s Congress was at once centralized with respect to party leadership but decentralized with respect to committee responsibilities, and thus not easily characterized. Similarly, she notes that today the degree of constituency consensus depends on the specific issue, as evidenced in the difference in the level of conflict in the North American Free Trade Agreement and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs votes of 1993 and 1994. These are useful observations, but they are also indications of the limitations of the model.

Gibson's focus in this book is on the traditional issues of trade: tariffs and quotas, dumping and retaliation. Constituency pressures are treated as either protectionist or free trade. But the big issues in trade today are very different from what they were in mid-twentieth century. To be sure, traditional issues remain; but services, competition policy, intellectual property, and, most importantly, the social issues of labor and environment are in essence regulatory issues, which engender a different kind of politics. In the battle over whether to give President Bill Clinton fast track authority in 1997, for example, the crucial issue was how to link labor and environment, and in this nested game there was no consensus.

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The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis *by Stephan Haggard. Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 2000. 280 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Few events have shaken the foundation of globalization as strongly as the financial crisis that hit Asia in 1997. Stephan Haggard provides a detailed, wide-ranging, and comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of this crisis. Noting that "the striking feature of the debates among economists [about the crisis] is the absence of systematic political analysis," Haggard sets out to detail the role politics played in the genesis and management of, as well as the recovery from, the crisis (p. 7). In its focus on the pre-crisis period, the book explores how business–government relations created moral hazard; in its focus on crisis management, the book explores how political uncertainty shaped governments' abilities to respond effectively to the crisis. Most of the book is devoted to three aspects of postcrisis politics—political change, corporate and financial restructuring, and the social consequences of the crisis.

The book's strong point lies in its detailed case studies of the countries most severely affected by the crisis. Particularly good are the treatments of the nature of government–business relations prior to the crisis (chapter 1), of the political changes that followed from the crisis (chapter 3), and of the consolidation of corporations and financial institutions enacted in the period immediately following the crisis (chapter 4). In each of these chapters, Haggard provides detailed information about what governments tried to achieve and evaluates the extent to which they were successful. The result is a comprehensive account of the evolution of the policy responses to the crisis that is not elsewhere available. For those interested in learning why the crisis developed and how governments responded to the crash, this book is indispensable.

The book's primary weakness is its absence of theoretical explanation for the policy responses so ably described. The book fails to go much beyond the standard democracy versus nondemocracy distinction, and this institutional dichotomy provides little analytical leverage. As a consequence, the book never presents a clear picture of the central societal cleavages that drove postcrisis politics. Such a picture could have been generated by a more systematic reliance upon economic theory. For example, it could have been quite illuminating to employ a simple economic model to explore how capital inflows and outflows, and the resulting exchange rate appreciations and depreciations, affected returns to various economic sectors. One could have used such an approach to specify the central cleavages along which postcrisis politics fell. Was the central cleavage between the traded and the nontraded goods sectors, between the financial sector and firms operating in the real economy, or between the export-oriented and import-competing industries? Of course, such an approach might not have been able to explain everything of importance about postcrisis politics, but it would have offered a good first cut.

The lack of a theoretical framework limits the book's conclusions in two ways. First, it is difficult to evaluate why Asian governments responded to the

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crisis as they did, or why some governments responded differently than others. Second, in the absence of a broader framework, it is difficult to draw broader conclusions about the political economy of financial crises. One might want to know, for example, whether the Asian experience was distinctive or whether it was instead a fairly typical crisis. Thus, while this book is likely to become the standard account of the Asian crisis and response, one must look elsewhere if one wants to place this crisis in a broader theoretical and empirical context.

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The New World Order: Contrasting Theories *edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin. New York, Palgrave at St. Martin's Press, 2001. 254 pp. $69.95.*

In this collection, two Danish research scholars have edited a very thoughtful review of the strands of theory emerging since 1989 about the future of international relations. The book will be of great value to any graduate student in the field, but is also quite readable, so that it will be of use in advanced undergraduate courses and of interest to many general readers.

The collection includes five West European authors (two of them the editors of the book) and four Americans and provides a broad perspective on a topic too often dominated by American scholars. But even more important, each of the authors, whether widely known on the basis of previous publications or less widely known, has been persuaded to stand back and reflect on the array of issues that have been raised.

The first two chapters, by Kenneth Waltz, predicting a rapid shift from American predominance to the multipolar array suggested by classic balance-of-power consideration, and by James Rosenau, arguing for a total redefinition of concepts and categories in how we view international relations, are useful summaries of the kinds of reasoning these major analysts have often put forward in the past, in effect a summary of what they would recommend as analysis to anyone entering the field.

The third chapter by Randall Schweller offers a thoughtful discussion of the democratic peace, of the ways in which domestic democracy may be expected to moderate and change international interactions. Michael William's fourth chapter, discussing the varieties of post-modern theory as they affect international relations, is thoughtful and reflective; it sorts out the big ideas, and provides an exhaustive and useful survey of the literature.

Birthe Hansen's chapter probes the possibility that a unipolar world order dominated by the United States may be more viable and beneficial than Kenneth Waltz or other realists would have believed. Charles Kupchan follows with a sixth chapter ably summarizing some of his earlier publications, arguing that

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there will be a decline in American preponderance, but that this can be managed, in a context of American benign intentions toward the outside world, to maintain a relatively peaceful international system.

Bertel Heurlin follows with a reflective discussion of the continuing limits that nuclear weapons impose on warfare; outbreaks of international conflict have to be seen, strategically and theoretically, as virtual warfare. Michael Cox presents a fair-minded overview of the state of Marxist and other radical theory in the aftermath of the 1989 collapse of communist rule. Henrik Larsen addresses the European Union as it interacts with various kinds of theoretical discourse.

This introductory survey of the theoretical debates about the new world order in international relations comments on a great deal of the literature. Much more than an introduction, this book will be a hard one to match.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland"? *edited by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry P. Pachon. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 192 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.95.*
Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America *by Juan González. New York, Viking, 2000. 346 pp. Cloth, $27.95; paper, $15.00.*

With the release of the year 2000 census data, the nation is again amazed by the rapid growth of the Latino population. A quick dissection of these data demonstrates the roots of the growth—unprecedented levels of immigration, both legal and undocumented, from throughout the Americas. Although immigration has long been part of the nation's and the Latino community's experience, its impact on the structure of the nation's politics has often been neglected. Instead, the exclusion, demand-making, and tentative political incorporation of U.S.–citizen Latinos, most of whom are U.S.–born, has been the primary focus of the Latino politics scholarship. As a result of the dearth of scholarly attention to Latino migration and its impact on U.S. politics, commonly held myths shape popular understandings. Greatest among these is the notion that Latino immigration is a new phenomenon and that Latino immigrants remain loyal to countries of origin; and if empowered, they might undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Americas. Rodolfo de la Garza and Harry Pachon's *Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland?"* and Juan González's *Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America* undermine these myths and demonstrate the foundations for a Latino politics driven by the U.S.-focused policy needs of Latino immigrants and their children.

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Juan González, a *New York Daily News* columnist and long-time community activist, seeks to undermine popular perceptions that Latino immigration is a new phenomenon. He identifies the root of contemporary Latino immigration not in the twentieth century, but in the nineteenth, and arguably before. He also positions Latino immigration as a natural outgrowth of U.S. imperialism and economic expansion. From the filibusters of the pre–Civil War era to the transfer of manufacturing jobs to low wage nations today, González argues that Latino immigration is a natural result of U.S. economic and political involvement in the Americas. In this shared history of economic and political exploitation by the United States, González finds the roots of a pan-ethnic Latino identity.

González identifies four issues that shape contemporary Latino relations with the majority population: politics, language, free trade/relations with Latin America, and the status of Puerto Rico. Another issue that drives the ultimate success of the notion of *a* Latino community is whether U.S.–born Latinos and immigrants will be able to develop a common identity and politics. Gonzalez's study weakens somewhat as it moves into analysis of the modern era. He correctly notes the diversification of the Latino population and nicely builds the different histories of Latino national-origin groups. Yet he fails to unite these histories into a coherent analysis of what builds today's Latino identity beyond the shared pressures to migration in Latin America. This problem becomes particularly evident in the discussion of the four key Latino policy issues; he does not make a strong case for the ways in which these issues unite Latinos or build a Latino political community. The status of Puerto Rico, in particular, is not an issue of much Latino interest outside of Puerto Rican populations despite arguably being a paradigm for the long-term consequences of U.S. intervention in the Americas.

Rodolfo de la Garza and Harry Pachon examine a second myth of Latino migration, specifically that the politics of Latinos generally or Latino immigrants more narrowly are driven by the foreign policy agendas of their countries of origin or ancestry. Reporting on the results of a multilayered research project on Latino attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, they demonstrate conclusively that Latinos have only a modest interest in foreign policy. Where they have firmly developed attitudes, they are broadly in accord with the objectives of U.S. foreign policy. To answer the question raised in the book's title, Latino politics is not that of the homeland, though the needs of family members abroad are of concern to Latinos. Their evidence includes surveys of Latino mass and elite option, analysis of immigrant-sending country policies toward their émigrés, analysis by senior foreign ministry representatives from major Latin American immigrant-sending countries, and scholarly interpretations of the role of Latinos in the making of U.S. foreign policy.

One of the most fascinating sections is the set of chapters by senior Latin American foreign ministry representatives. The surge in emigration from the Americas and the growing political influence of Latinos in the United States

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has created an opportunity that these countries have sought to tap. Specifically, they have sought to reinvigorate their ties to their émigrés. These include such efforts as Mexico's enactment of dual-nationality for its U.S.–naturalized émigrés and the U.S.-born children of Mexican immigrants or Colombia's discussion of granting parliamentary representation to expatriates abroad. For the most part, these governments do not yet fully see their émigrés as having separated themselves from their countries of origin; yet they overstate the importance of their émigrés to U.S. politics. In other words, Latin American foreign policy elites hold the same mistaken views of Latinos that the U.S. public does.

The surge in immigration from the Americas over the past thirty-five years has spurred an unprecedented cultural and demographic change that the United States is only beginning to come to grips with. These books seek to assess the impact of large-scale and sustained immigration from one part of the world on the process on the national body politic. González demonstrates that the roots of the answer to this question must account for the long history of relations with the other nations of the Americas. The tie that most if not all Latinos have to immigration is one of the cores of the contemporary development of a pan-ethnic Latino identity. Offering cautionary evidence to González's broad-brush approach, de la Garza and Pachon find that Latinos' roots in immigration do not engender strikingly different views of what U.S. foreign policy toward the Americas should be. Instead, the needs of family members abroad and home communities link Latinos to the Americas. But, as those personal ties decline, so does interest in the Americas. As a result, the common Latino identity, constructed in part around a shared experience with migration, will manifest itself around a domestic policy agenda based on common needs.

LOUIS DESIPIO
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Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice *by Katja Weber. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2000. 195 pp. Cloth, $62.50; paper, $20.95.*

This book seeks to explain the advent of highly integrated military alliances, particularly confederations. Katja Weber argues that the key preconditions are a high external threat plus high transaction costs that impede more independent alliance cooperation. Drawing on the theory of relational contracting, originally developed to explain the profitability of hierarchical firms, Weber hypothesizes four sources of transaction costs. First, asset specificity, arising from military specialization for coalition warfare or from reliance on specific geographic strongholds, raises the potential costs of relying on allies. Second, uncertainty about allied reliability makes investment in specific assets risky. Third

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and fourth, underdeveloped communication technology and cultural heterogeneity impede communication and coordination among allies.

Weber claims that integrated alliance institutions reduce these impediments to cooperation and thus become attractive to states facing dangerous common enemies. She adds the provisos that states must experience roughly symmetric threats and transaction costs to confederate, and that the threats must not be so immediate as to preclude time-consuming institution building.

Eight case studies are presented to test the theory: the Prusso-Russian, Austro-Prusso-Russian, and Quadruple Alliances at the culmination of the Napoleonic Wars; the German and Swiss confederations and the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance following Napoleon's defeat; the founding of NATO and the abortive European Defense Community (EDC) negotiations in the early 1950s. Weber concludes that transaction costs matter, though primarily from asset specificity and uncertainty rather than technology and heterogeneity.

The argument, though thought provoking, is not very persuasive. Controlled comparisons are difficult with so many explanatory conditions, and Weber provides no process-tracing evidence to support her historical interpretations—for example, officials' estimates of the utility of integration for overcoming these obstacles to cooperation. As she admits, the threat was too pressing to establish complex institutions to combat Napoleon in 1813 and 1814, so the chapter on these cases merely infers what might have been had there been more breathing room. Asymmetric threat perceptions and transaction costs in the NATO and EDC cases make it difficult to detect the impact of transaction costs on their outcomes too.

If the theory works anywhere, it should explain the German and Swiss confederations. But Weber finds that asset specificity was low for the former, if not for the latter, because of the strategic importance of its Alpine passes. The German states were similar culturally, unlike the Swiss cantons, so this variable doesn't help either. Communication technology was primitive for both, but this was the case for all the nineteenth-century cases examined in the book.

Uncertainty prevailed among both the Germans and Swiss, according to Weber's assessment of their past internecine conflicts, but such uncertainty is ubiquitous in international politics. Weber also mentions the number of partners as a source of uncertainty for the twenty-two Swiss cantons. This idea should have been developed further, since the German confederation also involved many weak states and because collective action is harder to orchestrate among the many than among the few. Collective action problems also help explain the 1950s, as well as current temptations for European military integration.

But shoe-horning collective action variables into Weber's multifaceted transaction cost framework would be less parsimonious and would explain little more than a simpler, collective-action explanation. Security interdependence (or, in relational contracting terms, joint production economies) might also be a more useful variable than military asset specificity, which is historically rare.

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It would subsume asset specificity while also capturing the vulnerability to rapid offensives that also promotes alliance tightness and integration, such as occurred in NATO.

PETER LIBERMAN
Queens College, City University of New York

The Making of the Taiwan Relations Act *by David Tawei Lee. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 217 pp. $35.00.*

The simultaneous announcement in Washington and Beijing on 15 December 1978 that the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) would soon establish diplomatic relations shocked not only the government and people of Taiwan, but also the U.S. Congress. Following the example set by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, President Jimmy Carter and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski secretly negotiated the normalization of Sino-American relations with their Chinese counterparts. Congressional leaders in both parties, angry at not being consulted, were convinced that the conditions of normalization, requiring that the United States sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954, posed a significant threat to Taiwan's security and freedom. Determined to reassert legislative prerogatives in foreign policy and bolstered by opinion polls showing widespread support for Taiwan, Congress initiated the process that resulted in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of April 1979. For more than twenty years, the TRA, which asserted a continuing American interest in Taiwan's security, has been the foundation of the quasi-official ties between the United States and Taiwan.

This informative monograph by David Tawei Lee, a distinguished diplomat from Taiwan, was originally a 1986 doctoral dissertation at the University of Virginia. Based on interviews and research conducted in the mid-1980s, Lee's study provides a meticulous account of the legislative history of the TRA that is a model for understanding how Congress operates in the arena of foreign affairs. He demonstrates how the Senate foreign relations leadership of Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Jacob Javits (R-New York) and their House counterparts Clement Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) and Lester Wolff (D-New York), acting under severe time constraints, skillfully wove the strands of conflicting congressional opinion into a workable compromise that accomplished the twin objectives of reasserting congressional prerogatives and providing a mechanism and set of operational guidelines to ensure Taiwan's security while allowing U.S.–China normalization to proceed.

Writing as a scholar rather than a partisan, only occasionally does Lee allow his irritation with Carter administration officials, who had scant regard for Tai-

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wan, to surface in this objective recounting of the process that resulted in the TRA. However, Lee makes it clear that the forceful assertion by Congress of an American interest in Taiwan's continued security and prosperity was the critical factor that overcame the administration's reluctance to risk Beijing's ire. Predictably, Chinese Communist leaders viewed and continue to view TRA as unwarranted American meddling in what they deem Chinese internal affairs.

Lee's concluding chapter assesses the impact of the TRA from the vantage of twenty years later, during which time the cold war ended, China emerged as a global power, and Taiwan underwent a remarkable transformation from authoritarian state to multiparty, pluralist democracy. Keenly aware of the challenges that Taiwan faces, Lee sees the TRA as a core element in the Asia Pacific security equation that has allowed Taiwan to prosper in the face of unremitting PRC hostility and Beijing's refusal to accept Taipei as an equal partner in negotiating the long-term reunification of China. Lee calls TRA a triumph of political realism that demonstrates the "virtues of moderation and prudence . . ." (p. 179). Within an American political context, it is certainly remarkable that legislation created under pressure has withstood the test of time and continues to provide an effective framework for governing the relations between the United States and Taiwan even in the absence of formal relations between the two states. Lee's study also serves as a pointed reminder of the need to keep U.S.–Taiwan relations in good repair at a time when they are likely to sustain new assaults from impatient PRC leaders determined to bring Taiwan under their control despite the contrary political will of the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
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After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars *by G. John Ikenberry. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. 293 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

This book seeks to explain the creation of international institutions in the postwar settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945, and the scope and durability of the last of these. Ikenberry argues that the dominant state's military and economic lead and the prospective partners' democratic qualities are key. Hegemony provides both resources and incentives for leading states to establish binding multilateral institutions, which lower the enforcement costs of maintaining a favorable order. Institutional restraints on the hegemon's power appeal to lesser states too. Democracies are better able to commit to institutions, due to their decision-making transparency, policy-making hurdles, and accessibility to foreign lobbying.

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In a series of case studies, G. John Ikenberry shows that the overall patterns of institution building in 1815, 1919, and 1945 are broadly consistent with these expectations. The predominant state's lead was far greater in 1945 (the United States) than in 1815 (Britain) or in 1919 (the United States), and democracy was more prevalent in 1945 as well. Accordingly, the post-1945 alliances and economic regimes were far more extensive and binding than the consultative arrangements established in 1815 and 1919. A final chapter on the 1990s shows that the institutions forged during the cold war show no signs of weakening despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ikenberry gives some attention to competing explanations, though he does so rather intermittently. He acknowledges that the post-1945 order was bolstered by the cold war rivalry, but points out that certain plans preceded recognition of the Soviet threat. Lessons of the recent past are also invoked to help explain American officials' post-World War II views of European order. The author argues that institutional persistence after the Soviet collapse contravenes the predictions of realist balance-of-power theory, while acknowledging that a single decade may not pose a critical test. (A realist hegemonic theory of order, though, would predict institutional persistence while the United States remains a predominant power.)

Ikenberry uses process-tracing evidence about the assumptions and causal mechanisms of his theory, but with mixed success. He nicely shows how Britain in 1814 and the United States as early as 1941 used allies' wartime dependence to extract commitments to their preferred visions of postwar order. But little evidence is produced to show that democracies have favored each other as partners because of their facility with international institutions, rather than, say, their common foreign policy goals.

The book is also more persuasive on the value of institutions for committing the hegemon's power than for restraining it. Institutions may restrain lesser states. Tying up German power in European integration and NATO after 1945 made it more palatable to France and Britain. Ikenberry argues Soviet leaders felt the same way when confronted with the prospect of German reunification in 1990, though the evidence here is weaker and mixed. But the postwar orders of 1815, 1919, and 1945 called for expanding the hegemons' power and commitments, not curtailing its power or ambitions. As Ikenberry acknowledges, Britain and the United States were reluctant hegemons for reasons outside their interest in order.

This undercuts the book's central policy conclusion—American power must remain harnessed to institutions to avoid frightening and provoking other states. One might surmise alternatively that reducing American commitments and power would achieve this goal just as well, whatever the consequences might be for stability among lesser powers. All in all, however, this is a thought-provoking and elegantly written book and an important contribution to our understanding of postwar orders and institutions.

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Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons *edited by Peter Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirth. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 270 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

This is a very useful and long overdue book. Unlike most other treatises, which focus on emergent proliferators as problems for the international nonproliferation regime, this volume describes how countries like Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, as well as terrorist groups (potentially) treat their preferred weapons of mass destruction from the perspective of declaratory, procurement, deployment, and employment doctrine. The book assesses how these strategic instruments are controlled within existing state structures. Much of this information is not available in ready form, because new proliferators usually do not discuss their acquisition rationales, their use doctrines, or their command and control systems in any open, expository, or comprehensive fashion. Analyzing these issues, therefore, requires painstaking detective work by regional analysts who have to piece together coherent explanations on the basis of fragmentary, incomplete, and often conflicting evidence.

This book represents a valuable survey of these matters, even though the individual chapters vary in quality and, more important, differ in style of treatment and in point of departure. Timothy V. McCarthy's and Jonathan B. Tucker's chapter on Iraq and Gregory F. Giles's chapter on Iran, for example, are detailed analyses of the Iraqi and Iranian programs that are substantially unified by the use (and threats) of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) witnessed during the Gulf wars. Similarly, Avner Cohen's chapter on Israel—which actually reveals previously unknown details about the Israeli nuclear program—focuses entirely on how Israel's attitudes toward nuclear weaponry were both forged and exhibited in the crucible of the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli conflicts.

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu's chapter on India focuses predominantly on how the Indian military, which had no organic association with the country's nuclear weapons program, attempted to cope with the changing strategic environment during the 1980s, but whether these developments could properly speaking be described as India's nuclear doctrine is another matter altogether. The chapters dealing with Pakistan, North Korea, and terrorism, though interweaving a variety of conflicts in the background, lack the sturdy anchors that conflict episodes or crises provide for purposes of analysis. This, however, proves to be an advantage, because it compels the authors to step back and assess the motivations, worldviews, and strategic interests of their subjects in more generic terms. Zafar Iqbal Cheema's chapter on Pakistan is a very useful overview of why Islamabad pursued nuclear weapons, but it is unfortunately incomplete because of the numerous developments in Pakistani doctrine and command and control arrangements that have occurred since this chapter was completed.

Joseph S. Bermudez's chapter on North Korea is state-of-the-art insofar as it brings together in very concise form the best of what is known at the unclassi-

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fied level about North Korea's unconventional weapons programs. Jessica Stern's chapter on superterrorism engages the knotty question of whether future terrorists are actually likely to inflict mass death given the traditional belief that what terrorists really want is simply a lot of people watching. Scott Sagan's conceptual chapter on "The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems" serves as the volume's unifying article insofar as it examines three models derived from political realism, organizations theory, and strategic culture as competing explanations for how doctrines and control systems developed by emerging proliferators might evolve. Although Sagan's piece by itself is comprehensive and illuminating, its use by several of the other contributors often adds little to their analyses and on occasion appears forced and distracting.

Empirical analysis obviously must be theoretically informed, but good empirical research does not always require self-conscious theoretical embellishing that incessantly aims to prove the superiority of some particular conceptual framework. Given the absence of reliable evidence on many of the issues examined in this volume, the quest for meaningful refutations of various theories may be simply chimerical at this stage of the research enterprise. In any event, political realism, organizations theory, and strategic culture are not theories per se (unless carefully specified as such) but rather metaphysical research programs. Consequently, they do not lend themselves to easy refutation by any simple accumulation of anomalous evidence. If some of the distracting theoretical garniture is disregarded, however, the concluding chapter by Lewis A. Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy, and Scott D. Sagan can easily be accepted as an excellent summation of what is known about the doctrinal and control systems adopted by emerging proliferators. The book as a whole remains a valuable introduction to how these states view their strategic capabilities and seek to control them in order to achieve certain desired political ends.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS
RAND

Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy *by Robert S. Litwak. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 290 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

In the post-cold war era, U.S. foreign policy has shifted its focus toward states like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, which threaten American security through their efforts to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or to support terrorism. These so-called rogue states are the subject of a great deal of fuzzy thinking in U.S. foreign policy decision making, and Litwak sets out to promote a more nuanced and sophisticated foreign policy strategy.

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The book reads primarily as a critique of Clinton administration policy, but it can certainly serve as an analytical starting point for any administration. In the author's view, the Clinton administration wrongly developed a one-size-fits-all policy toward very different states that were demonized under the rogue state category. Litwak reminds the reader that the use of the rogue label is quite American and stems from the traditional American view of the world as a struggle between good and evil. He discusses how U.S. administrations historically have had a need to exaggerate threats in order to mobilize public support. In the case of rogues, not only does the policy outcome get the United States into trouble with its allies, but it makes flexibility in approach—and in particular getting a country off the rogue list—quite difficult.

Litwak relies heavily on a way of thinking about foreign policy most often associated with political scientist Alexander George, and the result is an extraordinarily rich analysis. Litwak does a terrific job carrying out the George-type exercise of developing a list of factors that policy makers should consider when seeking to put together a differentiated strategy for modifying the behavior of the target state. Litwak describes three different strategies toward these states of concern: rollback, which relies on overt efforts to change a regime; comprehensive containment— the favored policy of the Clinton administration toward rogue states—which seeks to isolate a country politically and economically while deterring it militarily; and conditional containment, which folds an engagement policy into a containment strategy. Litwak demonstrates that the Clinton administration was forced to adopt this third strategy toward North Korea because it was faced with a highly developed nuclear weapons program in a country undergoing crisis and maintaining a heavy conventional deployment bordering a U.S. ally—and it worked. Particularly useful is Litwak's effort to distinguish conditional containment from appeasement. The former, he argues, offers inducements for the target state that are tied to specific behavioral changes; the reward comes after, not before, a particular step is taken; and the strategy can be stopped at any time if the target state starts reneging.

In addition to the excellent analytical framework, Litwak provides three detailed case studies—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The appendix includes several useful documents, including National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's 1994 articulation of the Clinton policy, CNN correspondent Christiane Amanpour's 1998 interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.

The reader finds himself disappointed at the end only because the concluding chapter merely recaps the main points, and these points are already repeated throughout the study. One is waiting for the author to lay out a specific strategy for dealing with Iran and Iraq. But the book offers only the general prescription of which categories to use to figure out a policy. Still, given the history and analysis Litwak provides, this book is a must read for analysts, policy makers, and students.

JAMES M. GOLDGEIER
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Spaniards and Nazi Germany *by Wayne Bowen. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2000. 250 pp. $34.95.*

Apologists for Franco have always argued that the wiley Caudillo saved Spain from the horrors of World War II by obstructing Hitler's plan to bring Spaniards into an alliance and by removing Naziphiles from positions of power in the Spanish government. Wayne Bowen marshalls new evidence from his interviews with old Francoists and from his meticulous work in Spanish archives to support these claims.

Bowen focuses on members of the *falange*, Spain's minuscule fascist party. His work is a pleasure to read, for its pages are filled with fascinating people—right-wing film makers, Naziphile activists and writers, expatriates in Berlin, and soldiers of the Blue Division fighting for the Axis on the Eastern Front. They did their best to serve the fascist New Order to the bitter end, even when Franco turned against them. Bowen succeeds in his "attempt to retrieve some of the enthusiasm felt for Nazi Germany" (p. 11) and is right to insist that we we pay more attention to fascism's many "fellow travelers" (p. 228). Bowen provides an invaluable service by unearthing so many new details about Spanish supporters of the New Order, who are an embarrassment to almost everyone in Spain today and who are therefore usually forgotten.

Readers will discover that Bowen is not interested in the relationship of most Spaniards to Nazi Germany, as the title of the book may seem to suggest. For example, Republican prisoners and starving workers, sent by Franco as slave laborers to Nazi Germany, receive mention but little sympathy (pp. 128–130), for the author is not really concerned with what these workers and prisoners thought about being Nazi slaves. Enslaved "communists" were simply Franco's way of repaying his debt to Hitler for helping to crush the Spanish Republic in the Civil War (1936–1939). They didn't matter to Franco, and they are not really the Spaniards Bowen has in mind either.

Readers may also be unsettled by some of Bowen's more dramatic claims. Chief among these is the author's counterfactual speculation that in 1940 "the Spanish dictator could have altered the course of World War II in favor of the Axis" by choosing to aid Hitler (p. 225). Does this mean that Franco won the war for the allies? This sounds strangely like Franco's own propaganda, which portrayed him as the "Sentinel of the West." Bowen also makes the complementary argument that "Hitler made a strategic blunder of monumental proportions" by not forcing Franco's hand in order to seize Gibraltar (p. 80). These speculations give too much credit to the importance of Spain and the chances of the Nazi regime. They sound like the nostalgia of unreconstructed Francoists and Naziphiles. It may be that the influence of such men, through the interviews they gave to Bowen, reached a little too close to home. A different explanation of these events, supported by other historians of contemporary Spain, is that Franco escaped entanglement with the Axis because Hitler despised the Spanish head of state and didn't see much value in allying himself

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with a bankrupt regime that had brought famine and unemployment to Spain, whose miltary forces were in disarray, and which enjoyed the hatred of half of all Spaniards. The blunder would have been to send German armies into such a place. In the spirit of speculation, perhaps Hitler knew the lesson of Spanish history—the one Napoleon did not learn in time: turning Iberia into a battlefield should be done only as a last resort and only after the British navy has been destroyed.

JOHN LAWRENCE TONE
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Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the 21st Century
by Carol Lancaster. Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 2000. 114 pp. Paper, $15.00.

The debate over reforming the U.S. foreign aid program is a hearty perennial within policy and academic circles, due in large part to the chronic unpopularity of foreign aid among the general public and many government officials. Amid this clutter, Carol Lancaster provides a clear and concise new vision for U.S. aid. To Lancaster, a "new policy paradigm" (p. 4) is taking shape within the U.S. aid community. The paradigm reflects the community's transition from the cold war era, when aid programs were based on enhancing U.S. security through anticommunist containment and the promotion of development in carefully selected Third-World states. It was during this period that U.S. foreign aid came under heavy attack, both for rewarding repressive despots and for doing little to arrest the underlying causes of poverty.

In the 1990s the mission of the aid program shifted to include the support of former Soviet bloc states as they implemented political and economic reforms. Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) identified global democratization as a primary objective. In practice, however, relatively small volumes of aid were committed for these purposes. As overall aid commitments fell, the entrenched bilateral aid transfers to Israel and Egypt claimed an ever-growing share of the aid budget. Despite congressional attempts to abolish USAID during the mid-1990s, the agency retained its independence and is currently pursuing a wide range of new missions that comprise the new policy paradigm.

Lancaster identifies four primary purposes for which U.S. aid is likely to be targeted. First, the United States is likely to be drawn into a steady stream of peace-making roles in regions of conflict. The second purpose for aid will concern transnational issues, in particular environmental problems that will become more acute as the world's population continues to grow rapidly. Third, U.S. aid will be needed to provide humanitarian relief in cases of natural and man-made disasters. Finally, aid programs are likely to be used to advance hu-

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mane concerns in such areas as child survival and the rights of women and ethnic minorities.

A primary challenge identified by Lancaster relates to the complex network of aid providers, including U.S. government sources, multilateral banks, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). She calls for a clear division of labor among these aid sources in the future. While the U.S. government is best positioned to target aid toward purposes that reflect the country's national interests (democratization, for example), the task of fostering development is better left with multilateral banks. As for the delivery of aid, NGOs have emerged as the most effective conduits of U.S. aid in enhancing health care and educational programs.

In her concluding chapter, Lancaster offers a series of proposals for reorganizing the network of governmental agencies responsible for dispensing bilateral aid. While her proposals, including a new agency to handle humanitarian relief and humane concerns, may improve upon the existing framework, it is doubtful that additional fragmentation is either advisable or politically feasible given the current climate in Washington. An empowered USAID, with a clear mandate and support from the White House and State Department, provides the best hope that the foreign aid program can overcome its past history of organizational confusion.

Although her analysis is brief, Lancaster provides extensive citations of recent scholarly literature and data sources that facilitate follow-up study. Overall, she does an impressive job of framing the current and future debate over U.S. foreign aid.

STEVEN W. HOOK
Kent State University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest

Handbook of Research on the International Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean *by G. Pope Atkins. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 411 pp. $30.00.*

Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000 *edited by Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 549 pp. $95.00.*

Getting it Published: A Guide for Scholars and Anyone Else Serious About Serious Books *by William Germano. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 192 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $15.00.*

Documents on the Laws of War *edited by Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 765 pp. Cloth, $85.00; paper, $35.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I was greatly disappointed by June Teufel Dreyer's review of Ashley Tellis's and my book, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy* [PSQ 115 (Winter 2000–01)]. Dreyer missed entirely the most basic points of the book. She misidentifies what we define as China's grand strategy, confusing it instead with what we define as China's overall strategic objectives. The two are not identical. She says we do not address the problem of what constitutes China. In fact, we go into considerable detail addressing exactly that point. We do not, as she suggests, hinge our argument on modern-day definitions of sovereignty, but rather on the fact that Chinese leaders throughout history sought to defend an identifiable geographic entity known as China against foreign security threats. She nowhere deals with this behavior, which is at the the heart of our definition of strategy. Finally, she ignores our clear definition of what a truly assertive China would look like, preferring instead to substitute her own definition. In short, the review did not at any point come to grips with the core argument that we presented in the book and so gave your readers the incorrect impression that any understanding of China's grand strategy "remains elusive."

MICHAEL D. SWAINE
RAND

The reviewer replies:

In my review, I noted that the description of China's Grand Strategy provided by Swaine and Tellis is of such a level of generality as to be of limited value in distinguishing China from other political systems. The policy recommendations of the authors were sound, but so broadly phrased as to be of little help in formulating specific policies. Despite Michael D. Swaine's response, I continue to feel that these remarks deal accurately with the core argument of the book.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
University of Miami

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

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

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